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Abstract 
Polycentricity has been identified as a prominent feature of modern landscapes as well as a 
buzzword in spatial planning at a range of scales worldwide. Since the Reform and Opening-
up Policy in 1978, major cities in China have experienced significant polycentric transition 
manifested by their new spatial policy framework and reshaped spatial structure. The 
polycentric transformation has provoked academics’ interests on structural and performance 
analysis in quantitative ways recently. However, little research investigates the nature of 
(re)formation and implementation of polycentric development policies in Chinese cities 
from a processual and critical perspective. 
This research interprets the underlying meanings and rationality of polycentric development 
strategy in planning discourse and explains how concrete centres within the polycentric 
system are created, governed and materialized to facilitate the implementation of polycentric 
policies in the special context of political system, spatial planning system and socio-
economic conditions in China. Referring to existing literature of polycentricity and theories 
of urban space, this research develops a novel theoretical framework, which holds that 
polycentricity is produced by the articulation of state power, planning profession and 
produced space. The research is founded on an embedded case study of Tianjin based on 
empirical data derived from interviews with stakeholders and secondary data. 
Through a discourse analysis of four Tianjin City Master Plans, discourses of ‘polycentric 
urban settlements’, ‘functional polycentricity’, ‘polycentric growth nodes’ and ‘nested 
polycentricity’ are identified, which are deployed in different ways with variegated 
composition of spatial elements. Moreover, rather than being mere technocratic practice, the 
production and legitimation of distinct discourses is essentially an articulation of multi-
scalar power involving various stakeholders, which is disguised and justified by the planning 
profession. The findings demonstrate that polycentricity is a malleable concept and its 
fluidity creates space to accommodate consensus or to allow the play of contested interests 
and policy experiments.  
Based on that, this research further selects centres in Tianjin Binhai New Area Core Zone, 
Wuqing District and Dongli District as embedded cases to explore how the polycentric 
development policy is implemented in practice. The empirical findings from local 
perspective show that these centres are created or formed according to different contexts 
and logics, and they are consolidated by employment of a portfolio of tools and 
instruments such as new planning and urban design, establishment of financial and 
development corporations, exclusive preferential policies, manipulation of public sector, 
land development and institutional innovation. Correspondingly, these centres have 
experienced distinct development trajectories and shown different spatial outcomes from 
the perspectives of urban form, functional composition, and spatial identity. It is suggested 
that significant gaps and contradictions exist between spatial visions and actual 
development, which poses challenges for sustainable development. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
‘One of the most interesting features of modern urban landscapes [is] the tendency of 
economic activity to cluster in several centres of activity.’ (Anas, et al., 1998: 1439)  
‘Polycentric development has rapidly become the buzzword amongst spatial planners 
in Europe, both in European policies and at the level of European countries.’ 
(Waterhout, et al., 2005: 163)  
With the transition to Posts-eras (Post-industrial, Post-modern, Post-Fordist and Post-
suburban), spatial configurations of cities are undergoing dramatic changes and have taken 
on more polycentric forms (Hall, 1997; Wu, 1998a; Kloosterman and Musterd, 2001; 
Davoudi, 2003; Phelps et al., 2006). A polycentric spatial pattern has indeed become an 
increasingly prominent feature of the modern urban landscapes worldwide. Driving forces 
such as advances in transport and information and communication technology, the 
transformation in production system and the emergence of a more globalized economic 
system, have created new spatial organization of socio-economic activities and led to an 
increasing scale and scope of spatial units. The polycentric features have become evident in 
metropolis and city regions by the rank-size distribution of agglomerations and complex 
flows of people, good and information within and between them.  
If the polycentric spatial form has experienced a long-term process of evolution, the 
polycentric discourses and policies have newly sprung up in the policy and planning realm 
recently, especially in last three decades. Polycentricity has become a planning doctrine and 
normative framework of spatial planning in (North-west) Europe. The popularity of 
polycentricity in Europe is related to its plurality of institutional system on one hand. 
Polycentrism has become a political discourse to facilitate the cooperation in spatial planning 
and integration of different national traditions in spatial development planning and 
management at the pan-European level. On the other hand, this spatial development mode is 
regarded as one of the best strategies for managing urban development, balancing spatial 
disparities, achieving social cohesions and economic competitiveness at simultaneously. 
This concept could bridge conflicting interests and objectives within one framework. The 
Interreg programme funded by European Regional Development Fund is a means to advance 
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territorial cooperation in spatial planning and practice (Hague and Kirk, 2003). It supported 
many research projects for better understanding of the application of the principle of 
polycentricity in European Spatial development Perspective (ESDP). Important research 
projects, such as European Spatial Planning Observatory Network (ESPON) and POLYNET 
(Hall and Pain, 2006) have established a cross-national network of researchers and a learning 
platform, which can provide profound and innovative knowledge about the evidences, 
implications and policy recommendations on polycentric development within and between 
European countries and major regions.  
In the recent decades, the concept of polycentricity has also attracted attention from scholars, 
planners and policymakers. A great deal of research in different disciplines has focused on 
the conceptualization of polycentricity and critically discussed its empirical performance at 
different geographical scales. This concept has also triggered vibrant policy debates and 
narratives. Many special issues of academic journals such as European Planning Studies 
(1998, 6.4; 2015, 23.6), Urban Studies (2001, 38.4), Built Environment (2005, 31.2; 2006, 
32.2), Regional Studies (2008, 42.8; 2014, 48.12), and Urban Research and Practice (2009, 
2.3) have been published to advance the understanding of polycentricity. A research network 
‘Polycentric Urban Regions’ funded by Regional Studies Association was newly established 
in 2017 to bring together international researchers and key themes on PURs. This research 
network held a series of workshops, which involved many international scholars from 
Central and Eastern Europe and China. These academic events will finally result in new 
special issues in near future.  
Perhaps influenced by the inspiring research in the West, the concept of polycentricity and 
its potential also appeals to planners, policy makers and geographers in China. In the context 
of the globalization of the economy and rapid urbanization in China, Chinese cities have 
experienced huge urban transformation in institutions, urban forms and economic and 
societal development since the implementation of the Reform and Open-door policy. With 
these changes, many cities and regions began to display polycentric features in rapid 
development process, and the polycentric development principle has been widely applied 
into their spatial planning. In other words, a significant polycentric turn can be seen in post-
reform China. The transition could be manifested in three aspects, namely the desirability in 
urban and regional policy, the emergence of polycentric landscapes and recent academic 
discussion. 
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1.1 Polycentric transition in China: manifestations in the policy agenda, 
urban reality and academic debate  
1.1.1 The quest for polycentricity in the policy agenda  
In transitional China, polycentric development strategy can be easily identified in recent 
policy and planning vision. The emergence of polycentricity in China is highly related to its 
political and economic transition. Although the marketisation process is evident and the 
relation between state, market and social relations has become somewhat more relaxed, 
China is still characterized by its strong state intervention and the state dominance over 
spatial production (Lin, 2007; Wu, 2015). State intervention is still an important driving 
force to alter the organization of cities and regions. Polycentric development vision is often 
pursued in national, regional and local strategies that have produced great impacts on the 
changing spatial form of regions and cities. 
At the intra-city level, polycentricity has become a normative agenda in master planning 
practices in China to determine the future spatial structures (Cheng and Shaw, 2017). Many 
mega cities such as Shanghai, Nanjing, Guangzhou and Tianjin have adopted this strategy 
in their previous master plans in different ways. Polycentricity is regarded as an ‘ideal’ 
development model with little doubts and the application of polycentricity in city master 
plan is supposed to resolve the ever-increasing problems associated with the unprecedented 
urbanisation process of recent decades (ibid.). This concept has also been vibrantly applied 
to newly emerging plans outside the statutory planning system such as urban strategic 
development plans and regional plans since the early 2000s. For example, transforming a 
monocentric urban structure to a polycentric one is one of major measures in the urban 
strategic plan in many Chinese cities for promoting urban development (Wu and Zhang, 
2007). The emergence of urban strategic plans or concept plans is driven by a more 
entrepreneurial local government and therefore polycentricity here is an instrument for 
enhancing economic competitiveness.  
Polycentricity is usually achieved through construction of new city centres or administrative 
annexations. Beyond the explicit use of the term polycentricity in different types of plans, 
there are many new planning concepts (e.g. Sub-centres, New Towns, New Districts, New 
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Central Business District, etc.) that imply polycentricity, frequently presented both in the 
mass media and in the planning and official documents published by governments. 
According to the book China’s New Town and New District Development Report (Feng et 
al., 2016), the development of new towns and new districts has been advocated by local 
governments and the number of the new towns and new districts at the county-level and 
above exceeded 3500 by the 2016. New towns and new districts in China have variegated 
types such as development zones, university towns, eco-cities, and airport cities. The total 
number of new towns and new districts continued to grow after 2016. These newly planned 
zones are regarded as important platforms for urbanization and economic development, 
which also reflect the aspiration of governments for polycentric development. Typical recent 
cases are the designation of a new administrative center in Beijing’s suburb Tongzhou in 
2015 for the relocation of the Beijing municipal government and a newly approved national 
level New District, Xiong’an New Area in Hebei Province in 2017. These two flagship 
projects are supported by the central state and represent the quest for polycentric 
development strategy at both city and regional level, and the intervention of the state in the 
recent polycentric transition.  
1.1.2 Restless urbanisation and new growth on the edge  
In pre-reform China, cities were highly concentrated and standardized, with a dense urban 
core and self-contained work units and communities throughout the cities (Gaubatz, 1999). 
Since the reform policy in late 1970s, China has experienced broader social, economic and 
cultural changes due to the transition to market-oriented economy, decentralization of 
decision-making and fiscal powers, the relaxation of household registration policy. These 
changes have led to significant changes in the structure and form of cities, not only rapid 
urban expansion but also the emergence of polycentricity or multi-nucleated urban form 
(Schneider et al., 2015).  
The term ‘restless’ reflects the incredible scale and speed of ongoing urban development in 
China (Wang et al., 2016) and the emergence of diversified urban landscapes (Shen and Wu, 
2012). The urbanization level of China reached 50 percent in 2011, while this figure was 
less than 20 percent at the start of Open-door reform (NSB, 2011). With continuous 
globalization, major cities in China, especially the coastal cities have experienced dramatic 
growth and have been in a period of functional transition. The knowledge-based economy 
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like producer services, creative industry and tourism have become the backbone industries 
and the traditional industries began to move to small towns and the suburbs.  
Although the traditional city core area still dominates urban development through 
contiguous expansion and large-scale regeneration projects, the urban landscapes in the 
peripheral area seem much more restless and complex. The broader social, economic and 
culture changes have led to the large scale urban expansion, suburbanization and new growth 
on the edge (Zhou and Ma, 2000; Zhou and Logan, 2008). Planned places such as clustered 
residential communities, new towns, brand-new university campuses, and development 
zones tend to be developed in the urban periphery in many Chinese cities (Ren, 2013). The 
urban peripheries have also become ‘mosaics of different social world’ based on economic 
and social structural shift (Ren, 2013). Suburban areas house high-income commuters, 
working classes and migrants all at once (Zhou and Logan, 2008), and are also comprised 
high-rise building, high-order services and commercial facilities (Gaubatz, 1999; Lin, 2001). 
Therefore, density is not only the feature of city core, but also in Chinese suburb and edge 
cities (Wu and Phelps, 2011). Chinese cities are evolving towards a polycentric spatial 
structure because of the new growth and new concentration in suburban and peripheral area.  
1.1.3 Recent academic attention to polycentricity in China  
This polycentric transformation process has not only become embedded in the policy agenda 
and public consciousness but has aroused academic discussion in China. As many cities and 
regions have evolved from a monocentric to a polycentric spatial pattern, recent research in 
the fields of geography and economics has noted this interesting phenomenon and attempted 
to analyse and investigate this tendency based on morphological and functional 
characteristics. 
Most studies focus on morphological polycentricity by investigating the employment or 
population distribution (Yang et al., 2014; Liu and Wang, 2016; Huang et al., 2017), land 
use change (Wu, 1998b; Yue et al., 2010) or property values (Qin and Han, 2013). Thanks 
to the availability of data on knowledge-based flow of people and information, the spatial 
analysis of polycentricity has been extended recently to its functional dimensions. Emerging 
research has begun to analyse the inter-city relations by exploring the transportation network 
(Liu et al., 2016) and knowledge network (Li and Phelps, 2017). Based on the analysis on 
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polycentric spatial pattern, some researchers further evaluated the performance of 
polycentric spatial pattern regarding its impacts on economic competitiveness, social 
cohesion and environmental sustainability (Zhang et al., 2017; Li and Liu, 2018; Li et al., 
2019).  
The extant literature mainly discusses the reality of polycentric development by employing 
a variety of quantitative methods and data sources. They were evidence based and tried to 
investigate to what extend the cities and regions in China are polycentric from different 
perspectives and database. Most of quantitative papers were conducted at the regional scale, 
although the spatial analysis of polycentricity originate from intra-city level. The common 
feature of existing literatures is that they recognize the role of planning and state influences 
on polycentric urban development in China and ascribe it to both the planning efforts by 
governments and to market forces in post-reform China. There is, however, little research 
that investigates polycentricity in urban planning theories and practices. 
1.2 Research aims and objectives 
From the introduction above, the concept of polycentricity in China is multifaceted, which 
is embedded in the policy agenda, manifested by urban transition and analysed by academics. 
There seems lack a common language between policymakers, planners, academics, and the 
public. Therefore, there is a need for a systematic and critical discussion to bridge these 
distinct approaches and interpretations. My interest in polycentric development originated 
from my own education and working experiences. When I was an undergraduate and master 
student, I garnered knowledge mainly from classes and textbooks and was trained as a 
geographer and planner. I learned of the polycentric spatial pattern in the urban ecology 
theories of Chicago School and the polycentric model in urban economic and economic 
geography. I was also taught that the polycentric and clustered spatial model is a principle 
that should be applied in spatial planning. At that time, Beijing, the city where I lived and 
studied, had suffered from severe ‘big city ills’ such as mismatch of job and residents, 
congestion and pollution. Polycentric development was taken for granted as a useful 
approach to solve these problems and advocated by governments and professionals.  
After I graduated, I worked as a planning consultant. Fortunately, I participated in the making 
of the Thirteenth Five Year Plan for Beijing Tongzhou District between 2014 and 2016. In 
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that period, Tongzhou District was newly confirmed as the administrative sub-centre of 
Beijing. This project was regarded as the cornerstone for the spatial transition of Beijing 
after its rapid growth and concentric sprawl since the foundation of People’s Republic of 
China. This project also reminded planners of the Liang-Chen Proposal (i.e. The Proposal 
on the Location of the Central Government District) proposed by Sicheng Liang and 
Zhanxiang Chen in 1950. During the plan-making process, I also referred to world-renowned 
new business districts in western countries such as Canary Wharf in London and La Défense 
in Paris in order to learn about some successful experiences.  
In the plan-making process, I began to rethink the proposal for sub-centres and polycentric 
development in China. Many confused points began to emerge in this process. For example, 
how could my professional knowledge gained from university inform the policy and plan 
making in polycentric development? Why was the administrative sub-centre proposed again 
while a similar proposal was abandoned after the foundation of People of Republic China 
(PRC)? What does the polycentric spatial pattern refer to and what types of centres and nodes 
consist of this spatial vision? Why does the prefix of ‘administrative’ make Tongzhou stand 
out from other new towns and subcentres? What changes and impacts will this proposal 
bring to the future development of Tongzhou? What are the political influences on 
polycentric development? To what extent is polycentric development a natural stage of urban 
development or a technical solution? Are there any differences in China, compared to 
Western approaches?  
In other words, polycentric development was often presented as a rational planning solution 
while the reality was something more confused, even chaotic. These questions further 
triggered my interest to systematically investigate the polycentric development at the intra-
urban level in China. In my PhD research, I was a member of the ESRC-NFSC joint research 
project which focuses on urban transformation in China. One of the research tasks of this 
joint program was to investigate the urban structure/space changes and how the planning 
process influenced the spatial structure of the city at the neighbourhood and intra-city level 
in three case cities Tianjin, Chengdu and Hangzhou. This program allowed me to conduct 
such a research on polycentricity in China. All of three case cities have shown the aspiration 
for polycentric development and the evidence in urban structure (Schneider et al., 2005; 
Qian, 2011; Wen and Tao, 2015; Liu and Wang, 2016). I selected Tianjin as my case city as 
there is no specific research on it, although it is one of the most typical polycentric cities in 
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China. The rationality of case selection will be further explained in the introduction of 
research method. 
Since my research was enlightened by the policy making process, this research is policy-
oriented in its nature. Distinguished by evidence-based research, the starting point of my 
research is to investigate polycentricity in case city based on the planning discourse rather 
than urban reality. Specific attention will be attached to the mutual relationship between 
power, knowledge, and space.  
The overarching question addressed in this thesis is:  
• How is polycentric development applied in spatial planning and implemented in practice 
in China’s transitional context? 
More specifically, the aim of this thesis can be unfolded in two aspects, which are 
interrelated and can be narrowed down to a series of sub-questions. Key objectives and the 
corresponding sub-questions needed to be addressed are identified in more detailed as 
follows:  
• First, it aims to interrogate the changes in nuance and underlying meaning of 
polycentricity in several rounds of plans in order to clarify the rationales of the decision-
making process by using Tianjin as a case study:  
➢ In what ways has the concept of polycentricity been deployed in Tianjin’s several 
rounds of master plans? 
➢ How has the concept of polycentricity changed over time in Tianjin?  
➢ In which ways do the formation and legitimation of polycentricity reflect the 
changing competition for power among stakeholders in China’s urban development? 
➢ What are the main features of the polycentric system in Tianjin in terms of the 
composition, positioning and recognition?  
• Second, it aims to explain how concrete centres in polycentric system are created, 
governed, and materialized to facilitate the implementation of polycentric policies.  
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➢ How have the selected centres been forged under coalitions of different actors? 
➢ What are the strategies, initiatives and actions that these actors adopt to build and 
consolidate new centrality in the concrete areas?  
➢ What are the achievements and challenges of the formation of new centres beyond 
the traditional city centre? 
1.3 Thesis structure 
The thesis is organized in nine chapters. This first chapter briefly introduces the research 
background, the origin and importance of research on polycentricity and aims and objectives 
of this research. Chapter 2 and 3 provide a thorough overview of the extant literatures on 
polycentricity from different perspectives. Chapter 4 introduces the research framework and 
research methodologies. Chapter 5, 6, 7, 8 are the main body of the research which set up 
the context of China and examine the formation and delivery of polycentric development in 
the case city Tianjin. Finally, a synthesized and reflective conclusion is made in Chapter 9. 
Following the chapter of introduction, Chapter 2 and 3 divide the literature on polycentricity 
into two parts: (1) conceptualising and theorising polycentric development; (2) planning and 
governance. Chapter 2 rethinks the concept of polycentricity and unfolds major polycentric 
configurations into an assembly of key elements, which enables the mobility of this concept 
into China. This chapter reviews the evolution history of urban form first. It then discusses 
three strands of theories that can explain polycentric development in research. Further, this 
chapter reviews the origins of fluidity of polycentricity from the perspectives of scales, 
dimensions, and its scalable property. The chapter then notes the need for clarification of 
this concept and unfolds major polycentric configuration based on previous discussion. 
Finally, drawing on the relevant discussion, this chapter provides critical points related to 
empirical research in the Chinese context.  
Chapter 3 then discusses the planning and governance debates on polycentricity. It first 
retraces the changing paradigms in urban forms and regards the emergence of polycentric 
urban form as an alternative paradigm. Then it introduces several classic planning concepts 
associated with polycentric development, the application of polycentricity in spatial 
planning and governance under this policy framework in the western context. The planning 
theories and practices in western context have explained the reasons for the popularity of 
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this concept and have shown that the concept of polycentricity could be reinvented and 
reproduced across scales and regions and is subject to multiple interpretations. After that, 
the spatial identity is elaborated as a bridging concept to bring polycentric discourses and 
practices together. Based on this review, it calls for research on planning and governance of 
polycentricity in a Chinese context. 
Chapter 4 is related to the research design and methodology used in this research. The 
chapter first introduces a new epistemology to understand urban structure/space, which treats 
the space and places as a multi-scalar process of socio-spatial transformation rather than a 
fixed, unchanging, and bounded spatial units. Drawing on the literature review on 
polycentricity and theories of spatial politics, an analytical framework is developed that 
could be applied to the following empirical studies. Meanwhile, the case study design, 
methods of data collection and analysis are further elaborated. The research is based on the 
data collected from fieldwork and official public resources, such as interviews, planning 
record, internal consultancy reports. These data are analysed by different qualitative methods. 
A discussion of ethical issues is also presented.  
Chapter 5 sets up the general context of China’s urban development and planning system 
according to the key elements related to polycentric development identified by the literature 
review and analytical framework. The major changes and characteristics in planning system, 
political and institutional system and the restless urban space in peripheral area in China are 
highlighted. The discussion of evolution of planning system, changing planning ideology, 
unique political and administrative system and the dynamic socio-economic changes provide 
a broader frame for the formation of polycentric policies. 
Chapter 6 aims to respond to the first objective that how polycentric development is applied 
in spatial planning. It investigates the underlying meaning and rationale of the application 
of the polycentric development in Tianjin’s City Master Plan diachronically. By reviewing 
and analysing four rounds of master plans in Tianjin since 1978 using discourse analysis, 
the changing polycentric discourses are identified and the underlying rationales, the 
mechanisms pf power and the institutionalization process are examined. Finally, a 
polycentric system with multiple centres are also identified, which provide a basis for the 
embedded case selection in Chapter 7 and 8. 
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Chapter 7 and 8 attempt to respond to the second objective that how the polycentric 
development strategy is implemented through the development of concrete centres. It turns 
to focus on embedded cases selected during the research process. The analysis seeks to 
explore the formation of policy and the actual development at local level at the same time. 
Each chapter first explain why and how specific centre has been planned and what actors are 
involved in this process. Then it discusses the tools and instruments that are used to facilitate 
their development. After that, the spatial changes, functional repositioning and place identity 
are examined. In the end, the achievements and challenges facing these centres is analysed.  
Chapter 9 finally brings together the major findings of this research. The research findings 
based on empirical study in Tianjin are summarized first. This is further expanded to the 
international debate on polycentricity. Following that, the implications on policy and plan 
making are analysed. The thesis concludes with reflections on the broader implications of 
the findings as well as the future research agenda.  
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Chapter 2 Unfolding polycentricity: concept and theory 
2.1 Introduction  
A wide body of literature has greatly contributed to conceptualising and theorising 
polycentric development. However, polycentricity is still a fuzzy concept and there exist 
multiple interpretations and variations in different contexts. Polycentric development is 
becoming an evident phenomenon worldwide. Based on the research in the North America 
and Europe, this chapter aims to rethink the concept of polycentricity and to unfold major 
polycentric configurations into an assembly of key elements, which enables the mobility of 
this concept into China. The comprehensive literature review also informs key points that 
need special attention in the empirical analysis of this thesis.  
This chapter reviews the evolution history of urban form first. The rise of polycentric cities 
and regions and their driving forces are elaborated and then polycentricity as a natural urban 
process is highlighted. It then discusses three strands of theories that can explain polycentric 
development in research. Further, this chapter reviews the origins of fluidity of 
polycentricity from the perspectives of scales, dimensions and its scalable property. The 
chapter then notes the need for clarification of this concept and unfolds major polycentric 
configuration based on previous discussion. Finally, drawing on the relevant discussion, this 
chapter provides critical points related to empirical research in the Chinese context.  
2.2 Evolution of urban form  
2.2.1 The rise of the polycentric city and region  
In the preindustrial period, cities were small-sized and concentrated around the city core, 
which was dominated by religious, political, administrative and social functions (Sjoberg, 
1960). The advent of the Industrial Revolution in the nineteenth century gave rise to the 
industrial city. In the early days of the industrialisation period, the industrial city inherited 
some characteristics of preindustrial city and showed a concentric zones pattern (Knox and 
Pinch, 2010: 20-22). Subsequently, western cities especially in Europe and North America 
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stepped into the stage of fast urbanisation. The size of the cities increased rapidly and began 
to extend outwards from the central area to the suburbs, initially along with the corridors.  
While originating in the nineteenth century, suburbanisation emerged as the dominant 
process after the Second World War and became different from its original nature 
(Champion, 2001a). According to Cervero (1989), there are three waves of suburbanisation 
and the function of residence, manufacturing and commerce, business and high-technology 
sector dominates each wave of decentralisation in turn. ‘Third wave’ of suburbanisation can 
be viewed as the momentum of polycentric transition. The mass decentralisation of 
manufacturing, shopping and offices have given rise to the new centres of business and social 
services and created a multi-nucleated pattern of outer suburban centres in the post-industrial 
city (Stanback, 1991; Palen, 1997). Many terms have been coining to describe this new 
change in the form of city. Stanback (1991) developed the concept of ‘new suburbanisation’, 
and the emergence of new centres outsides of central cities have been variously termed as 
‘exopolis’ (Soja, 2000), ‘exurbia’ (Soja, 2000), ‘technoburb’ (Fishman, 1989) and ‘edge 
cities’ (Garreau, 1991).  
Moreover, since the 1990s, the trend of globalisation, the shift of economic structure and 
technological advances in post-industrial city have reshaped both the physical and social 
structure significantly. Social and economic activities occurred on a growing geographical 
scale beyond the city. One of the typical consequences is the rise of polycentric spatial 
pattern at a larger regional or country scale (Hall and Pain, 2006). The process has turned 
historically separated metropolitan areas into functionally connected polynucleated urban 
regions. Polycentric transition in the spatial pattern of cities and regions have become more 
evident recently and have manifested themselves in different development phases. For 
example, Hanlon et al. (2009: 87) reviewed the historical evolution of metropolitan form in 
the United States and divided the metropolitan form into several phases characterised by 
distinct spatial features, which includes central cities (19th and early 20th centuries), early 
suburbs (the first half of 20th century), exurbs and edge cities (1970 to 1990s), edgeless cities 
(1980 to 2000s), the megalopolis (1960s to 2000s), boomburbs (2000s) and metroburbia 
(2000s).  
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2.2.2 Driving forces for polycentric development 
Based on the evolution history of urban forms, polycentric transformation is embedded in 
the process of economic, technological, and socio-spatial transformation. The major forces 
facilitating polycentricity can be categorised into these three aspects. These changes or 
forces are not separate, but they are often intertwined to reshape the urban landscape. 
Technological innovation 
The spatial structure of modern cities evolved with technological innovation in transport and 
communication. Before 1850, freight transportation was highly reliant on harbours, rivers 
and canals because of low transport costs and substantial scale economies, and personal 
transport within the city was mainly by foot and horse-drawn carriage (Anas et al., 1998: 
1429). Similarly, the advent of railways in the late 19th century also created advantages near 
the station like waterway (ibid.). These means of transportation constrained the scope of 
urbanisation to relatively small but high-density centres. The centres were often 
manufacturing districts formed near the harbours or rail terminals, with mixed residences 
surrounding it (Moses and Williamson, 1967). 
The innovation of mechanised and efficient long-distance transport modes enlarged the 
scope of the urban economies and accelerated the speed of urban expansion, which makes 
the polycentric development possible. Between 1850 and 1900, electric streetcars and 
subways supplementing human and animal powered transport and created ‘streetcar suburbs’ 
and the ‘nineteenth-century city’ by encouraging people to migrate out of the city (Anas et 
al., 1998: 1429). Economic activities also became dispersed, concentrated around the 
stations and mass transport spokes. Then in twentieth century, the widespread use of the 
automobile led to large scale dispersion of businesses and residences. The improvements to 
highway and railroad system fostered new population clusters, facilitated inter-urban 
communication and increased the connection between cities and surrounding towns (Anas 
et al., 1998; Garcia-López, 2012). With increasing city centre congestion and expanding 
connectivity and low-price land available in the urban fringe, the comparative advantage of 
historic city centre location gradually was weakened, and new centres emerged in the 
suburbs (Stanback, 1991). However, due to path dependency, the central areas around 
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historic harbours and rail terminals remained vital and the most important nodes in the city 
such as CBDs were often formed centred on these positions, for cities in Europe in particular.  
Technological advances in information processing and telecommunications further altered 
the economic structure and spatial pattern (Castells, 1996; Gaspar and Glaeser, 1998; Hall, 
1993; 1999). With the rapid process of globalisation and development of communication 
technology, the global economy is characterised by the flow and exchange of information, 
capital and cultural communication (Castells, 2010). The flow especially the knowledge-
based flows of people and information have facilitated the complexity and interrelationship 
of cities. The ‘space of flows’ has underpinned the polycentric development at various scales 
and component centres shifted from the agglomerations of manufacturing to the 
concentration of services sectors and knowledge-based economy, which gives more 
emphasis on the network and cooperation. Information technology also fragmented the 
spatial distribution much further than was already happening in polycentric urban regions 
(Couclelis, 2000).  
Economic transition 
Since the 1970s, Fordism has been gradually replaced by the post-Fordist system which is 
dominated by information and communication technology (Knox and Pinch, 2010: 28). The 
main sector of economic activities has shifted surely from manufacturing industries based 
on production to service activities, especially the informational economies (Hall, 1993). 
Informational industries have become the main driver of urban growth and played a vital 
role in shaping a new spatial structure since the 1980s. The information intensive industries 
include banking and finance, insurance, legal services, accounting and other business 
services (Castells, 1989: 144).  
Coinciding with advance in technologies, decentralisation of routine functions (such as back 
offices) and household services have already been largely dispersed under conditions of 
Fordist suburbanisation (Van Criekingen et al., 2007). However, the advent of the 
informational society produced a new logic for location choice of informational economic 
activity. Its locational logic is determined by access to information, by direct face-to-face 
communication or by electronic communication (Hall, 1993). Except for some informational 
services that require a high degree of immediacy that are still located in the biggest and the 
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most specialised centres like global cities, other informational industries like R&D, creative 
and cultural industries can relocate to cheaper and non-central sites (Hall, 1999; Van 
Criekingen et al., 2007). Also, because of the flexible production system, the geographic 
clustering of high-technology industries becomes more flexible and there is a growth of ‘new 
industrial space’ in peripheral area (Knox and Pinch, 2010: 28). These changes in the drivers 
of industrial location have been translated into spatial restructuring and led to wider spatial 
division of labour. Just like Lever claimed, ‘Fordism has been equated with suburbanisation 
and decentralisation, whereas post-Fordism is often invoked as a cause of recentralisation 
and reurbanisation’ (2001: 278). 
Demographic transition 
The transformation to the post-industrial city not only involved technological and economic 
structure changes but also transitions in demography. Demographic regimes in the developed 
world have changed dramatically since the Second World War. The main demographic 
features and corresponding changing population and household profiles include: (1) longer 
life expectancy plus lower fertility after the baby boom generation led to the zero or even 
negative natural growth rate and an aging society; (2) The huge and increasing rate of net 
international immigration became the main source of population growth and diversified the 
ethnicity, race and culture, which made Western cities increasingly cosmopolitan; (3) 
Household composition has also changed dramatically and is now characteristics by many 
more non-traditional households (single-parent, female-headed, childless or one-person 
household, two-earner families etc.); (4) With changing household structures and economic 
development, the number of affluent households that have more freedom of choice and 
movement has increased (Champion, 2001b; Musterd and van Zelm, 2001; Knox and Pinch, 
2010: 9). 
Demographic transitions play important role in understanding urban and regional spatial 
restructuring (Clark, 1987). Compared to the ‘demographic drives’ behind urban 
restructuring, Champion (2001b: 668) employed the word ‘conformity’ to reflect the 
relationship between demographic change and evolving urban structure. On one hand, 
different urban structures like the monocentric city or the polycentric urban region will 
provide a different set of choices of places to live, which may change or reinforce current 
settlement patterns. On the other hand, residential behaviour and preference can be an active 
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force in shaping the urban landscape. The changing household types and their residential 
preferences contribute to the formation of polycentric city or polycentric urban region 
through their particular demands.  
2.2.3 Polycentricity as a spontaneous process  
Based on the historical review above, polycentricity is a spontaneous process along with the 
macro changing urban context. Polycentric urban structure is the consequence of urban 
resilience and adaptability to the changing environment. The emergency of polycentricity is 
caused by the recent techno-economic paradigm shift, which is a slow process taking place 
over decades. In other words, polycentricity is a product of evolution (Champion, 2001b). 
The development of urban function, form and pattern are governed by set of forces, which 
can be grouped into centripetal forces and centrifugal forces (Colby, 1933; Krugman, 1996). 
Polycentric development process is an expression of the dialectic and competition between 
concentration (centripetal forces) and deconcentration (centrifugal forces).  
Some scholars adopt a simulation approach to prove that polycentric spatial pattern is an 
likely outcome of urban system (Batty, 2001; Krugman, 1996; Wu, 1998a). Wu (1998a) 
carries out an experiment based on cellular automatic approach and the results suggests that 
subcentres are formed through stochastic ‘errors’ like local development, and further, the 
accumulative population density and local interaction can facilitate the further development 
of these centres. When the negative effects emerge, a new centre in another location will be 
formed. Krugman (1996) posits that when the tension between centripetal and centrifugal 
forces satisfy certain criteria, a spontaneous polycentric metropolis will always be formed, 
regardless of the initial distribution, by developing a self-organisation model to simulate 
edge cities. Batty (2001) simulates the long-term spatial structure of Great Britain based on 
a series of spatial models at fine scales and the simulation confirms that the urban landscape 
is inevitable polynucleated with flattened rank-size distribution.  
Champion (2001b: 664) summarizes three ways in which the polycentric urban 
configurations can evolve and emerge, namely the centrifugal mode, the incorporation mode 
and the fusion mode. A monocentric city can evolve into a polycentric urban system because 
of centrifugal forces of original centre and continuous growth of alternative centres. 
Polycentricity can also be formed by the coalescence of centres through the incorporation of 
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surrounding small centres or integration of several formerly independent centres in similar 
size because of separate growth and improvement of transport links between them. These 
modes can also occur at the same time, especially when the urban region system consists of 
more than one urban centre (Lambregts, 2006).  
2.3 Theorising polycentric development  
Although polycentric urban form had already been identified and emerged, the concept of 
polycentricity did not gain any real currency in academic discourses until the 1960s 
(Davoudi, 2003). Due to the accelerating pace of urban growth and spatial restructuring, the 
existing theories about urban structure and urban system were incapable of explaining the 
urban reality. Many new studies have emerged to address the new changes in spatial 
organisation. There are three main strands of literature in urban economics and geography 
that theorise polycentric development, namely (1) the reformulation of monocentric model 
to polycentric model, (2) the reformulation of the urban system concept and (3) the extension 
of agglomeration economies.  
2.3.1 Modelling polycentric development 
From monocentric to polycentric model 
In urban economic research, theoretical models were developed and modified continuously 
to depict the transition process of urban spatial structure. Alonso’s (1964) monocentric city 
model dominated the conceptualisation of the internal structure of cites until the 1970s. This 
model was then broadened to include production, transport and housing (Anas et al., 1998: 
1434). The monocentric model argues that the Central Business District where jobs are 
located imports workers from the suburbs and exports goods and services to them based on 
bid-rent theory. The land use pattern is defined by the trade-off between desire for space and 
commuting cost.  
Because of rapid and complex urban changes, the monocentric city model is no longer 
capable of depicting the urban structure. A polycentric model was presented to help explain 
the emergence of new employment beyond the Central Business District because of the 
growing significance of agglomeration economies in location choice. Fujita and Ogawa 
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(1982) theorised a non-monocentric model and formulated a multiple equilibria model of 
urban land use. Given different parameters, the model could yield multicentric as well as 
monocentric urban configurations. The equilibrium number of subcentres tends to rise with 
population and commuting costs, which has been tested and supported by the empirical 
studies in American metropolitan areas (McMillen and Smith, 2003). In the polycentric 
model, the bid-rent functions and land use density can be determined by the largest influence 
of one only centre, or by access to every centre and the sum of influences if various centres, 
according the assumption of the relationship between centres (Heikkila, et al., 1989; Anas 
et al., 1998: 1441).  
Identification of sub-centres 
The emergence of polycentric model led to an increasing number of empirical studies that 
focus on the identification of (sub)centres in the polycentric urban configurations, primarily 
in North American metropolitan areas. Several methods have been applied to identify these 
subcentres that rival with traditional CBDs.  
The formation of new subcentres can be explained by economies of agglomeration (Anas et 
al., 1998), which can be achieved when economic agents are concentrated and located in 
spatial proximity. Based on agglomeration logic, centres are supposed to be a concentration 
of business activities. Besides, because of the significant size and the diversity of functions, 
centres are places which have enough magnitude to produce significant effects in the 
functioning of cities, especially regarding transportation systems, land value, population 
distribution, and service provision (McMillen, 2003). Similarly, Burger and Meijers claim 
centres are expected to have both absolute and relative importance, as the ‘importance’ of a 
centre can ‘be ascribed to the settlement itself as an agglomeration and as a central place 
providing goods, services and jobs to surrounding places’ (2012: 1131).  
Therefore, most urban economists and geographers use employment density, population 
density and land use (value or change) to identify subcentres and evidence the existence of 
polycentric spatial configurations. The principle of identification subcentres in these 
different methods is to identify the significant peak value within the study area. A variety of 
methods have been used to identify intra-urban (sub)centres, such as local knowledge in 
administrative institutions, planning organisation or real estate firms (Anas et al., 1998: 
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1433), cut-off thresholds (e.g. Giuliano and Small, 1991; Song, 1994; Cervero and Wu, 1997; 
Garcia-López and Muñiz, 2010), parametric methods (McDonald and Prather, 1994), and 
non-parametric methods (McMillen and McDonald, 1997; Leslie, 2010). 
The (sub)centre delimitation methodologies can also be carried out through the functional 
approach. Urban centres can also be identified by the capacity of centrality. Centrality is 
generally reflected through interaction flows, such as journey-to-work flows, shopping flows, 
information flows (Bourne, 1989; Cladera et al., 2009; Suárez and Delgado, 2009). These 
various approaches have confirmed the existence of polycentric structure at the intra-city 
scale by identification multiple centres. It is interesting to note that the former body of 
literature is mainly based on the US cases while the functional approach is more often 
applied to European metropolitan area. 
2.3.2 Reformulation of urban system theory 
Due to the shift to the informational economy and the growing spatial scale that social and 
economic activities occur, Hall (1999: 181-184) claims that the traditional Christaller’s 
central place system should be modified into a new urban system. The seven-level hierachy 
in central place theory needs to be supplemented by two additional levels (global cities and 
sub-global cities) and the three lowest levels in this system have disappeared. Cities survive 
in this system but have turned into polycentric urban regions due to increasing specialisation. 
In Hall’s new urban system, the traditional urban hierachy remains existent or even enhanced. 
However, theoretical bases of central place model such as the hierarchy have been 
challenged with the rise of network economies. From the 1990s onwards, a number of studies 
on changing urban system have stressed the limitations of central place theory and hinted 
the new network system model to replace it (Batten, 1995; Meijers, 2007a). Burger et al. 
(2014) discuss the feature of network system and compare it with central place system (see 
Table 2.1). The most important feature of network model of spatial organisation is the 
presence of multidirectional relationships between relatively similar-sized and no 
hierarchical centres. Network model stresses a spatial integration and complementarity 
between different centres, which is more suitable in polycentric urban region (Meijers, 
2007a). Therefore, both urban networks and polycentricity have been incorporated into 
policy discourse.
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Table 2.1 Urban system in central place model versus network model 
Characteristic Network system Hierarchical system 
Morphological 
structure 
Multi-nodal; 
Several centres in close 
proximity to each other; 
Centres of relatively similar 
importance 
Uni-nodal;  
One principle centre;  
Relatively significant separation 
between city and countryside 
Orientation of 
functional linkages 
and spatial 
integration 
Multidirectional;  
Two-way core-periphery/ 
periphery-core linkages and 
crisscross linkages between 
centres of similar size 
Unidirectional;  
Linkages directed at the principal 
centre;  
No relationships between centres of 
similar size 
Type of spatial 
constellation 
Network city or polycentric 
urban region 
Monocentric metropolitan area 
Relationship 
between spatial units 
Tendency toward 
complementarities and regional 
cooperation 
Tendency toward competition; 
Local orientation and dependence 
Economic 
specialisation 
Function of centres independent 
of centre size but dependent on 
urban network position;  
Spatial division of labour 
between centres (horizontal 
complementarities) 
Economic function of centres 
dependent on centre size with higher-
order functions concentrated in larger 
centres (vertical complementarities) 
Economic 
externalities 
Agglomeration economies 
shared among groups of cites of 
similar size; 
Relative absence agglomeration 
diseconomies 
Agglomeration (dis)economies 
restricted to the urban core 
Source: (Burger et al. 2014: 1922) 
2.3.3 Agglomeration economies and polycentricity 
The reformulation of the polycentric city model and the urban system paradigm are achieved 
by introducing agglomeration theories. They have been largely extended so that they 
provided better options for interpreting the rationality and transformation process of 
polycentricity at both urban and regional scales. Acknowledging various agglomeration 
economies and their spatial influences can help us understand the origins of polycentricity 
in comparison to traditional strands (scale, function and morphology) (van Meeteren et al., 
2016). The formation of clusters of activities and the location of these centres are determined 
by the agglomeration economies to a certain extent. There exist three different approaches 
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to conceptualise agglomeration economies, namely micro-economic foundations, 
geographical foundations, and macro-territorial foundations (Camagni and Capello, 2015), 
which are related to the polycentric development at a variety of scales. 
At the micro level, technological and pecuniary externalities encourage enterprises to 
become located close together and concentrated within a certain physical distance. As a 
result of ‘agglomeration diseconomies’ and ‘proximity economies’, a polycentric rather than 
dispersed spatial pattern tends to be formed with several significant and interacting clusters 
of economic activities. The new centres are not formed randomly but depend on spatial 
heterogeneity (Anas et al., 1998) and the existence of shadow economies (Camagni and 
Capello, 2015). In the geographical foundation of agglomeration economies, the influence 
of space cannot be ignored (Parr, 2002). Within a large spatial scope, economic externalities 
can be shared by a group of settlements, depending on the proximity to larger cities or 
metropolitan area. The terms ‘externality field’ (Phelps et al., 2001) and ‘regional 
externalities’ (Parr, 2002) were coined to reflect agglomeration economies at wider spatial 
configuration via the process of ‘borrowed size’ (Alonso, 1973). The third approach 
highlights the networking and cooperation capabilities under which agglomeration 
economies can be fully exploited in different size classes of cities in a territory. This 
approach is related to ‘urban network externality’ (Capello, 2000) and can be termed a 
process of ‘borrowed function’ (Camagni and Capello, 2015). 
Many empirical studies have emerged recently drawing upon these theories in China. Feng 
et al. (2013) employ both monocentric model and polycentric model to test the changing 
spatial pattern in Beijing and the results show Beijing is transitioning towards polycentricity 
and characterised by a monocentric model, a dual-centred model and  a seven-centred model 
in this process according to the population density function. Other studies apply similar 
methods such as threshold that have been widely used in America metropolitan area to 
identify employment centres and test their influences in China (Huang et al., 2015; Huang 
et al., 2017). The network model of urban systems and city regions is also tested to reflect 
the polycentricity by the employment of a variety types of flow data (Liu et al., 2016; Li and 
Phelps, 2017). Theories of agglomeration economies are mainly used to explain the 
performance of polycentric spatial pattern, especially in the economic term. The impacts of 
urban spatial structure on economic performance are largely associated with agglomeration 
economies and diseconomies effects of urban centres (Zhang et al., 2017; Li and Liu, 2018).     
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2.4 Fuzziness and fluidity of polycentricity 
The historical evolution of urban form and theories related to polycentricity suggest that the 
concept of polycentricity is by no means new. It can be traced back to the turn to the 20th 
century. For instance, Howard’s Garden City Movement, initiated in the late 19th century, 
proposed a utopian vision of self-sufficient and interconnected new communities as satellites 
of the central city. Urban sociologists in the famous Chicago School employed urban 
ecological analysis to describe urban spatial patterns and generalised three types of internal 
urban structure. Based on the previous concentric zones and sectors model, Harris and 
Ullman (1945) generalised the ‘multiple nuclei model’ whereby cities develop around 
several discrete centres due to historical development or through migration and 
specialisation stimulated by new growth. In the planning realm, synonymous expressions of 
polycentricity appeared in French national and regional planning policy as early as the 1960s 
in the Gaullist period (Baudelle and Peyrony, 2005; Waterhout et al., 2005). At the initial 
stage, this concept was employed at the urban region and intra-regional level but the term 
was not used explicitly. In 1991, the concept of polycentricity appeared in the Europe 2000 
(CEC,1991) as a central European spatial development principle and was then confirmed by 
the European Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP) (CEC,1999).  
Although consensus has been reached on the multinucleated development phenomenon and 
its popularity in spatial planning policy, the definition of polycentricity is still not uniform. 
Polycentricity has a broad and fluid meaning. In urban studies, urban economics and 
geography, polycentricity literally means that there exist multiple centres (at least two) in a 
given territory (Kloosterman and Musterd, 2001). However, specifically, it is still a fuzzy 
concept with multiple interpretations because polycentricity means different things at 
different geographic scales, from different perspectives and according to different 
approaches and methods (Davoudi, 2003; van Meeteren et al., 2016; Rauhut, 2017). On one 
hand, polycentricity can refer to spatial clusters of almost any type of human activity derived 
from the inherent complexity of city (Kloosterman and Musterd, 2001). On the other hand, 
planners, human and economic geographers, and politicians all embrace this notion as a 
dynamic and interdisciplinary concept (Davoudi, 2003). These two aspects lead to divergent 
interpretations of polycentricity by different people for different purposes. As exemplified 
by Davoudi:  
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‘Urban planners use the concept as a strategic spatial planning tool; economic and 
human geographers use it to explain the changing spatial structure of cities; the 
European Union Commissioners and their counterparts in member states often 
promote the concept as a socio-economic policy goal aimed at achieving a balanced 
regional development; and civic leaders use the term for ‘place-marketing’, presenting 
the notion as synonymous with pluralism, multi-multiculturalism and dynamism, as 
well as a symbol of the ‘post-modern’ lifestyle.’ (2003: 979-980). 
The following section analyses the fuzziness and fluidity of polycentricity through 
investigating multiple geographic scales, perspectives, and measurability of polycentricity.  
2.4.1 Scale dependency and sensitivity 
Polycentric development is a scale-sensitive geographical phenomenon that can take place 
on different geographic scales. Currently, polycentricity has been observed and analysed at 
various geographical scales, including the intra-urban, the inter-urban and inter-regional 
scales (Champion, 2001b; Davoudi, 2003; Kloosterman and Musterd, 2001; Liu and Wang, 
2016). The polycentricity can also be applied at the global scale (Taylor et al., 2008), which 
is based on the debates about ‘world city’ (Friedmann, 1986) or ‘global city’ (Sassen, 1991). 
The majority of extant literature focuses on three scales, which can be categorised into three 
levels, namely micro (intra-urban), meso (intra-region) and macro level (inter-region). 
Traditionally, polycentricity has referred to and originated from intra-urban agglomeration. 
With the process of globalisation and regionalisation, this concept was applied to the larger 
geographical scales. The concept of polycentricity has been connected to ‘such territorial 
concepts as ‘city’, ‘urban region’, ‘mega-city-region’, ‘metropolitan area’ and ‘global city 
region’ (Burger and Meijers, 2012: 1128). Moreover, lower-order geographical units can be 
merged into one functional unit at a higher-order scale, which means the polycentricity at a 
lower-order scale may become monocentric at larger scale, and vice versa (Hall and Pain, 
2006: 4). The multiple scales increase the difficulty of conceptualising polycentricity. 
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2.4.2 Morphological, functional and strategic polycentricity 
Polycentricity can be analysed in a multi-faceted way. It has been shifted from an important 
analytical tool to a normative framework of spatial planning (Davoudi, 2003). As a 
descriptive and analytical tool, polycentricity is mainly used to depict and explain the 
evolving urban structure. As a normative goal, polycentricity defines the potential areas to 
cooperate and promotes the reality of polycentricity through building a common strategy. 
Giffinger and Suitner (2015: 1174) use the terms ‘structural polycentricity’, ‘institutional 
polycentricity’ and ‘strategic polycentricity’ to distinguish different standpoints. Similarly, 
Rauhut (2017) divides the multiple interpretations into two categories, polycentrism and 
polycentricity. The former is regard as a normative agenda or a sort of doctrine with 
significant political meaning, while the latter refers to scientific explanations. This section 
mainly discusses the structural polycentricity and polycentricity as the normative agenda 
will be discussed in next chapter. 
Morphological and functional polycentricity are two distinct but complementary dimensions 
of structural polycentricity. The morphological dimension is determined by nodal features 
(like size, density, function), regardless of the relations between nodes (Burger and Meijers, 
2012). Morphological polycentricity describes the geographic distribution of cities, towns or 
centres in terms of population and economic activities within the territory and stresses an 
even and balanced distribution (Burger and Meijers, 2012; Wen and Tao, 2015). Functional 
or relational polycentricity refers to interactions and cooperation (like network activities, 
flows) between centres and a balanced, multi-directional relationship is considered to be 
more polycentric (Burger and Meijers, 2012; Vasanen, 2012; Giffinger and Suitner, 2015). 
The linkage or relationship between centres are mainly related to knowledge-based flows of 
people and information (Hall and Pain, 2006; Green, 2007; Vasanen, 2012). Therefore, 
functional polycentricity is closely related to concept of ‘space of flows’ and ‘network 
model’. This is a reason that functional polycentricity is more often included into policy 
discourse.  
When depicting structural polycentricity, these two dimensions are complementary and are 
often combined in empirical research (e.g. Burger and Meijers, 2012). However, the specific 
urban system may have different performances along these two dimensions. Generally, 
morphological polycentricity is the precondition of functional polycentricity (Giffinger and 
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Suitner, 2015: 1175). Compared to functional polycentricity, morphological polycentricity 
is much easier to achieve than functional polycentricity. For example, most regions in the 
Netherlands tend to be more morphologically polycentric than functionally polycentric 
(Burger and Meijers, 2012), although the specialisation and network connections among 
cities in the Netherlands are well recognised. 
2.4.3 Polycentricity as an intermediate state 
The definition of polycentricity varies in its degree of restrictiveness (Champion, 2001b: 
664). ‘Pure’ polycentricity is merely theoretical, while too loose or arbitrary a definition 
makes the concept nonsensical. Green (2007) argues that polycentricity is not something that 
either does or does not exist. It is a scalable concept to measure the degree to which an urban 
system approaches ‘pure’ polycentricity. Furthermore, according to the different dimensions 
in spatial structure, polycentricity can be measured along both morphological or functional 
dimensions (Hall and Pain, 2006; Green, 2007; Meijers, 2008; Taylor et al., 2008; Vasanen, 
2012; Brezzi and Veneri, 2015).  
2.5 Unfolding polycentric configurations 
Due to the fluidity of polycentricity, it is necessary to tease out the most important 
polycentric configuration before undertaking empirical analysis. Drawing from Champion 
(2001b), polycentric configurations including the polycentric city, the polycentric urban 
region and the polycentric urban field at the intra-city, intra-regional and inter-regional 
scales respectively, are most often discussed in academic research and in policy making. 
This section attempts to clarify the differences between different polycentric configurations 
and to unfold the ambiguous definition of these polycentric configurations into an assembly 
of components and features (Table 2.2).  
2.5.1 The polycentric city  
At the intra-urban scale, polycentricity means that population and economic activities 
disperse and reconcentrate to multiple sites beyond the traditional CBD or the nuclei zone 
of a city (Kloosterman and Musterd, 2001). The polycentric city is most likely to be observed 
in large cities or metropolitan area such as Los Angeles, London or Paris. When too many 
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economic activities are centralised at the city-core with a limited built-up area, the cost of 
congestion and the bidding up prices for land and labour will also limit the size and density 
of the agglomeration and drive cities to spread out (Davoudi, 2003: 982). Such 
decentralisation has not been spread out randomly but in the sense of an organised scattering 
of people and firms (Anderson and Bogart, 2001). Rapid decentralisation and 
reconcentration process on the edge of large cities gives rise to new centres that are 
distinguishable from dispersed or scattered form. The polycentric city also gains currency in 
policy and planning as it is believed that it can benefit from agglomeration economies and 
avoid diseconomies.  
These centres are large concentrations of office and retail space connected to residential 
areas and transport networks. Centres refer to an area in a city where there is confluence of 
people and other activities (including political, economic and cultural activities). They are 
called ‘sub-centres’ because they are subsidiary to the old centres (Anas et al., 1998: 1427). 
The traditional centre and sub-centres together with their hinterlands comprise the urban 
sub-system within the metropolitan area and configure the metropolis as ‘a city of cities’ 
(Cladera et al., 2009). In the US context, the emergence of new employment centres 
contributes to the formation of the polycentric city and subcentres are identified by statistical 
methods. In the post-industrial city, centres are specialised agglomerations of high-order 
concrete functions or advanced producer services (Hall, 1999; Van Criekingen et al., 2007). 
Van Criekingen et al. (2007) identified seven recurrent types of centres currently developing 
in European metropolitan areas, namely political centres, business centres (two types: 
Command and control, technology and creation), culture and retail centre, mass consumption 
centre, education and knowledge centre, logistics centres. Polycentric cities are made of the 
combination of these centres and sometimes several types of centres may overlap and 
interact in the same place. For example, the traditional city centre remains the most multi-
functional part of most cities (ibid.). Similarly, Peter Hall (1999: 178) proposed an 
archetypal polycentric urban form in modern cities which included six main activity centres, 
namely a traditional business core, a secondary business core, a tertiary business core, an 
outer ‘edge city’, outermost ‘edge cities’ and specialised concentrations. Again, these 
specialised centres may only exist simultaneously in large metropolitan areas high on the 
urban hierarchy, like global cities, world cities or capital cities.  
28 
 
The boundary of the polycentric city is based on functional perspective rather than the 
administrative perspective. Cities are no longer mere morphological entities and the 
discrimination between central city and suburb, town and country has been eroded. Parr 
(2008) clarifies the definition of city through two concepts. The first definition is ‘built city’, 
which is a physical entity (a continuous or almost continuous surface). The second one is the 
‘functional urban region’ (FUR), combining the adjacent districts or municipalities which 
have close interaction with the built city. A FUR is characterised by a single labour market 
area. A large proportion of research on polycentricity at the intra-urban level is inclined to 
adapt the FURs as the subject territory. The urban area or metropolitan area is an area 
together with the city core, suburbs and commuting hinterland.  
2.5.2 The polycentric urban region  
The polycentric urban region (PUR) has gained much more attention than the polycentric 
city recently, especially in the European context. Globalisation and the popularity of 
neoliberalism have led to the re-appreciation of the roles of the city region in the national 
and international system (Brenner, 1999; Hall and Pain, 2006; Scott, 2001). This trend 
requires intense regional cooperation to simultaneously secure economic competitiveness 
and ease environment and equity problems (Wheeler, 2002), and to further a ‘spatial 
reconstitution of urban form’ and ‘reterritorialization’ (Brenner, 1999; 2002).  
The PUR is a typical region distinguishable from other regions, and it has gained much 
currency on policy agenda. PUR is a territory including a specific set of cities, none of which 
is dominant. Meijers defines a PUR as a region composed of ‘a collection of historically 
distinct and both administratively and politically independent cities located in close 
proximity, well connected through infrastructure and lacking one dominating city in political, 
economic, cultural and other aspects’ (2007b: 3, 4). Parr (2004) outlines seven conditions 
required to define the PUR, namely clustering of centres, an upper limit on centre separation, 
a lower limit on centre separation, the size and spacing of centres, the size distribution of 
centres, interaction among centres and centre specialisation.  
The basic idea of PUR implies physically and political separated but functional interrelated 
settlements (Parr, 2004; Turok and Bailey, 2004). Prime examples of PURs include the 
Randstad in the Netherlands (Faludi, 1994; Kloosterman and Lambregts, 2001; Musterd and 
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van Zelm, 2001; Lambregts, 2008), the Flemish Diamond in Belgium (Albrechts, 1998; 
2001), the Rhine-Ruhr in German (Blotevogel, 1998; Knapp et al., 2006), and the Glasgow-
Edinburgh region in the Scotland (Bailey and Turok, 2001; Turok and Bailey, 2004). Outside 
Europe, typical examples such as the Southern California metropolitan region in the US and 
the Kansai area in Japan are mentioned (Batten, 1995). These polycentric urban regions 
mainly consist of medium or small sized cities. To compete with metropolitan areas and 
other large economic entities in modern economies, it is said to be necessary to build their 
functional interdependency for better performance (Van Houtum and Lagendijk, 2001; 
Turok and Bailey, 2004).  
In fact, various concepts present different images of interdependence, such as ‘conurbation’ 
(Geddes, 1915), ‘dispersed city’ (Burton, 1963), ‘urban field’ (Friedmann and Miller, 1965) , 
and ‘network city’ (Batten, 1995). The conurbations are the cases of urban settlements that 
are located too close together while the urban field enlarges the scale of urban living into the 
inter-regional area. Therefore, policymakers and planners often refer the concept of PUR as 
an ‘urban network’. Nonetheless, Van Houtum and Lagendijk (2001: 751) point out four 
differences between the concept of PUR and other concepts. First, PUR is in the middle 
ground between urban interdependence and urban hierarchy theory because the concept of 
PUR stresses both the importance of horizontal linkage between the members of PUR and 
the importance of the coalition as central places in a hierarchical system. Second, the concept 
of PUR is presented as a planning and a priori concept, which is based on images of 
functional integration rather than reality. Third, despite the emphasis on the functional 
interaction between cities, the physical linkages between urban centres receive much more 
attention. The fourth difference is the boundaries of polycentric regions are drawn more 
explicitly and this concept is applied to existing centres.  
PUR comprises several existing cities, towns and other urban settlements. The 
administrative cities or the functional urban areas are often defined as urban centres in this 
system. Polycentricity at inter-urban scale stresses much more the interaction and network 
between existing centres. PURs are formed through the increasing important functional 
linkages between existing cities and towns. Therefore, PURs tend to be formed through the 
incorporation and fusion mode, according to Champion (2001b). Kloosterman and Musterd 
claim the difference between centres of polycentric city and polycentric urban regions as 
well:  
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 ‘the shift towards polycentricity in the context of one individual city implies an 
unfolding of a spatial division of labour where ‘new’ locations are being developed’, 
while in the PURs, ‘the evolving spatial division of labour is interposed and sometimes 
superimposed upon the existing configuration.’ (2001: 627)  
Beyond this, they also highlight the differences in physical form, political entity, and identity. 
First, transport links and land use patterns in polycentric urban region differ from the 
polycentric city. More specifically, PUR is characterised by cross-commuting by private cars 
because of the lack of historical infrastructure and PUR may include a large amount of 
agricultural and green areas between centres. Secondly, the polycentric urban region 
including many independent cities involves more than one political entity, which 
complicates the governance and institutional building. Finally, PUR will develop a new 
regional identity and blur the rooted local identities of individual cities.  
2.5.3 The polycentric urban field  
Polycentricity can occur at the inter-regional or transnational level as well. The configuration 
at this broader scale could be termed as ‘polycentric urban field’ (PUF). This concept is 
mainly used in planning and policy discourse which reflects the planners’ or policy-makers’ 
attempt to apply polycentric logic to a broader region. The ‘megalopolis’ coined by 
Gottmann (1961) is the prototype of this spatial form, characterised by a densely urbanized 
area, network of people, goods and information, and a complementary organisation of these 
spatial components.  
Different from the PUR and the traditional polycentric city, PUF often erodes the boundaries 
of national and regional states. In Europe, the polycentric megalopolis comprising command 
centres, such as Paris and London together with the adjacent urban regions such as Randstad 
and Rhein-Ruhr, was predicted to dominate the development of Europe in the 21st century 
as the cities and urban regions would be linked by efficient intra-metropolitan transport and 
telecommunication system (Kunzmann, 1996). Dieleman and Faludi (1998) regard the 
polycentric urban field as the ‘network of city networks’. They suggested that due to the 
rapid growth in the peripheral area between the urban regions, adjacent regions like the 
Randstad, Rhine-Ruhr and Flemish Diamond may become integrated with the less urbanised 
area between them to develop into one polycentric urban field at the macro level. 
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To sum up, the variation and key features between these three polycentric configurations are 
reflected in scales, centres, political entities, evolution processes, and morphological, 
functional, and strategic characteristics (Table 2.2). Among these aspects, centres are the 
most essential and fundamental element in polycentric urban system because they are often 
understood as the ‘building blocks for polycentricity’ (Dühr, 2005: 236). Centres in 
polycentric city are clusters of (any type of) human activities characterised with high density 
and property values, which can be newly spawn or be formed based on old towns. Centres 
in other two polycentric configurations are often historical and pre-existing regions, cities, 
and towns with independent political statues, which are associated together by 
morphological, functional, or political relation between them. The different definitions of 
centres lead to the differences in other elements of polycentricity such as boundary, physical 
linkages, morphological, functional, and strategic dimensions (Table 2.2). Based on previous 
sections, the differences between these three polycentric configurations are also reflected in 
the form of agglomeration economies, research topics and research objects. Therefore, 
polycentricity can be deconstructed into these common elements so that the ambiguity can 
be diminished. Moreover, it can function as a new definition framework which in turn 
construct polycentricity with different combinations of these elements.  
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Table 2.2 Unfolding three major polycentric configurations 
Components 
Polycentric city 
(PC) 
Polycentric urban region 
(PUR) 
Polycentric urban field 
(PUF) 
Scales 
Intra urban scale; 
Intra metropolitan scale 
Inter urban scale; 
Inter metropolitan scale 
Inter-regional scale; 
Transnational scale 
Nodes 
Subcentres e.g. employment 
or population centres, and 
agglomerations of specialised 
economic activities; 
Characterised with high 
density and property values 
Functional urban areas or 
administrative cities 
Cities and regions with 
proximity and common 
features 
Spacing 
Continuous or nearly 
continuous built-up area 
Physical separated by 
green space or agricultural 
area between centres 
The inter-metropolitan 
periphery 
Boundary 
Functional areas or daily 
urban system without clear 
boundaries including suburbs 
and commuting hinterlands; 
Dynamic and evolve with 
functional linkages 
Relative explicated 
boundaries, usually 
referring to the planning 
area or political entity; 
Dynamic and evolve with 
voluntary participator 
Relative explicated 
boundaries referring to 
the planning area 
Linkages 
Historical public transport, 
e.g. trams, streetcars, 
subways 
Highways and newly 
constructed railway or high 
speed-way 
Intra-metropolitan and 
inter-metropolitan 
transport and 
telecommunication 
system 
Evolution 
model 
The centrifugal model The incorporation model; 
The fusion model 
The incorporation model; 
The fusion model 
Morphologic 
dimension 
Newly developed sites; 
Old towns 
Pre-existing settlements one contiguous region of 
very high densities  
Functional 
dimension 
Subordinated to CBD; 
A certain degree of 
specialisation; 
Be independent sometimes 
and rival with traditional 
centres 
High degree specialisation; 
Cross-commuting and 
virtual communications 
like emails, telephone calls 
High degree of 
interaction of traffic, 
goods and information 
Strategic 
dimension 
Match the employment, 
residence and public services; 
Ease the problems generated 
by excessive economic and 
demographic concentration 
on old cores; 
Optimize land use 
Increase the 
competitiveness; 
Reduce the disparities 
between regions and urban 
systems 
Reduce the disparities 
between regions and 
urban systems; 
Joint management and 
governance 
Agglomeration 
economies 
technological and pecuniary 
externalities; 
Agglomeration diseconomies 
regional externalities; 
network externalities 
network externalities 
Research field 
Theoretical modelling; 
Empirical identification of 
centres and evaluation of 
polycentricity 
Policy agenda; 
Empirical evaluation of 
polycentricity and 
performance 
Policy agenda 
Typical cases 
American metropolitan area European urban regions American megalopolis; 
European regions and 
European Community 
Sources: Summarized by author 
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2.6 Conclusion and discussion  
This chapter provides a comprehensive review regarding conceptualising and theorising 
polycentricity in the western context. Based on the review, it deconstructs three major 
polycentric configurations that are most often referred in academic studies and within the 
planning realm and builds a new framework consisting of key components and features of 
polycentric development. This framework includes spatial, social, economic, political, and 
historical elements, which enables the mobility and comparability of this concept across 
different contexts and scales. It will be applied to Chinese specific context in order to 
understand the components of polycentricity in Chinese cities. The framework also has 
potentials to provide insights for building the analytical framework of this research. In this 
way, the investigation of polycentric development in China can provide more useful insights 
and can be placed into broader international debates.  
There are four key points from this chapter that can inform empirical research about 
polycentric development in China. First, it is important to consider the development process 
of polycentricity. The changing macro environment, development trajectories and 
characteristics in different phases of polycentric development need to be considered 
(Giffinger and Suitner, 2015). Polycentricity is a spontaneous process caused by techno-
economic shift. It appears when a city or region steps into a certain development stage with 
the transitions of industrial, demographic and infrastructure foundations and shows different 
characteristics. Substantiated by Batty (2001), polycentricity is an evolutionary process 
affected by historical factors. Therefore, polycentric urban development should be subjected 
to a relative long-term analysis including the changing socio-economic and technological 
conditions as potential driving forces for spatial restructuring in both urban reality and policy 
discourses. 
Secondly, it is impossible to investigate polycentric development only by focusing on a 
single geographical level or a single dimension with the complicated functional relations and 
growing scales that social economic activities occur. Polycentricity is a scale-dependent and 
multi-dimensional concept and these dimensions should be researched mutually interrelated. 
Cities or metropolitan areas are supported by the functional relations with other cities or 
regions and further the embeddedness in global networks (Giffinger and Suitner, 2015). 
34 
 
Therefore, in order to better understand polycentricity in China at the intra-city level, the 
influences of lager urban system need to be included during analysis. In addition, the 
dimensions that polycentricity refer to and their interrelationships are required to be well 
investigated. 
Thirdly, the specific historical, political, and geographical contexts of China need to be 
considered to distinguish China’s polycentric approach from those in the West. According 
to the literature review, polycentricity is a broad and fuzzy concept, the explanation of which 
depends on the spatial, social, economic, and historical elements. The polysemy of 
polycentricity has been clarified through an assembly of key components and elements. It is 
found that the key nodes, morphological features, functional linages, the strategic priority 
constitute the polycentric configurations and these elements vary between polycentric cities, 
urban regions and urban fields. It is also noteworthy that the research interests and typical 
cases of polycentric development vary between different geographical and political context, 
for example between North America and North-west Europe. Research in the US mainly 
focuses on identification of subcentres and polycentric development at the metropolitan scale, 
while the European counterpart attaches much more attention to city-region and cross-border 
region scale and discusses it in policy realm. Cities and regions in China have distinct 
geographical, political, and historical backgrounds, compared with their counterparts in the 
US and Europe. Therefore, key elements in the framework, such as scales, key nodes, 
evolution process, morphological, functional, and strategic dimensions, need to be dealt with 
more reflectively when applied to China.  
Finally, it is more feasible to investigate polycentricity from the policy framework first as it 
defines nodes, political entity, functions more explicitly. As an analytical tool, polycentricity 
occupies an intermediate state without a clear baseline to accept or reject it. It is also easily 
affected by the methods and samples. Since the 1990s, polycentricity has become an 
important normative agenda at different scales with different purpose (Davoudi, 2003). 
Theories such as agglomeration economies and urban network provide theoretical 
foundations for the popularity of polycentric discourse in the policy and planning realm. In 
next chapter, the application of polycentricity in strategic vision will be discussed in more 
detail.
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Chapter 3 Polycentricity in strategic vision: planning and 
governance 
3.1 Introduction 
Polycentricity has been widely used in western planning and policy realm, especially in the 
European context. This chapter focuses on the planning and governance of polycentric 
development at a variety scales, which can explain the reasons for the popularity of this 
concept in spatial planning and the factors affecting its implementation. This chapter first 
retraces the changing paradigms in urban forms in planning history and the emergence of 
polycentric urban form as an alternative paradigm. Following that, this chapter links 
polycentricity with classical planning concepts such as new towns and growth poles, 
considering their contribution to the formation of polycentricity. Subsequently, it discusses 
the application of polycentricity in policies and spatial planning, especially in Europe. 
Underlying meaning and rationality of polycentricity in different territories at pan-European, 
national, regional or metropolitan levels are examined. Further, the chapter presents the 
relationship between governance and polycentricity. After that, the spatial identity is 
elaborated as a bridging concept to bring polycentric discourses and practices together. 
Finally, this chapter summarizes key conclusions and provides some insights for the research 
in China.  
3.2 Changing paradigms in urban forms 
Urban planning was established as a profession to manage urban extension and remodel the 
nineteenth century industrial city in reaction to the city conditions thrown up by the 
Industrial Revolution (Healey and Williams, 1993; Breheny, 1996). Desirable urban forms 
have been key debates in planning theory throughout the planning history. This section 
introduces the paradigm shift in urban forms that are embedded in urban planning system 
and discusses the emerging polycentricity as an alternative form to pursue sustainable 
development. 
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3.2.1 Compact versus dispersed pattern 
The growth of industrial city gave rise to the new profession of urban planning. A variety of 
reformist ideas have discussed the form and function of human settlements with the 
objectives to addressing urban problems since the late nineteenth century. Several utopian 
visions of urban forms have been proposed in the historic stages of planning theories which 
have key influences on planning circles as well as government policy making worldwide.  
The first influential paradigm related to urban form is Garden City. At the turn of the 20th 
century, Howard in his famous book Tomorrow: A Peaceful Path to Real Reform promoted 
the Garden City model and put it into practice through the construction of Letchworth (1903) 
and Welwyn (1919). The nature of the Garden City is supposedly perfect combination of 
town and country life, in which all the advantages of the most energetic and active town life 
combine with all the beauty and delight of the country (Howard, 1898). Howard envisaged 
the Garden Cities to be well connected to a central city via railways and a green belt would 
exist between each settlement to prevent towns merging. As Parker (2015: 54) points out, 
‘Howard was not in favour of a return to low-density village type communities and would 
even have tolerated the population densities of inner-London for his new Garden Cities’. 
Hall (2014: 97, 98) argues that the ensemble of central city and self-contained garden cities 
formed a polycentric ‘Social City’ and the Garden City model can be regarded as the 
prototype of polycentricity. 
Since the early twentieth century, the spatial ideology of planning has changed initially 
because of new building technologies and widespread use of cars (Parker, 2015: 60). 
Modernist planners searched for ‘rational development’ (maximum technological efficiency) 
and asserted functionality over form and newly built forms over old forms (Hirt, 2005). 
Modernists like Le Corbusier insisted that the new urban pattern needed to favour spaced 
high-rises and concentrate population in the metropolitan centre and free space for green and 
open spaces (Hirt, 2007; Parker, 2015: 61). His ideas were then incorporated into the well-
known Athens Charter, which set the standard principles for modernist architecture and 
planning. If Le Corbusier stressed the high-density urban pattern, another figure of 
modernism, Frank Lloyd Wright, proposed a radical dispersed pattern called ‘Broadacre 
City’, according to which the old city disappeared and instead a utopian vison of a dispersed, 
zoned but integrated city was created (Wright, 1932). Although utopias are difficult to be 
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realised in practice, the key elements such as functional zoning, high density in the city 
centre and dispersing population have become dominant paradigms in modern planning 
across the world, especially in the post-war period. 
Modern planning theories generally promoted dispersal of human activity as solutions to 
urban problems (Breheny, 1996; Hirt, 2005). Planning policy is one of the critical factors 
that caused large scale urban dispersion and sprawl in practice (Healey and Williams, 1993). 
Yet dispersed urban development implying low-density suburbanisation has led to 
environment deterioration, social segregation, increased energy consumption and pollution, 
and city centre decline (CEC, 1990; Masnavi, 2000; Dieleman and Wegener, 2004). The 
awareness of the limits of nature and the important role of planning strategies and regulatory 
practices in environmental improvement have led to a new paradigm of sustainable 
development since the late 1980s with the publication of UN’s Brundtland Report (WCED, 
1987). The sustainability paradigm requires a holistic consideration of problem solving in 
economic, social and environmental dimensions, which has been associated with planning 
and policy (Burton et al., 1996; Wheeler, 2000; Jepson, 2001).  
Urban form has significant implications for urban sustainability, particularly its social and 
environmental dimensions. Sustainable urban form comprises different components, such as 
land use, building types, transport systems, street layouts, the size of settlements, green space 
and many other elements (Jabareen, 2006; Masnavi, 2007). Current or post-modern planning 
ideologies emphasise a return to compact cities in reaction to urban sprawl and promote 
higher density, more diverse and mixed land use and compact urban form to achieve 
sustainable development (Healey and Williams, 1993; Burton, 2000; Neuman, 2005; Hirt, 
2005).  
The Compact City model has been translated into new policy and planning initiatives and 
movement since 1990s. In 1990, the EU published the Green Paper on the Urban 
Environment, which claimed that zoning policy led to environmental problems and 
advocated mixed use and more intense development as the principles of planning (CEC, 
1990). Since then, the concept of the compact city has been incorporated into policy and 
implemented across the world (Breheny, 1996). In (northwest) Europe, governments attempt 
to achieve sustainable urban form mainly through the compact city policy and the promotion 
of the multifunctional land use (Burton et al., 1996). The compact city policy aims at 
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containing unlimited urban sprawl and reliance on private cars. Across the North Atlantic, 
the New Urbanism and Smart Growth movements have similar objectives (Dieleman and 
Wegener, 2004). Compared to the compact city, New Urbanism and Smart Growth advocate 
the promotion of mixed use at fine grain (e.g. communities, neighbourhoods, and physical 
design factors like street architecture) and facilitate infill development based on planning 
and architectural principles (Duany et al., 2000; Grant, 2006). New Urbanism is essentially 
reminiscent of the Garden City and Neighbourhood Unit theories, all of which integrate 
reformist ideas and civic values to address urban problems (Garde, 2008). Moreover, these 
new planning paradigms does not mean a return to a single dense centre. In practice, New 
Urbanists attempt to improve low density suburbia by introducing these new development 
principles and regulation (Parker, 2015: 66). Regional thinking was also incorporated to 
achieve the revitalisation of central city as well as metropolitan sustainability (Wheeler, 
2000).  
3.2.2 Polycentricity: an alternative form towards sustainability?  
However, critics have pointed out that the compact city may not always deliver the intentions 
of the politicians and planners. For example, compactness may lead to less domestic living 
space, lack of affordable housing, increased crime levels and a worse environment for 
walking and cycling (Burton, 2000). Moreover, in reality, cities are becoming both 
centralised and decentralised and evolve towards a wider urban region. Worldwide, cities 
are converging to the same new model in which new centres are emerging in the process of 
peripheral growth. The tradition monocentric paradigm is challenged, and instead 
polycentric urban structures are developing (Berry and Kim, 1993; Healey and Williams, 
1993). Evidence has emerged that there may exist an eclectic urban form for sustainable 
development, which is the so-called polycentric city. It is a typical urban spatial structure 
which is distinct from both monocentric urban form and unorganised urban sprawl. 
Polycentric development theoretically has potential to achieve more sustainable forms with 
the rapid urban growth (Jenks and Kozak, 2013). This spatial pattern is said to be able to 
benefit both businesses and residents because of agglomeration economies. This model 
avoids the diseconomy of over-compactness and generates positive externality for the whole 
urban system. 
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Different from dispersed pattern, this development pattern stresses both the intensification 
or consolidation of subcentres and their efficient connection by public transport. Mixed use 
of land and effective public transport are essential to sustainable polycentric urban 
development (Figure 3.1). It is an urban form that still stresses concentration, although it 
may take place both within and outside the older centres (Marcuse, 2013). The polycentric 
development is appropriately called ‘concentrated’ deconcentralisation (ibid.). The key 
nodes in polycentric system take form of high-density compact cities. In other words, the 
polycentric city looks like many compact cities or centres systematically connected by 
efficient public transport. Therefore, polycentric development inevitably adopts the Transit-
oriented Development (TOD) principle, which refers to high-density and mixed-use areas 
around public transport stops (Cervero et al., 2002). Also, the idea of polycentrism refers to 
a ‘network’ of interconnected nodes. Thus, not only is the self-sufficiency of centres stressed 
but also complementarity and synergy between centres.  
 
Figure 3.1 Sustainable urban form: polycentric and monocentric 
Source: (Jenks and Kozak, 2013: 88) 
Polycentric spatial development theoretically can address problems such as congestion, 
pollution, unbalanced development and uncontrolled urban sprawl but it may also give rise 
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to some other problems, such as acting as a barrier to interaction and low efficiency. It 
appears that there are at present no conclusive answers regarding the question of whether 
polycentricity can be instrumental to achieving economic competitiveness, territorial 
cohesion and environmental sustainability (Kloosterman and Lambregts, 2007; Meijers, 
2008). The effects of polycentricity in terms of three dimensions of sustainability are still 
ambiguous in empirical evidence, which may partly stem from the different methodological 
perspectives and from the selection of indicators (see Veneri and Burgalassi, 2012). 
3.3 Planning and polycentric development 
Government policies and planning play an important role in shaping cities via land use 
regulation and the provision of social infrastructure (Anas et al., 1998: 1459). Planning 
practices related to polycentricity can be categorised into planning for and planning of 
polycentricity. Planning for polycentricity is evident in classical planning approaches such 
as the ‘new towns’ and the ‘growth poles’, which influenced the formation of new urban 
centres and hence helped to develop a polycentric spatial pattern. Planning of polycentricity 
has sprung up in the European spatial planning as an important development principle.  
3.3.1 Planning for polycentricity  
As mentioned in chapter two, the polycentric urban pattern emerged and evolved over time. 
A polycentric development pattern typically consists of historic densely urbanised 
settlements and newly developed centres. Affected by planning theories and the shift of 
planning paradigms, new towns and growth poles schemes have become important planning 
policies to fulfil theoretical visions. The cities and regions became polycentric when the new 
towns or growth poles newly planned in the post-war period became mature. Meanwhile, 
these planning concepts remain important in current planning practice, and are often 
associated with polycentric development of cities and regions.  
The new town movement was developed from the idea of the garden city. After 1945, the 
new town programmes appeared in Britain and then were extended to other European 
countries. New town development became a planning doctrine for the post-war physical and 
social reconstruction and transformed from a voluntary movement to government policy 
(Wannop, 1999). Many countries, regions, and municipalities adopted this policy, which led 
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to a diversity of new town policy. First, the principal purpose of these new towns was not 
just for population overspill, but also for the objectives of regional economic growth, 
housing provision and balance of job and residence (ibid.). Second, there are four schools of 
new town policy in Europe: the British one attached to the Howards’ Garden City tradition; 
the Scandinavian-Dutch one related to the Athens Charter; the French one more dependent 
on national and regional planning policy and the Soviet on independent industrial towns 
(Merlin, 1980). Some new towns were developed by expanding small towns and others were 
newly created (ibid.). This planned expansion and decentralisation can attain the economic 
and social objectives of a dispersal policy without the environmental impacts caused by 
scattered development (Echenique et al., 2012). Nevertheless, new towns contributed to the 
process of counter urbanisation, social polarisation, and socio-spatial segregation of less 
mobile groups during implementation process. 
Another important planning concept contributing to polycentricity is growth poles, which 
were proposed by Perroux (1955) primarily referring to a set of economic activities linked 
to propulsive industries (Glasson, 1978). When it comes to the geographical dimension, 
growth poles are regard as growth centres which can influence their surroundings (Darwent, 
1969; Parr, 1973; Glasson, 1978). The application of growth pole theory involves the 
selection of planned growth poles or new growth centres. Planned poles generally favour 
locations with potential for future growth (e.g. sufficient land, interregional transport, 
existing agglomeration economy, urban amenity, etc.) (Parr, 1999b).  
Growth poles can be either spontaneous or planned (Parr, 1999a). A theoretical basis for the 
adoption of a growth pole strategy in planning is that the rectified spatial configuration 
regarding settlement size, hierarchical level, frequency and location can exploit existing 
factor endowment and attract a set of economic activities (Parr, 1999b). This strategy was 
widely used to solve regional problems including reviving a depressed area, encouraging 
regional deconcentration, modifying the national urban system and attaining interregional 
balance (Parr, 1999a). Among these functions, the first is associated with economic 
development, while the latter three show a potential for the polycentric spatial pattern. The 
designated new centres modify the spatial structure in the direction of centralised 
deconcentration to reduce the negative externalities. At the same time, the primacy and 
hierarchical level of city (region) is reduced by the decentralisation process as the 
competitiveness of the whole city or region is promoted. 
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3.3.2 Planning of polycentricity  
In the late twentieth century, the concept of polycentricity became an important and popular 
normative goal of spatial planning and the buzzword among spatial planners in Europe 
(Davoudi, 2003; Waterhout et al., 2005). The planning of polycentricity in Europe sprung 
up in the context of deindustrialisation, European integration and globalisation (Blotevogel, 
1998). It became one of the most important policies of European Spatial Development 
Perspective (ESDP) published in 1999, in which it stresses the development of a balanced 
and polycentric urban system (CEC,1999). The ESDP offered a paradigm change and new 
perspective as an alternative to the core-peripheral model of the European territory (Copus, 
2001; Davoudi, 2003; Meijers et al., 2005). It appealed to the promotion of complementarity, 
interdependence, and cooperation at once rather than merely transportation links (CEC, 
1999). Compared to the traditional welfare or cohesion policies based on redistribution, 
polycentric development policies are ‘potential-based’ or ‘opportunity-oriented’ approaches, 
emphasising making use of endogenous potential or creation of new employment 
(Antikainen and Vartiainen, 2005; Davoudi and Wishardt, 2005). 
One of the reasons for the popularity of this concept in planning and policy discourse is that 
it brings economic competitiveness, social cohesion, and spatial structure together. 
Economic development, together with social and environment concerns, were the dominant 
spatial planning issues for metropolitan regions in the 1980s and 1990s in Europe. Cohesion, 
which is primarily about equity, addresses urban disparities and geographical imbalance, 
while competitiveness is about strengths and potentials (Waterhout et al., 2005). Polycentric 
urban form is supposed to generate greater positive agglomeration externalities as well as to 
facilitate the achievement of social, economic and environment goals (Parr, 2004). The 
advocacy of a polycentric strategy in Europe is a distinctive approach that rejects the North 
America acceptance of sprawl, inner city decline, extreme social polarisation and 
excessively dependence on the car while still enhancing economic competitiveness 
(Docherty et al., 2004). 
Polycentricity in ESDP is a ‘nested polycentric concept’ because the centres mentioned are 
themselves polycentric systems (Meijers et al., 2005). Since the implementation of ESDP, 
polycentric development has become a normative framework at pan-European, national, 
regional, metropolitan and local scales (Brezzi and Veneri, 2015). Even at the same 
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geographic scale, the meaning or object of polycentric development policies may differ 
(Meijers et al., 2005). For example, policies in Greece, France and Portugal focus on 
reducing urban disparities within the urban system while policies in Italy, Poland and 
German address major geographical imbalances within their country’s territory. In a 
relatively well developed polycentric urban system like Switzerland, the Netherlands or 
Finland, the dominant objective behind polycentric development has become making the 
country as a whole more competitive; In Austria, Spain and the UK, polycentric development 
policies can only be found at the regional scale (Waterhout et al., 2005). 
This policy framework has been reproduced across the scales and regions (Richardson and 
Jensen, 2000; Shaw and Sykes, 2004; Gloersen et al., 2007; Dabinett, 2010) and therefore 
the application in planning practice is subject to multiple interpretations. Even in the same 
nation, the idea of polycentricity is applied, interpreted and reinterpreted to reflect the certain 
regional background. Polycentricity could be a concept to promote transnational planning, 
an organisation tool within a region, an analytical tool, a rhetorical device or a mutual 
learning flatform (Shaw and Sykes, 2004). The differences in (morphological and political) 
origins determine the challenges the regions face and lead to different concerns and opinions 
toward polycentrism among policymakers and planners (Lambregts, 2006; Schmitt, 2013). 
At the regional scale, the idea of polycentricity has been applied to spatial planning and 
policies in two kinds of regions in Europe in order to facilitate either polycentric urban region 
or the polycentric metropolitan regions. These regions differ according to their 
morphological structure. As Parr (2008: 3022) argues, several Mega-City Regions (MCR) 
discussed in the POLYNET programme (Hall and Pain, 2006), such as Southeast England, 
Northern Switzerland, Greater Dublin and Rhine-Main are essentially type of city-regions, 
while other cases such as Randstad, Central Belgium are of the PUR type considering their 
size distribution of centres and interurban connection.  
PURs in European policies are characterised by a distribution of more or less equally 
medium-sized cities beyond the economic core of Europe (e.g. the Randstad, Rhine-Ruhr, 
Flemish Diamond), and the purposes is to increase the competitiveness between cities in the 
modern economy (Dieleman and Faludi, 1998; Lambregts, 2006; Turok and Bailey, 2004; 
Van Houtum and Lagendijk, 2001). The central and federal state planning framework in 
Germany plays an important role in the formation of polycentric Rhine-Ruhr metropolitan 
region, which area was first identified as a functional unit in 1993 (Blotevogel, 1998). The 
44 
 
concept of the ‘Flemish Diamond’ comprising Brussels, Ghent, Antwerp and Leuven was 
invoked in the Structural Plan for Flanders in 1997 in the context of shift from a centralised 
state to a federal structure (Albrechts, 1998). These regions are even larger than the 
metropolitan area or metropolis, but they need to increase the competitiveness by closer 
functional connection in order to attract more investment and enhance their position in 
Europe as well as internationally.  
Polycentric metropolitan regions refers to places where there already exists a large urban 
agglomeration surrounded by several smaller centres (e.g. the Paris Region, Greater Dublin 
and Greater London plus Southeast England), and the aim is to control unlimited sprawl and 
combat the dominance of core city (Turok and Bailey, 2004; Waterhout et al., 2005). The 
polycentric strategy of these regions can be national, regional or local because of their 
monocentric dominance of both population and economy (Davoudi and Wishardt, 2005; 
Halbert, 2006). As Halbert (2006) claims in relation to Paris, the strategies at different scales 
are paradoxical because national policy aims to narrow the disparities between the Paris 
region and other regions by implementation of redistribution policy, while at the 
metropolitan level limited decentralisation has happened within the Paris metropolitan area. 
These regions sustain considerable growth, but they need to ease congestion and protect the 
natural environment and built heritage by guiding the redistribution of economic activities 
in order to ease urban problems rather than be concerned with the regional disparities.  
3.4 Governance and Polycentricity  
The reasons for the success of the concept of polycentricity in European spatial planning are 
also highly related to the changing power structure and interactions between stakeholders. 
Normative positions and interests at different levels of government and actors are important 
in shaping the ESDP framework which represents the polycentric discourse (Richardson and 
Jensen, 2000). Guided by this policy framework, polycentricity has become a key concept 
at the level of member states and regions because it is promoted as a communication tool of 
involved stakeholders and a process of discursive integration of European spatial 
development (Gloersen et al., 2007). The process of changing power relations and 
knowledge communication between stakeholders regarding polycentricity include both the 
vertical and horizontal dimensions (ibid.: 422). Vertical process refers to the changing 
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relations between higher and lower levels of government and horizontal process refers to 
strategic cooperation and competition between regions and between municipalities.  
The concept of polycentricity has been used to facilitate the formation of collaborations and 
networks among municipalities and regions, not only from the perspective of urban form 
and function, but also with respect to political and administrative dimensions. Because of 
the ‘subsidiarity’ principle, EU policy actually tends to be implemented at national, regional 
and the local levels (Stephenson, 2013: 819). For example, Interreg programmes funded by 
Structural Funds, aims to achieve Europeanisation and regionalisation through strengthening 
three strands of cooperation, namely cross-border, transnational, and inter-regional 
cooperation. It has become a channel to disseminate the European spatial development 
discourse to the regional level and the polycentricity within Interreg community can be 
reinvented as a strategy for regional empowerment and transnational interactions, which 
questioned the traditional national hierarchical framework (Gloersen et al., 2007: 430) .  
Polycentricity was most often applied at the regional level because of the integration or 
‘Europeanisation’ process since the 1990s, which changed the power structure and 
governance framework. On one hand, reform of the European Structural Funds has placed 
greater stress on partnership and co-ordination (Stephenson, 2013: 819). Due to funding 
incentives, governments at the national, regional and local level government recognise the 
importance cooperation beyond administrative boundaries, which therefore encourages 
administrative reform and cooperation within or across regional and national boundaries. On 
the other hand, as a result of the institutional creation of EU, the decision-making power of 
member states has been stretched up to the supra-national level and down to sub-national 
level (Marks, 1993). Therefore, the increasing importance of subnational-levels and their 
links with other tiers of governments should be recognised in the institutional analysis. As 
the European spatial planning system has become a multi-level system, multi-level 
governance emerged and is often used as a framework to understand how governance was 
arranged in Europe (Stephenson, 2013).  
Institutional or political polycentricity has become evident due to the proliferation of multi-
level governance (MLG). MLG refers to ‘a system of continuous negotiation among nested 
governments at several territorial tiers’ because of the ‘unravelling’ of the central state 
(Marks, 1993: 392; see also Hooghe and Marks, 2003). This governance mode deals with 
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regions that must be recognised and protected or need to be redefined (Fabbro and Mesolella, 
2010). MLG has been extended to include non-governmental actors like individuals and 
institutions. The mutual dependency, communication and interactions between levels are the 
most important features for MLG (Fabbro and Mesolella, 2010; Stephenson, 2013).  
Multi-level governance refers to governance by multiple actors in non-hierarchical modes 
of interaction and represents an alternative to hierarchical governments. In principle, the 
benefit of the shift from government to governance is that the governance is much more 
flexible and, at the same time, can overcome the administrative fragmentation of local 
authorities. Hooghe and Marks (2003) describe two types of multi-level governance with 
distinct characteristics but sometimes intertwined. The first type is based on federalism and 
characterised by general-purpose jurisdictions, limited number of governments and a durable 
systemwide architecture. In contrast, the second type of multi-level governance is a task-
specific governance system with multiple distinct functional jurisdictions at numerous 
territorial scales. The second type is quite common at the local level for the purpose of 
production and consumption public goods, while the first type is rooted in regionalism and 
aims to deal with conflicts and problems in territory (ibid.).  
Similarly, the multi-level governance structure divides into two theoretical ideal types, 
territorial and functional governance, according to a series of different properties of 
institutions including type of actor, legal status, organisational structural, membership, 
thematic scope, geographic scope (Fricke, 2015: 854). This empirical research shows that 
several organisations characterised by certain degree of both ideal governance types may 
exist simultaneously and the characteristics of these organisations play a key role in the 
coordination and implementation of spatial policy. In Europe, the concept of polycentricity 
is often applied in transnational and cross-border region spatial planning. Cooperation in 
these types of regions needs to overcome differences between the political, administrative, 
and planning systems (ibid.: 850). Therefore, the governance of cross-border regions is non-
hierarchical, involving multiple governmental tiers and territories. 
For the lower scale such as metropolitan or local government, the fragmentation and inter-
municipal collaboration is also the key to the governance of metropolitan region or 
polycentric urban region. The increasing interaction between cities and towns asserts the 
need for cooperation rather than competition in the development of polycentric urban regions. 
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Polycentric development is likely to involve a wider range of actors. Davoudi (2007) argues 
that inclusive inter-municipal coalitions for different functions across a PUR is likely to be 
more effective than establishment of a single city-region authority due to the dynamic and 
fuzziness of the boundaries of a city region. In addition, the creation of a new authority is 
politically sensitive and is likely to challenge smaller local authorities. Lefèvre (1998) 
summarizes two modalities of institutional arrangements for metropolitan government, the 
supra-municipality and inter-municipality. The formal institutional framework is also an 
important factor influencing the regional cooperation and coordination. Adjustments such as 
new tier of government and the redistribution of competencies can only be implemented 
gradually and is likely to be resisted by the existing administrative framework (Meijers and 
Romein, 2003: 179). 
Although consensus could, in principle, be easily achieved through cooperation around 
planning (Meijers and Romein, 2003), the implementation of polycentricity is relative weak. 
Implementation requires forging synergies and cooperation between multiple actors and 
multiple interests. However, there is seldom a formal government structure for polycentric 
urban regions. A fixed or strong regional government may not be suitable for the region or 
city where multiple actors and diverse functional relations exist. In addition, stronger 
regional government may lead to lower complementarity within region, as the municipalities 
under the jurisdiction of a strong regional government may lack functional division while 
municipalities having more autonomy will forge their own competitiveness through an 
unique business niche (Cowell, 2010). 
To exploit the potential of polycentric urban regions, the building of regional organising 
capacity is necessary (Meijers and Romein, 2003). Organising capacity is defined as  
‘the ability to enlist all actors involved and, with their help, to generate new ideas, and 
to develop and implement a policy designed to respond to fundamental developments 
and create conditions for sustainable development’ (van den Berg and Braun, 1999: 
995). 
The governance capacity of a city region is reflected in its ability to construct effective policy 
within it and to participate in multi-level policymaking (Nelles, 2013: 1353). There are three 
different schools of thought in terms of city-region governance. The first is the metropolitan 
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reform school, which focuses on improving the performance of governance through 
institutional reform and consolidation in order to better encompass the functional region. 
The second is the public choice school, which argues that the autonomy of several 
jurisdictions results in efficient public services provision because of certain degree of 
competition. The third approach is the new regionalism school, which argues that the 
cooperation could be achieved through a voluntary network of interdependent actors. Nelles 
(2013: 1359-1362) also argues that civic capital (including the leadership, networks and 
scale) is the crucial determinant of the strength of horizontal cooperation beyond other two 
dimensions that are institutional environment and opportunities. Van den Berg and Braun 
(1999) also claim that the integrated vision of urban development, the formation of strategic 
networks and leadership are key elements for the organising capacity. Meijers and Romein 
(2003) argue that the organising capacity of PUR is determined by the spatial economic 
conditions, political institutional background, and cultural identity.  
The intermunicipal partnership could be used as a tool to promote polycentrism, but it can 
also change the power relation between the central city and the peripheries. Outside the 
central city, new forms of governance have emerged involving municipalities, chambers of 
commerce, trade unions and third sectors in small or medium sized cities and towns in order 
to reinforce the (sub)centrality of peripheral municipalities, which may compete with the 
central city and contribute to the emergence of polycentricity (Pradel-Miquel, 2015). 
Sometimes, the intermunicipal partnership is strongly led and supported by central cities for 
competitiveness in a global economy and therefore the central city has to make concessions 
to the peripheries to build up the cooperation (Lefèvre, 1998). The limited access to power 
structures and restricted agenda-setting ability may even create new marginality in a region, 
especially for in-between spaces and actors beyond the ‘network nodes’ and ‘corridors of 
connectivity’ within a polycentric city region (Herrschel, 2009).  
3.5 Spatial identity: bridging vision and reality  
Identity has become an important part in urban experience. It is also employed as an 
important tool in regional planning and development (Paasi, 2003). Therefore, identity is a 
key element to understanding the spatiality of places and the regionalisation process in the 
context of polycentric discourses and practices. Planning visions, policy implementation and 
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urban reality can be articulated into the framework of spatial identity. However, it is much 
less discussed in the literature on polycentricity.  
The identity in a polycentric system comprises at least two scales, the identity as a whole 
and the identity of places within it. For the regional or network city planning and 
development, a common or shared identity is a crucial factor in the shaping of PURs 
(Kloosterman and Musterd, 2001; Van Houtum and Lagendijk, 2001; Turok and Bailey, 
2004). The prerequisite of a PUR is to distinguish itself from other regions, and a clear 
boundary will be shaped in policy rhetoric and in citizens’ consciousness. Within a 
polycentric system, the cities and their parts should vary in their nature and image 
(Champion, 2001b: 667). Musterd and Zelm (2001) argue that the size of PUR is too large 
to be relevant to households and individuals because of constraints on people’s experience 
in time and space. From a household perspective, high quality and distinct identity of places 
can be used to provide more differentiated and complementary residential milieux in 
polycentric urban area at more local level.  
Regional identity is produced in an intertwined cultural-historical and political-economic 
context. It is defined as ‘a process consisting of the production of territorial boundaries, 
symbolism, and institutions’ (Passi, 2003: 478). It is formed through the actions ‘from above 
in the form of territorial control/governance and from below in the form of territorial 
identification and resistance’ (ibid.: 477). Van Houtum and Lagendijk (2001) present a 
regional identity framework of PURs consisting of three dimensions: strategic, cultural and 
functional. This categorisation reflects a similar principle of classification of regions by 
Meyer (1963) (see also in Parr, 2008), who divides the region into homogeneous region, 
nodal region and policy region, based on common characteristics, economic linkages and 
policies respectively. In this framework, the strategic identity of PUR appears in policy-
oriented documents which identify a certain area as a policy region, aiming at improving and 
promoting an endogenous growth network within region through creating a common 
perspective. Cultural identity refers to the collective consciousness of belonging and 
imagination of local citizens for the region. Functional identity means the functional 
coherence (economic, political or social interconnection and linkages) within the region. 
Van Houtum and Lagendijk (2001) argue that these three dimensions are interdependent and 
can explain the process of shaping of PURs.  
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However, PURs, especially cross-border regions, are proposed by politicians and planners 
rather than simply based on historical regionalisation processes or homogenous 
identification process. As a strategic planning concept then, PURs are created by spatial 
planning, and their regional identities are reformed and rescaled by strategic purposes. As 
Van Houtum and Lagendijk claim, the (re)production of identity:  
‘should be perceived in the context of the subjective interests of dominate actors, such 
as key politicians and business people, planners, consultants, scientists and local 
media’ (2001: 756) and ‘the map and pencil rather than the analysis play a decisive 
role in the shaping of PURs’ (2001: 765).  
The strategic identity of a PUR may facilitate the building its cultural and functional identity 
to a certain degree. However, one problem is that without the basis of a common identity, 
the voluntary cooperation and the formation of a common strategy would become impossible. 
More seriously, a politically manipulated experience would be meaningless due to the lack 
of support for the cultural and functional identity. Cultural and functional identity can invoke 
and sustain the shaping of PUR by its grounding in existing reality and by providing new 
elements such as symbols, images, slogans, believes and new functions. For example, 
Central Scotland (Glasgow- Edinburgh) region can be counted as a typical PUR when 
examining its spatial form, while it is two separate city-regions with distinct identities, 
limited economic interactions and fragmented governance. In terms of identities, these two 
city-regions lack a shared identity among citizens because of differences in culture, 
development trajectories and ideas, and lack of interaction of everyday activities (Bailey and 
Turok, 2001; Turok and Bailey, 2004). Rhine-Ruhr is another example of an urban region 
with a morphological polycentricity but without a regional identity or regional co-operation 
(Knapp, 1998). Subregions in this polycentric urban region, such as the Ruhr and the Rhine-
axis have formed their own identities, in which process the historical and economic profiles 
play more important roles than planning imaginaries (Goess, et al., 2016).  
Polycentricity is also associated with spatial imaginary and city branding practices in 
reshaping space and spatial relations (Goess et al., 2016; Granqvist et al., 2019; Wäckerlin 
et al., 2020). In the polycentric urban region, cities are supposed to distinguish themselves 
from neighbouring cities and market themselves in specialised and complementary ways 
(Goess et al., 2016). City branding practices revolve around two different concepts that are 
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‘brand identity’ and ‘city image’, which jointly shape the identity at the local and regional 
level (Wäckerlin et al., 2020). Brand identity is the designed and desired image held by local 
government, which has an impact on the people’s perception and on interventions in physical 
environment. Place image is associations about a place in the perception of any individuals 
or group, which influences their spatial practices and participation in policy and decision-
making processes. Polycentricity adds a new dimension to city branding for the member 
cities (ibid.). Therefore, the branding process of polycentric regions or mega-cities needs to 
develop a ‘polyphonic’ brand texture with many distinctly different elements (Ren and Berg, 
2014). Different parts of cities have their roles and characters in this overall brand texture in 
order to achieve a leveraging effect on the city brand as a whole. Co-branding is therefore 
an important way of creating a sense of inclusion. 
Identity of place is determined by both physical form and individual subject experiences, 
both direct and mediated at a range of scale (Roberts et al., 1999). It can change coincident 
with the evolution of urban form. With the rapid decentralisation process, attitudes towards 
the periphery and rural area in a territory have changed. In the post-suburbia discourse, the 
periphery is no longer differentiated from the urban (Phelps et al., 2010). New urbanity could 
be discerned and developed in the urban fringe. The urban landscape of the periphery has 
changed into an amalgam of shopping centres, business parks, theme parks, colleges and up-
scale housing, which has been called ‘diffused urbanity’ (Gospodini, 2006). In order to make 
the polycentric development more ‘liveable’ and ‘integrated’, Robert et al. (1999) emphasise 
the importance of the incorporation of urban design and the creation of new perception of 
spaces at imaginary level, so that the new subcentres can develop their own identities and 
support other centres by involving an inclusive network of movement and communication.  
3.6 Conclusion and discussion 
This chapter investigates the application and implementation of polycentricity in the policy 
and planning realm, based on extant literature about planning history and planning practices 
in different countries, regions, and cities. It shows that the European Community led the 
majority of discussion of polycentricity both in policy discourse and in academic research. 
The debate on polycentricity from the planning and governance perspectives is rather limited 
in China. Nonetheless, the spatial transformations led from land market reform and 
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transitional institutions have been thoroughly discussed (Lin, 1999; Wei, 2012). The 
discussion of polycentricity is often associated with suburbanisation process in China, which 
is largely influenced by urban planning such as new towns plan (Feng et al., 2008; Feng et 
al., 2009; Shen and Wu, 2012; 2017). Until very recently, research on the specific topic of 
polycentricity has emerged (e.g. Cheng and Shaw, 2017). This chapter links polycentricity 
with sustainable development, spatial planning, territorial governance, and spatial identity 
based on the debate in western context. Four themes can be drawn that have relevance to the 
planning and governance of polycentricity in China, which indicate new dimensions that 
need to be investigated in empirical analysis.  
First, theoretical foundations, planning knowledge referred to and local adjustments are 
important to be included in empirical research, when analysing polycentricity in planning 
documents. Polycentricity is regarded as a sustainable urban form if the physical and 
functional connection between nodes are well maintained, in the context of the return to 
compact urban form and the emergence of regional thinking in the post-modern planning 
paradigm. Although polycentric urban form can theoretically achieve sustainability, 
empirical research still has no conclusive views about its performance in this respect. 
Nonetheless, professional planners still hold the theoretical benefits of polycentric 
development, which can explain the popularity of this concept in the policy realm to a certain 
degree. Furthermore, the application of planned theories such as new towns and growth poles 
(centres) modify urban and regional spatial patterns and contribute to polycentric transition. 
Professional knowledge in China’s planning is influenced by foreign ideas, but local 
adjustments may result in different interpretations and application of these planning ideas.  
Secondly, planning of polycentricity is a policy framework that can be reproduced to achieve 
multiple purposes, which is not just confined to rational planning based on sustainable 
discourse. The reproduction process is influenced by the differences in historical, political, 
and geographical contexts. This point reasserts the importance of historical, political, and 
geographical contexts in interpreting the polycentricity that has also been mentioned in last 
chapter. According to the discussion in these two chapters, the concept of polycentricity in 
the European context is mainly regarded as a normative goal. In fact, polycentricity is a 
Euro-English term (Waterhout et al., 2005: 163). The ESDP has facilitated the concept of 
polycentricity in Europe since the 1990s. Polycentricity has been applied in spatial planning 
at the pan-European, national, and regional level, but the notion of polycentricity has been 
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reproduced in different countries and regions according to different political, functional, and 
morphological conditions. Common identity of history and culture, existing political-
administrative frameworks and the proximity of moderate size cities encourage more 
attempts to form polycentric urban regions in policy realm (Salone, 2005). However, 
polycentric strategies are often non-binding and is mainly achieved through programme-
based or incentive-based approach (Waterhout et al., 2005). In North America, polycentric 
urban development is driven by the market forces of land, commercial and residential 
property markets, mainly without planning or with micro-planning by the private sector, 
especially in the peripheral area (Hise, 1997; Phelps et al., 2006). Based on western 
experience, it is evident that the distinct political system, planning approach and the 
particular history and geography of China will lead to the reinvention of polycentricity 
whose progress will be similarly influenced by planning and market forces but in different 
ways to the West. Therefore, political purposes underlying the reinvention of polycentricity 
and the influences of historical, political, and geographical contexts need to be further 
interrogated in China.  
Thirdly, power structures and interaction between stakeholders play critical roles in 
discourse formation and implementation of polycentric development strategies. In Europe, 
multi-level governance and polycentric governance modes, based on flexibility, partnership, 
and voluntary cooperation network, have transcended traditional hierarchical government in 
plan-making process and implementation process, which is one of reasons for the success of 
the concept of polycentricity. The implementation of polycentricity requires forging 
synergies and cooperation between multiple actors and multiple interests. Moreover, new 
forms of governance may also reshuffle existing power relation and spatial relations. Again, 
the differences in political and planning system also lead to differences in governance mode 
in terms of polycentric development. The governance in Europe is often in the form of multi-
level governance including supranational, national, regional, and local level, and the public 
sectors play a key role in the cooperation and interactions between different authorities. For 
the US, there exist many local municipal governments within a metropolitan area, and 
therefore the institutional fragmentation lead to many attempts to metropolitan consolidation 
to facilitate cooperation and partnership (Lefèvre, 1998). A big difference is that governance 
change in the west arises out lengthy manoeuvrings among multiple parties whereas in China 
change is more at the behest of powerful state actors. Therefore, exploring the changing 
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relations between state actors and innovation in governance modes is helpful to understand 
the making and implementation process of polycentric strategies in China.  
Finally, spatial identity is a useful concept that can bring planning vision and urban reality 
together. Identity of polycentricity consists of different dimensions that are held by different 
agents such as government authorities or by individuals. These dimensions are 
interdependent and interactive. This thesis aims to investigate both the policy making and 
implementation and thus needs to investigate both the image in planning vision and identity 
in urban reality. Chinese cities have experienced ‘restless’ urban development and have been 
characterised by diversified urban landscapes (Shen and Wu, 2012; Wang et al., 2016). The 
identity of urban space and urban system is becoming complicated in this process. The 
changes in spatial identity are an important indicator to reflect the polycentric transition and 
the success of policy implementation. The influences of politics, function, and physical form 
on reshaping identity need to be considered. Moreover, identity in a polycentric system 
comprises the identity of a city or region and the identity of places within it. Inspired by this, 
this research will investigate the identity of the case city first and then investigate identity of 
specific parts in much more detail regarding to polycentricity.  
These conclusive discussions in chapter 2 and 3 are crucial to better understanding of 
polycentricity in China. It is necessary to build an analytical framework to articulate all these 
points. In next chapter, a new epistemology of space/structure will be introduced. Based on 
that, a novel theoretical framework will be built that includes all these elements.  
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Chapter 4 Theoretical framework and methodology 
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter borrows from the post-structuralist research on space to construct a novel 
theoretical framework. The new framework resonates with the literature discussion in 
previous two chapters and it also determines research design and methodology of this 
research. This chapter first provides a theoretical perspective to understand urban space and 
the politics of space. Following that, it constructs a theoretical framework to explore 
polycentricity in China. This framework aims to address research questions in a systematic 
way and facilitate a better understanding of polycentricity in China from a spatialised 
political economy approach. Subsequently, this chapter discusses research strategy and 
research methods and justifies their rationale and provides a detailed information about data 
collection and analysis process. 
4.2 A new epistemology of urban space 
According to the discussion in chapters two and three, polycentricity has been researched in 
multiple disciplines and from different standpoints. This research aims to investigate the 
application in planning and implementation in practices regarding polycentric development 
in China. Therefore, it is necessary to build a new epistemology of polycentricity to better 
understand the policy making as well as policy delivery. The spatial triad of Lefebvre (1991) 
and debates on politics of space are referred in this section. In this way, a new framework 
that bridges policy discourse and implementation, integrates vision and reality, links power, 
knowledge and space together can be developed.  
4.2.1 The production of urban space 
The concept of space is derived from philosophy and mathematics (Lefebvre, 1991). Space 
was traditionally regarded as absolute space and it was studied in geography from the 
‘chorological’ perspective in 19th century and early 20th century, which showed high interest 
in collective existence or phenomena in space, the law of spatial distribution and spatial 
forms (Hartshorne, 1958). Since the 1960s, space has become a focal point of social science. 
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Traditional opinions, that regard space merely as an evidence of senses, a passive locus or 
container of human activities and social relations, were subject to critiques because non-
material factors, such as politics, society and culture were ignored.  
Drawing on the work of philosophers such as Hegel, Nietzsche and Marx, Lefebvre proposed 
a new way of thinking about space and social change in his book The Production of Space. 
Lefebvre argues space and the social are intertwined and inseparable, and further proposed 
the core idea that ‘(social) space is a (social) product’ (1991: 26). In this theory, space is 
regarded as both the (social) product and producer of social dynamics during the process of 
production and reproduction. 
The Production of Space is a unitary theory of physical, mental and social space. A 
conceptual triad has been proposed by Lefebvre to reflect the ontology of space. The spatial 
triad comprises three distinct but inherently related parts: (1) spatial practices, (2) 
representations of space and (3) space of representation/representational spaces (Lefebvre, 
1991). Lefebvre also uses the terms ‘perceived space’, ‘conceived space’ and ‘lived space’ 
to refer to this triad and points out the trialectical relationship within it (Lefebvre, 1991). 
The first set of parts above represents the epistemological dimension and the latter set of 
parts set the phenomenological dimension of the spatial triad (Schmid, 2008).  
From a Lefebvrian perspective, spatial practices are associated with perceived space between 
daily reality and urban reality, which is directly related to materiality. Representations of 
space means conceptualised space or conceived space, which are linked to the relations of 
production and to the production of knowledge. Lefebvre sees the representations of space 
as the ‘order’ of space which is ‘the space of scientists, planners, urbanists, technocratic 
subdividers and social engineers’ (1991: 38). This space is the dominant space in any society 
or mode of production, which is employed to generate the ‘abstract space’ through the 
process of conception. Representational space refers to the lived space of ‘inhabitant’ and 
‘user’, which is a dominated and passively experienced space where the imagination seeks 
to change and appropriate it. 
Distinguishing the three spaces is fundamental to understanding the spatial triad, but it offers 
various interpretive possibilities. Elden (2004) argues that perceived space is physical and 
material space, while conceived space is imagined and constructed by mental processes, and 
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lived space is modified and altered by everyday life. Merrifield (2013) claims that social 
space is concealed in spatial practices that facilitate social functioning. Representation of 
space is a mental and abstract space embedded in power and ideology while representational 
space is related to the body and is an imagined space by ‘inhabitants’ and ‘users’ (ibid.). 
Harvey (1989) claims that spatial practices take on their meaning under specific social 
relations and ‘get used’ or are ‘worked over’ in the course of social action. He adds other 
spatial dimensions such as ‘absolute space’, ‘relative space’ and ‘relational space’ to 
Lefebvre’s spatial triad and builds a matrix of specialities, which emphasises not only 
political and economic power but also symbolism and meanings during the production of 
space (Harvey,1989; 2006). Soja (1996) highlights the importance of representational space 
and regards representational space as social space and terms it the ‘Thirdspace’ to 
differentiate it from mental space and physical space. 
The concept of ‘the production of space’ shifts the research interest in social science from 
production (of things) in space to the production of space itself (Merrifield, 2013). As a 
typical form of social space, urban space is a central concern of Lefebvre. As Lefebvre (1991) 
notes, urban space is at the centre of human activities, which reflects a dialectic of centrality 
and is filled with conflicts and contradictions. From Lefebvre’s perspective, urban space 
functions as (1) the material means of production; (2) a consumption objects; (3) a political 
instrument; and (4) the instrument of class struggle. Urban landscapes and structures have 
been reshaped by political and economic elements, such as capital, power and class. 
Lefebvre’s theory provides an important perspective to explain the phenomenon and 
problem of rapid urban expansion, pervasive urbanisation and spatial organisation. His 
epistemological framework of (urban) space is useful for urban studies and planning research 
as it is instrumental to constructing a research framework. For example, Lennon and Moore 
(2018) formulate a new framework for examining the micropolitics of the production of 
space by extending the theory of Lefebvre. He and Lin (2015) borrow from Lefebvre’s 
spatial triad to build a state, market and society triad to explore the production and usage of 
new types of urban spaces including edge cities, urban villages and mega projects in China. 
They also suggest the importance of using this triad to investigate the social, political, and 
economic forces in production of polycentric urban landscapes in China.  
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4.2.2 The politics of space  
According to Lefebvre’s theory, space is essentially a political product and politicised in the 
production and reproduction process. Urban space is filled with conflicts and contestations 
between the state and society, between state and capital, and between states at different 
scales. These conflicts revolve around two key themes ‘abstract space’ and ‘differential 
space’, representing the exchange value and use value of space respectively (Lefebvre, 1991). 
‘Representations of space/conceived space’ is interwoven with the abstracting process that 
generates abstract space, and ‘spaces of representation/lived space’ is tied to the process 
through which differential space is generated (Lennon and Moore, 2018). From the logic of 
capital construction and circulation, space can be produced, consumed, distributed just like 
the other means of production (Lefebvre, 1991). Abstract space is therefore produced and 
regulated by the modern state in order to sustain the rational economic circulation in the 
sphere of production and facilitate the state control and manipulation (Brenner and Elden, 
2009). ‘Differential space’, which reasserts the use value and differences, challenges and 
resists the abstracting forces in capitalist rationality through appropriation and symbolic 
interaction (Lennon and Moore, 2018).  
Space is not just the container in which politics takes place, but it is also the medium and 
outcome of contests and struggles. Politics as well as other social relations are articulated in 
the production of abstract space and differential space. Therefore, the politics of space is 
reflected in the process of production of space by state regime politics and in the process of 
resistance by everyday spatial politics. Space in general but abstract space in particular is 
the ‘political product of state spatial strategies of administration, repression, domination 
and centralised power’ and both institutional arrangement and political imaginaries are 
reshaped in the production process (Brenner and Elden, 2009: 359).  
This thesis mainly focuses on the relatively dominant and privileged power in the production 
of space that is termed state power. Studies of the politics of space in this formal form analyse 
the process of capital accumulation (Harvey, 1978; 1981), the reconstitution of power 
relations in new form of governance (Logan and Molotch, 1987; Stone, 1989; Macleod and 
Goodwin, 1999) and the politics of scales (Delaney and Leitner, 1997; Brenner, 2000; Ward 
and Jonas, 2004). Harvey (1978) formulates the circuits of capital flow to explain why new 
space is continuously produced so as to sustain the provisional stabilisation of capitalist 
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urbanisation. Space becomes the new surplus value when the surplus value created by labour 
and materials in the primary circuit have reached their limits (over accumulation). As Harvey 
points out in his time-spatial fix theory, the huge amount of capital investment in fixed assets 
(thereby reorganising the geographical landscape and form) is the main approach to facilitate 
the circuit of capital and thereby to temporarily solve the contradictions through 
geographical expansion of production and consumption (Harvey, 1981). Due to the 
decentralisation of state power and the shift from managerialism to entrepreneurialism, the 
role of local economic development in urban politics and urban space governance has been 
stressed (Harvey, 1989). Municipal governments became more powerful and they undertake 
the responsibilities of economic development, the provision of public service and 
infrastructure construction (Painter, 1995). New forms of institutional arrangements on 
urban development have emerged in this process such as the emergence of alliances of key 
interest group and the growing influence of private sector (Macleod and Goodwin, 1999). 
The ‘growth machine’ (Logan and Molotch, 1987) and the ‘urban regime’ (Stone, 1989) are 
two of most influential perspectives to achieve new mechanism of policy development and 
implementation. 
However, governance theories such as these failed to integrate the influences of national 
state and failed to problematise the issue of scale (Macleod and Goodwin, 1999). Since the 
1990s, questions of scalar organisation and the process of rescaling have become the central 
focus of urban and regional research in the context of globalisation and multiscalar state 
restructuring (Brenner, 2000). Therefore the production of space/politics of space has 
extended to the production of scale and the politics of scale (Delaney and Leitner, 1997; 
Brenner, 2000). In these accounts, scale is not a pre-given geographical concept, referring to 
bounded spaces such as the local, regional, national and global, but it is socially constructed 
in the process of political, economic and social restructuring (Delaney and Leitner, 1997). 
Similarly, scales have become both containers, media, and outcomes of socio-political 
contestation and struggle (Brenner, 2000). Spatial rescaling has become a part of political 
strategies in coping with the crisis of Fordism, dealing with conflicts and struggles, and 
reshuffling power relationships (Swyngedouw, 2000; Brenner, 2000). City regions that 
constitute vital sites for rescaling process, are produced in order to manage conflicts and 
struggles in particular circumstances and to forge political alliances or partnerships within 
and between cities and regions (Ward and Jonas, 2004; Healey, 2006). 
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State planning, or rather ‘spatial policy’ is also one of the major focuses of Lefebvre’s 
account of the politics of space (Brenner and Elden, 2009). Space is continuously shaped 
and reshaped through various types of spatial strategies. Although planning professions 
entail a body of knowledge with an empirical base and often use scientific and technical 
approaches in order to claim that its methods and philosophy is objective and neutral, the 
spatio-temporal programmes and plans are essentially political processes just as their core 
object, space, is political (Lefebvre, 1976). The apparatus of official planning represents the 
mobilisation of knowledge and technical expertise for the purpose of abstraction (Lefebvre, 
1991). In this sense, modern planning policies are used as tools to legitimise the action of 
state (control and domination) and the action of capital (abstraction and circulation) (Dear, 
1986). 
Lefebvre (1991: 3, 4) also refers to the work of Foucault to stress the instrumentality of 
knowledge. From a Lefebvre perspective, representations of spaces are produced with the 
help of knowledge and expertise. From a Foucauldian perspective, knowledge or discourses 
are competing sets of ideas, which can serve power but also challenge power (Foucault, 
1972). Although Foucault’s discourse theory is most often applied to micro-politics, it is also 
helpful for this research. The dialectical relationship between power, knowledge and space 
helps reshape Lefebvre’s spatial triad. More importantly, it offers a methodological insight, 
which will be discussed in following section.  
4.3 The construction of the theoretical framework  
This research aims to answer two interrelated questions, as introduced in chapter 1. The first 
is what underlying meanings and rationality of polycentric urban development in the policy 
and planning discourse in China are. To address this question, polycentric discourses, power 
relations and polycentric space/structure are required to be critically interrogated. Second, 
this research asks how concrete centres in the polycentric system are created, governed, and 
materialized to facilitate the implementation of polycentric policies. Polycentricity is 
regarded as ‘a system of centres’ in this research. Therefore, this research analyses the 
polycentric system as a whole first and then selects specific places within the case study city. 
Drawing on the conclusive discussions in chapter two and three and the politics of space 
theory above, a novel theoretical framework is developed, which provides guidance for the 
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methodology and empirical analysis. The framework is applied to both the systematic 
analysis and detailed investigations of specific centres (Figure 4.1).  
The key components are state power, planning profession and produced space which appear 
in the core of the theoretical framework. These components have dialectic relationships and 
they together co-produce polycentric structure/space. (1) State power: Polycentricity in the 
policy realm is politically constructed as the result of interaction between key actors and 
stakeholders. These actors include the multiple levels of governments, actors within and 
between government departments or organisations, and quasi-government actors such as 
state-owned and state-influenced developers. Their interests, capacity, tools and instruments 
are key dimensions of state power. (2) Planning profession: This element represents the 
main source of knowledge and discourses about polycentricity. The planning profession 
masters the knowledge and technical expertise about the spatial arrangements and 
organisation, which is informed by planning theories and concepts. Planners pursue a 
polycentric spatial pattern and create polycentric discourses to form an instrumental space. 
Their dominant discourse and its composition are related to political and technical rationality. 
In addition, the professionals’ personal habits and their awareness of professional ethics play 
an increasingly important role in the final output. (3) Produced space: This component 
comprises both physical space and urban experience. The morphological and functional 
characteristics are important dimensions for polycentric development. The state power and 
planning profession generate impacts on the built environment, the perception and identity 
of space.  
The framework in Figure 4.1 also highlights the contexts, scales, processes, and approaches 
to achieve a better understanding of how the polycentric development takes place in China. 
These four elements are drawn based on the extant literature and frame four analytical 
aspects or objects that specific attention should be paid to. (1) Context: The politics of space 
is not isolated from the territorial and historical context. The vision of polycentricity is 
subject to different interpretations and objectives. Therefore, the development stage of the 
city and macro policy ideology influences the form of polycentric development. (2) Scale: 
Scale here refers to both geographic scale and political scale. On one hand, the geographical 
scale is pre-determined by the political and administrative system and it provides an 
important site for the exercise of power. This research identifies different geographical scales 
and distinguishes the scale at which the polycentricity has been applied. On the other hand, 
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‘scalar flux’ implies that these geographical scales are redefined and reshaped for special 
purposes or because of the changing socio-economic relationships. The rescaling strategies 
which significantly influence the relationship between power and space are identified as 
critical events in the empirical analysis. (3) Process: This research is process-oriented, which 
retraces the development process and decision-making process at the same time. (4) 
Approach: According to the literature, polycentric development is a mixed process of top-
down and bottom-up mechanisms. It can be either proposed or facilitated by policies and 
planning or emerge spontaneously in urbanisation and regionalisation process. To identify 
approaches is helpful to understand spatial logics and outcomes of polycentric development, 
especially for the creation and development of specific nodes within the polycentric system. 
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Figure 4.1 An analytical framework to understand polycentricity in China 
Source: Produced by author 
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4.4 Research methodology 
This research interprets polycentricity through a constructivist approach. That means it 
admits the ‘subjective rationalism’ of planning and supposes that the planning and 
development process is a power-laden process in China. While the plurality of understanding 
and different perspectives on polycentricity are acknowledged, this research does not attempt 
to reject the ‘objective truth’. The scientific and technical explanations as well the changes 
in terms of material space were also investigated to understand the dialectic relationships 
between power, knowledge and space in discursive formation and implementation process. 
The aim of this research was achieved through an embedded case study approach combined 
with using multiple qualitative data and strategies.  
4.4.1 Embedded case study  
According to the literature, polycentricity is essentially embedded in a process of urban 
development and policy making. In-depth and longitudinal research is of greater value than 
mere measurement or description. This research attempts to achieve a transformation from 
structural to processual understanding. It needs to investigate the evolution of urban form, 
the changing macro socio-economic environment and the political process involving critical 
actors, all at the same time. Therefore, both the temporal dimension and contextual 
conditions need to be considered. A case study (of a specific city) can involve a combination 
of these two dimensions (Bryman, 2015).  
Case study strategies have been widely adopted in research in many disciplines. The design 
of holistic or embedded, single case or multiple case are two crucial distinctions for case 
study research (Scholz and Tietje, 2002). This research is designed to adopt the embedded 
case study approach. Embedded case study includes multiple units of analysis on different 
levels, which is appropriated for knowledge integration and synthesis (Scholz and Tietje, 
2002; Yin, 2013). The overall case in this research is the case study city as a whole system. 
Following a comprehensive account of the evolution of polycentric system in planning 
vision and urban reality, typical centres within the polycentric system were analysed as 
smaller units, which allows the in-depth analysis within limited time and resources. Finally, 
the knowledge acquired from this two-level analysis was integrated into the main case level 
to answer the twofold research questions. Another significant advantage of case study design 
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is that it can draw upon various types of data and analysis methods (Yin, 2013). More 
specifically, the data (documents, interviews, and statistics, etc.) and data analysis methods 
(statistical analysis, discourse analysis, spatial analysis, etc.) can be involved in one case.  
The city of Tianjin was selected as a single case according to both validity and pragmatic 
considerations. As polycentricity is a context-sensitive theory and this research adopts a 
constructivist approach, Tianjin is not used as a representative case, although similar logics 
and approaches might be encountered in other Chinese cities. Tianjin satisfies five main 
conditions as follows. First, the polycentric concept should be embedded in the local 
planning ideas and polices in case study city. Second, the case must possess a polycentric 
urban form or show a significant polycentric development trend. Third, the case study city 
is better to be embedded in a wider regional and global network so that it is influenced 
significantly by actions at a larger scale. Fourth, the case is better to be characterised by the 
features such as rapid urban expansion and growth both in economic and population, where 
significant adjustment about urban form can be identified. Last but not least, the selection of 
the case should also be based on pragmatic considerations. In this case, cooperation with 
Nankai University in Tianjin facilitated the field work and data collection, and the researcher 
also had familiarity with Tianjin from his earlier work as planner.  
Tianjin is one of the most important manufacturing and port cities in North China. After 
Beijing and Shanghai, it is the third municipality of China under the direct control of the 
central government. Municipalities in China are cities with greater importance in politics 
and economic development. They are parts of the highest-level Chinese administrative 
divisions at the same tier as provinces. Located along the west coast of Bohai Gulf and in 
the north-eastern extremity of the North China Plain, Tianjin is surrounded by the Hebei 
province and Beijing municipality (Figure 4.2). Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei together form the 
third largest economic region or urban cluster. Historically, Tianjin’s development was 
always highly influenced by Beijing and recent regional policy focussed on the Beijing-
Tianjin-Hebei Region, which has become of national significance, is expected to generate 
new influences.  
66 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Location of Tianjin 
Source: (Wei and Jia, 2003) 
Since China’s Open-Door Policy, like many other eastern and coastal cities, Tianjin has 
experienced dramatic urban growth and spatial transformation. However, Tianjin has 
received far less attention from scholars than other large cities in China, such as Beijing, 
Shanghai, and Shenzhen. Nonetheless, Tianjin has shown its speciality in terms of spatial 
development. The spatial structure of Tianjin has been reconfigured because a secondary 
city took initial shape on its southeast coast. In the planning realm, the development of the 
Binhai New Area was promoted so that it became a ‘twin city’ with the old city core. 
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Moreover, other new centres and policy enclaves have been continuously proposed in recent 
plans. In sum, the polycentric transition in Tianjin is prominent in the planning discourse 
and reality.  
The embedded smaller units/cases were determined in the process of analysis. There are 
three criteria for identifying them. First, the embedded cases are required to be explicitly 
identified as the key element of polycentric discourses of Tianjin. Second, these selected 
smaller cases are supposed to have greater political and economic significance. Third, these 
centres need to be recognised by key actors and interviewees. The results of selection are 
introduced in chapter 6, 7 and 8 in more detail.  
4.4.2 Data collection and analysis 
Theoretical propositions guided the data collection and the analysis process. The theoretical 
framework demands that attention should be paid to the power relations between key actors, 
and to changes in planning discourse and in material space under certain conditions. 
Therefore, the research contains both secondary data and primary data, which are highly 
complementary.  
Secondary data used in this research include (1) policy and planning documents, (2) official 
publications about history of urban construction and planning in Tianjin, (3) internal 
planning consultancy reports, (4) official statistical yearbooks at municipal and district level 
and (5) online resources from government official website and public media. These 
documentations provide substantial information about local history, chronicle of events, 
planning making process, institutional arrangement, development strategies and key 
development projects.  
First-hand data were obtained via semi-structured interviews. Interviews with heterogenous 
research participants informed policy context, decision-making process, planning practices, 
governance mechanisms, underlying rationality, driving forces, development process and 
place identity. This type of data was complemented and cross-checked by documentary data, 
and it also used to complement secondary data when the discourse analysis was carried out.  
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The two types of data were analysed in different ways in empirical chapters that aim to 
answer different part of research questions. To answer the first research question, this 
research adopts discourse analysis. The texts in planning documents were the main object of 
analysis, but the other objects in discourse analysis were beyond the text which were 
analysed based on interview data and other documentary data. The second research question 
was addressed mainly based on primary data such as interviews and site survey but still 
complemented by documentary information. Therefore, the research methods this research 
employs include discourse analysis and semi-structured interview. The details of theoretical 
roots, data collection and analysis techniques are discussed as follows.  
Discourse analysis  
Discourse generally refers to the aggregation of written or spoken communications. 
However, scholars use the term ‘discourse’ in a range of meanings. As a contested term, it 
is impossible to impose ‘a one size fits all’ definition to discourse, even though, Hastings 
(1999) still highlighted two key dimensions to this term. In linguistic definition, ‘discourse’ 
can be used to refer to either a single instance or event of language use, or groups of 
utterances or texts which originate or belong to a certain social domain. Hastings (2000) also 
identifies an insightful way of understanding discourse and discourse analysis propounded 
by Van Dijk (1997: 3), in which the ‘discourse’ is simply defined as ‘language use’ and 
‘discourse analysis’ as ‘the study of talk and text in context’. The emphasis on textual and 
contextual analysis has led to a restricted view of the nature of policy process, which make 
the policy lose its dynamic, conflictual and processual characteristics (Hastings, 2000). 
Therefore, Jacobs (1999) argues for the need to understand both text and practice to solve 
this problem.  
Spatial planning research, which is influenced by disciplines such as geography and cultural 
studies, has begun to highlight the role of discourse (or language) and to incorporate 
discourse analysis into the policy process (Richardson, 1996; Healey, 1999; Richardson and 
Jensen, 2000). In recent years, it has been deployed as a methodology to understand the 
process of urban policy and planning making and implementation (Jacobs, 2006). It is worth 
noting that there exist various and different theoretical and methodological approaches. 
Nevertheless, these approaches are all grounded in the philosophical discussion of the 
relation between language and reality. The common features of these approaches are that 
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they highlight the role of language in policy and planning realm and understand the world 
from a social constructivist epistemology. Language is not only a representation of an 
underlying reality but is also constitutive of social actions. 
According to different theoretical roots, Richardson (1996) categorises the theories and 
analysis of discourse that applied to policy and planning analysis into two camps, broadly 
Habermasian and broadly Foucauldian. Lees (2004) identifies two distinct strands of 
discourse analysis in urban research, namely political economy informed analysis and 
Foucauldian-inspire research. Based on Lees’ argument, Jacobs (2006) argues some other 
variants of discourse-based research fall outside this typology, such as discursive psychology, 
which mainly focuses on the interpretation of interview or conversational data. Generally, 
discourse analysis in policy and planning realm can be polarised into two groups, text 
oriented discourse analysis and Foucauldian approach according to the definition of 
discourse (Sharp and Richardson, 2001; Xu, 2016).The analysis of former discourse consider 
discourse textually, while the latter one is mainly based on the broader Foucauldian view 
about power and knowledge. However, in many empirical studies (e.g. the special issue in 
urban studies, 1999), both approaches show a concern to the inequalities of power, though 
the differences indeed exist in what the power refers and the means through which change 
can be achieved (Sharp and Richardson, 2001). These two distinct approaches indicate a 
collision of philosophy between modernity and postmodernity, a discourse between 
idealized consensual and antagonisms, a theory ground between communicative rationality 
and power relations (Jensen, 1997; Richardson, 1996). These two approaches have overlap 
to some extent, and the clarity of the differences between them can inform scholars the 
theoretical bases and the techniques of analysis. 
Text-oriented discourse analysis focuses on how language is used in particular settings and 
contexts and what implications and effects are made through discursive practices. For 
example, in critical discourse analysis, Fairclough (1992; 1995) proposes a dialectical 
relationship between text and social practice and provides an explicit analytical framework 
including text analysis, discursive practice and social practice for discourse analysis. Critical 
discourse analysis primarily focuses on the real social and political problem rather than the 
mere study of discourses outside the wider context (van Dijk, 2015). Texts as elements of 
social events are productive activities produced by agents, who draw on social structure and 
social practice when producing them (Fairclough, 1995). Texts are produced in given time 
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and place and intertwined with other elements of social practices, such as social relations. 
Thus, discourse analysis allows scholars to incorporate elements in the context into text 
analysis. The detailed text analysis (e.g. the analysis of genre, styles, vocabulary, rhetorical 
mode) can help provide new insights about understanding the reality.  
Power, hegemony, ideology and inequalities are typical terms belonging to the macro-level 
of analysis in critical discourse analysis (van Dijk, 2015). Critical discourse analysis focuses 
on ‘the way discourse structures enact, confirm, legitimate, reproduce, or challenge 
relations of power abuse (dominance) in society’ (ibid.: 467). In this approach, discourse is 
employed as a tool or instrument of power control and hegemony. A discourse coalition that 
refers to a group of agents who shares a common social construction (Hajer, 1993) can be 
formed in this process. That means a policy agenda can be achieved through integrating the 
dominate power into the laws, rules, norms, or even ideal consensus. 
In terms of the consensus, the dominate actors attempt to impose their discourse on others 
through persuasion or the exercise of power (Hajer, 1993). Discourses are seen as ‘system 
of meanings’ and a rational and democratic consensus between plural discourse can be 
achieved through good communications (Healey, 1996; 1997). According to this approach, 
the different interests can be articulated into one acceptable agenda and the power relations 
are regarded as a prior. In addition, this Habermasian approach based on communicative 
action is discourse of critical rationality (Richardson, 1996).  
Foucauldian discourse analysis draws on post-structuralist theories, particularly on the work 
of Michel Foucault. Discourse, power and knowledge are key concepts and consistently 
argued in Foucauldian theory. For Foucault, power is ubiquitous and insidious masked as 
forms of truth and knowledge (Foucault, 1980; 1990). There is no ultimate truth and 
language is not mere a representation of ‘reality’, instead it play an important role in 
establishing the ‘regime of truth’ (Foucault, 1980). The language, power and knowledge are 
interconnected through discourse (Foucault, 1972; 1977). ‘Regime of truth’ can determine 
the formation of social problems and the solution to address them selectively, which can be 
conceptualised as an outcome of power struggles.  
In this approach, discourses are interpreted as a combination of different elements of text, a 
set of competitive ideas and values, and a system of actions (Hajer, 1995; Sharp and 
71 
 
Richardson, 2001). Different systems of meaning or discourses compete for influence and 
impose their ideas and identity to other discourses (Sharp and Richardson, 2001). 
Contradictions and conflicts between these discourses are linked to power so that the 
structural changes in society can be viewed as a shift of relative influence of discourse. 
Therefore, Foucauldian approach tend to adopt a historically based analysis to understand 
the shift of discourse through which power is exercised (Jacobs, 2006).  
Compared to the text-oriented approach, Foucauldian approach challenges the assumption 
of pre-given identity of actors and argues that power can both construct and undermine 
identity position (Jensen, 1997; Lees, 2004). Another significant difference is that both 
rational and irrational arguments can be ‘truth’ through the exercise of power and the 
analysis of discourse is based on ‘contingent rationality’ (Sharp and Richardson, 2001). 
Planning and policy are authoritive discourses, through which institutions and organisations 
pursue political objectives. As Richardson (1996: 279) argues, ‘policy is shaped by 
arguments or discourses, based on knowledge claims which may be rational or irrational, 
reasonable or unreasonable’. He criticises the ‘turn to argument’ in planning theory based 
on Habermasian approach which focuses on communication is power-blind, though scholars 
such as Healy has acknowledged power and weakness of communication actions. In real 
world, the deployment of power rather than the rationality shapes the policy and dominate 
policy debates. Therefore, Foucauldian approach is not so much linguistically based but 
more interested in the relationship between power, rationality and space (Richardson, 1996). 
This research adopts a scaled discourse-analytical approach to study polycentric discourse 
in city planning in China, influenced by Foucault and like-minded scholars. First, plan 
making is based on the definition of urban development problems and how solutions are 
framed. This process is relatively selective and determined by power and rationality in the 
form of strategic decisions. Secondly, the task of planning is to coordinate conflicting 
interests within a process during which institutional structures, practices and actions need to 
be considered. Thirdly, in Chinese planning the master plan persists as an urban development 
blueprint that defines future development in a grand way. Language use in Chinese City 
Master Plans, especially about spatial patterns, tends to be simple and straightforward. 
Therefore, beyond the text, our analysis focuses more on the context and the power that is 
embedded in the planning content. Fourthly, when we consider the hierarchical and 
centralized nature of planning in Chinese cities, it becomes clear that power relations often 
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involve a range of stakeholders, such as central and local government, public agencies and 
the private sector. It is desirable, therefore, to add ‘politics of scale’ into discourse analysis 
(Keil and Debbané, 2005; Xu, 2016). 
Foucault inspired discourse analysis has not always been consistently applied in empirical 
research because of its flexibility and abstraction and because there is no precise 
methodological principle for conducting it. However, Sharp and Richardson (2001) list some 
key questions that the Foucauldian discourse analytical method should concern, for example, 
discourse identification, manifestation, the struggles and conflicts between discourses. 
Jensen (1997) proposed a theoretical framework for analysing spatial planning for the urban 
space, which consists of the linguistic part, power-rationality part and the practice-oriented 
part of discourse analysis. This epistemological framework of discourse analysis is suitable 
for the consideration of space, politics, and economy.  
Drawing on previous researchers’ analytical frameworks (Jensen, 1997; Healey, 1999; 
Richardson and Jensen, 2000; Sharp and Richardson, 2001), this research analyses the 
polycentric discourses in Tianjin’s planning roughly following five procedures: (1) 
Identifying the discourse object: The object of discourse in this research is specified as 
polycentricity but it is a complex entity that is constructed and transformed in the process of 
new discursive formation. (2) Context setting: The formation and transformation of 
discourse objects should be situated in social, economic, and historical context and explore 
what make new discursive practice possible, necessary or inevitable. (3) Discursive 
construction: This process does not simply refer to the use of the concept of polycentricity 
explicitly. It includes links to other plans and policies, the mode of problematisations, the 
use of specific vocabulary and concepts, the rhetorical mode, the components, and scales, 
and claims about knowledge. Texts were therefore categorised into these aspects in order to 
examine their underlying meaning, with the use of coding to provide reliability and 
comparability. (4) Mechanisms of power: The strategies and dynamics of power in the 
planning process are central to our analysis. The analysis focuses on inter-scalar political 
relations and investigates who is involved, what are their claims and purposes and how their 
contested and mutual interests and values are articulated and hence how previous discourse 
is reshaped. (5) Discourse institutionalisation: To analyse how discourse is translated into, 
or legitimized by, concrete policies and actions in the operationalisation, changes in 
institutional structures and tools for plan implementation will be highlighted. The 
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recognition that there is a reciprocal relationship between multi-scalar politics, 
institutionalisation practices and discursive practice is essential to the analysis process.  
Key data include planning archives and master plan documents. Since the 1980s, Tianjin has 
had four master plans and the text analysis mainly is based on these, while the power 
relations and institutionalisation process are traced through planning archives and interviews. 
All these planning documents are written in Chinese and there is a risk that translation to 
English may lead to the loss of conceptual equivalence (Wolf and Fukari, 2007). To 
minimise the influence of translation, special attention was given to retain the original 
meaning as much as possible. For readers of Chinese, planning jargon is shown in its original. 
Semi-structured Interviews 
The second qualitative method is semi-structured interview. The aim of semi-structured 
interviews is to learn about the historical context, underlying rationale and primary objects 
of spatial strategies, including the processes of polycentric development and the instruments 
and actions they adopt, what meanings they give to spaces. Qualitative interviews are helpful 
to gain a deeper understanding of the discourse and space reproduction, which cannot be 
obtained through documents and statistical data.  
Semi-structured interviews have attracted more interests than other types of interviews 
because the viewpoints of interviewed subjects are more likely to expressed in an open way 
(Flick, 2014: 207). The theoretical background of this method is that researchers study the 
topically relevant perspective in an interview. The reality is subjective rather than objective 
and absolute. This ontological stance affects the epistemological assumption and the 
treatment of relationship between researchers and the researched. Qualitative interviewing, 
as Seale (2011) claims, can be conducted from different epistemological standpoints, such 
as in a realist approach and in an idealist approach. In more detail, in a realist approach, 
interviews are viewed as resource, which provides real ‘fact’ independent of subject’s 
viewpoints. In contrast, the idealist position treats the interview as a topic, through which 
the interviewee’s account for the social world are expressed. In the latter approach, the 
interview is treated more as a social event and it is a process of data generation during the 
interaction of researcher and interviewees.  
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In practice, interview data are often analysed both as resource and topics, and this is the 
approach adopted here. On one hand, the interview materials were regarded as 
complementary to planning documents. As Sharp and Richardson (2001) argue, 
operationalising the Foucauldian discourse analysis requires a combination of research 
methods. The interview material can help to reconstruct the policy process through gathering 
information of context and identifying critical moments and events. On the other hand, 
interviewees’ interpretations, attitudes and experiences towards polycentricity are also very 
important.  
Interview were conducted with key stakeholders involved in the planning and spatial 
development process. Research participants were identified through two principles: (1) those 
who had substantial influences on the formulation of planning policy and the spatial layout 
of Tianjin; (2) those who have been involved in related initiatives for polycentric transition. 
Therefore, the targeted key actors were inevitably related to the political and planning system 
of China, which is thoroughly introduced in next chapter. Participants included government 
officials from both municipal and local level and from different department (e.g. the 
Development and Reform Commission, Planning Bureau, Land Bureau, Management 
Committee of policy enclaves, etc.), professionals and academics, and managers of 
enterprises (e.g. consulting companies, real estate companies, urban development 
corporations). In total, 43 interviews were conducted in two fieldtrips. The first fieldtrip was 
conducted between February 2018 and May 2018. In the first fieldtrip, interviews were 
mainly conducted with governmental officials from Tianjin Municipal Government and 
Tianjin Binhai New Area. Meanwhile, many secondary hand materials and data were 
collected. The second fieldtrip was carried out from May 2019 to June 2019, which mainly 
included interviews with governmental officials related to embedded cases and some 
supplementary interviews at municipal level. The detail list of interviewees is attached in 
Appendix 1.  
These participants can be viewed as experts in the planning and development process in 
Tianjin, who have specific insights and knowledge. According to Bogner and Menz’s (2009) 
definition, experts are those who have both specialist and practical knowledge referring to 
their specific professional sphere of activity. They further classify the knowledge and 
expertise into three types: namely technical, process and interpretive knowledge. Technical 
knowledge ‘contains information about operations and events governed by rules, 
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application routines that are specific for a field, and bureaucratic competences and so on’ 
(Bogner and Menz, 2009: 52); Process knowledge is related to the information about the 
sequences of actions, interaction routines and past or current events the expert is involved or 
has knowledge; Interpretive knowledge refers to ‘the expert’s subjective orientations, rules, 
points of view and interpretations’(ibid.). The expert interviews can provide the researcher 
both process knowledge and context knowledge. Generally, in expert interviews, the staff 
members of an institution with a specific function and knowledge are the targeted groups 
(Flick, 2014: 227). In addition, researchers that are interested in expert knowledge should 
treat the interviewees as a representative of a group rather than private person.  
This perspective give rise to issues about identification of research participants and data 
analysis process. First, some of current government officials and planners may not be 
familiar with the historical facts and decision-making process. Therefore, this research also 
interviewed some retired expects who participated in planning making. Secondly, for 
successful expert interviews, the researcher was required to familiarise with the development 
history and planning content of case study city and to be equipped with related theoretical 
basis so that the interviewees’ answers can be probed in more depth and details. In this way, 
the interviewees showed great interests and incentives in sharing and communicating 
information with interviewer. For example, one interview with local planners lasted more 
than three hours. Thirdly, the changing roles of interviewees between experts and private 
person were required to be clearly identified during analysis. More specifically, the answers 
based on the authoritative knowledge or personal experiences were clarified. This point is 
one of the key forms of failure for the expert interview (Meuser and Nagel, 2009).  
Interviewees of this research were all at relative high positions and had competent 
experiences to answer my interview questions. However, it is difficult to gain access to 
authority group and public sectors’ cadres in Chinese situation. Therefore, the help of 
colleagues from Nankai University played a key role in this process. Nankai University is 
the top university in Tianjin and has built a good relationship with Tianjin Municipal 
Government. In addition, participants were recruited from other channels. Two strategies 
were adopted here. First, researcher’s personal network such as alumni was used to recruit 
qualified interviews. Second, based on the established local contacts in this process, a 
snowball sampling technique has been adopted to recruit more interviewees.  
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The interview topic guide was designed to restrict the questions and answer interactions to 
the research topic. The interview guide is essential because of interview time pressure and 
the need for narrow focus (Flick, 2014: 211). The interview guide was theoretical driven. 
Topics were inspired by the key themes that are emphasised in literation chapters and 
theoretical framework. Each interview typically lasted around one hour. A list of key 
questions has been developed and interview questions were tailored according to the types 
of interviewees (See Appendix 2). For government officials, the themes of questions are 
focused on the purposes and priority underlying spatial strategies, governance mechanisms, 
development process, the formation of centres and consolidation approaches, outcomes and 
challenges. Interviews with planners and academics focused on rationale and practice of 
polycentric principle in planning, selectivity of centres, development process and urban 
reality, driving forces and the role of plan, problems and challenges. From the enterprises’ 
perspective, the main information collected were their relations with government, their 
interests and contribution, perception and expectations regarding polycentric development 
of Tianjin.  
The classic qualitative approach through coding, sorting, sifting and integration data (Weiss, 
1995; Chowdhury, 2015) was used to analyse interview data. All interviews were transcribed 
into Chinese first. When using direct quotations in writing up data, the important excerpts 
were translated into English. After transcribing, the transcriptions were coded manually by 
the themes of interview guide and research framework. At the initial stage, the main pre-
determined themes were applied to interview transcripts. New themes emerged during the 
coding and categorising process and the coding system was refined, which was used to code 
the transcripts again. Then excerpts labelled under same themes were extracted into a same 
document to reduce and reorganise the data. Finally, the relationship and interactions 
between these themes were identified and interpretations were given based on the theoretical 
framework. Given the flexibility of qualitative data analysis, it also requires that researchers 
need to go beyond coding, sorting, and sifting and to actively perform in interpretive and 
reflexive way (Chowdhury, 2015). Therefore, the interpretation is necessarily a recursive, 
interpretive, and reflective process wherein initial findings need to be constantly revisited 
and refined.  
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4.4.3 Research ethics 
In this research, the main potential ethical issues are limited to confidentiality and consent. 
Before entering the field, an ethics application form was approved by the ethics committee 
at the University of Glasgow. All interviews were conducted following the requirement of 
ethics approval. Participant Information Sheet and Consent Form were provided before 
interview which ensure the participants know the research background and they were 
voluntary to get involved in the study. It is however worth noting that written consent was 
difficult to obtain, given the social and political norms and culture in China. Instead, oral 
consent was obtained. 
Confidentiality is required to be well maintained in this research. Personal information and 
data were kept in a safe place and only the researcher can get access to them. Moreover, 
pseudonyms were used to keep interviewees anonymous. The cases of interviews were coded 
according to their types and characteristics. Interviews were referred in this thesis via 
pseudonym. G stands for government officials, P for planners, A for academics, F for firm 
managers. For governmental officials, the postfix refers to the tier of government: TJ for 
Tianjin, BH for Tianjin Binhai New Area, WQ for Wuqing District, DL for Dongli District, 
NK for Nankai District. However, this standard approach for anonymity and confidentiality 
maybe did not work well. The interview sample was not homogenous but rather consisted 
of a heterogenous group of individuals from different backgrounds. Especially for the 
government department, the attributes of organisation were kept in order to make sense of 
data. The interviewees (usually cadres of one specific department) may be able to be 
identified by other managers from another department. I discussed it with my interviewees 
about this issue and ensured they are comfortable with attributing the name of organisations, 
under which situation the confidentiality is not possible to guarantee. 
4.5 Conclusion  
This chapter sets the research framework and methodology of this research. Based on 
theories of production of space and politics of space, a novel theoretical framework was 
developed, which argued a constructivist approach to investigating planning and practices 
of polycentric development in China. This theoretical framework includes several key 
themes identified from literature, which will be applied to empirical analysis shortly. This 
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framework will not only help a better understanding of the (re)production of polycentric 
discourses in the overall case, but also identify key themes for investigating practices in 
specific embedded cases.  
In terms of methodology, an embedded case study was adopted and was combined with 
discourse analysis and semi-structured interview. Theoretical roots, data collection and 
analysis techniques were introduced as well. These two research methods will address 
research questions in a combined way, based on both interview data and secondary data. The 
empirical analysis will be presented in chapter 6, 7 and 8.
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Chapter 5 Contextualising polycentricity in China  
5.1 Introduction 
As discussed in literature review chapters, polycentricity is subject to different 
interpretations because of differences in the social-economic, political, and geographical 
context. Context is also an important element in the research framework in order to frame 
the polycentric planning and development. This chapter aims to set the background for the 
empirical analysis in the following chapters by considering the changing political framework, 
the planning system, and the restless urbanisation in the suburbs. These backgrounds are key 
to a better understanding of the demand for and rationality of polycentric development, 
considered both as an urban development trend and as a planning strategy.  
This chapter is organised as follows. First, it introduces the administrative framework and 
the dynamic relations between central and local government, which is relevant to the urban 
development policy and planning management. Following that, the evolution of planning 
system in China is introduced and special attention is attached to city master plans which 
provide an arena for the polycentric rhetoric. Then the political, economic, and socio-spatial 
changes in the suburban area are illustrated based on current (post)suburbia research in China. 
Finally, the chapter summarizes Chinese unique backgrounds and their implications for 
polycentric planning and practices in the case of Tianjin.  
5.2 Political and institutional context 
The features of institutional framework have great influence on the power relations and 
governance capacity for decision-making and policy implementation. China has a long 
history and its political framework and cultural characteristics are distinct from the western 
countries. Before the empirical research, the political and institutional background need to 
be careful investigated. 
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5.2.1 Hierarchical and fragmented administrative framework 
The Chinese government is hierarchically organised and there are now five levels of 
government at the central, provincial, prefectural, county, township, and village levels. Due 
to the complexity of the administrative divisions in China, cities can be found at provincial, 
prefecture and county levels according to their political levels (Figure 5.1). Therefore, ‘city’ 
in China is an ambiguous word, which often refers to a large area including both urban and 
rural territories and has different political and economic power determined by its political 
level.  
 
Figure 5.1 Administrative framework of Chinese cities 
Source: Produced by author 
The loose definition of city in China is the result of a series of administrative reforms, 
especially after 1978. The administrative restructuring has transferred more power to cities 
and enlarged their jurisdiction from the central cities into city regions (Ma, 2005). There 
have been three approaches of territorial restructuring since the 1980s (ibid.). The first is to 
implement a system of ‘cities administering counties’ (shiguanxian). Through this system, 
the prefectures were merged or adjusted to prefectural cities, and therefore the number of 
prefectures was reduced. The second strategy is ‘converting county to city’ (xiangaishi or 
chexian jianshi). The majority of counties were converted to county level cities and some of 
them are radically converted to prefectural cities in order to administer the surrounding 
counties. Since the early 1980s, the number of county level cities had increased rapidly. Most 
of these new county level cities are subordinated to prefecture level cities. The third key 
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approach is known as ‘abolishing county and establishing district’ (chexian shequ), which is 
achieved through annexation of suburban counties by a central city.  
The administrative restructuring in China is a kind of rescaling strategy to devolve power 
from the central state to local level and to alleviate the conflict between political units at the 
same level. However, compared to Europe and the North America, China’s administrative 
system still has a rigid and observed hierarchical structure as the rank (dengji) determines 
the political and economic powers that the administrative units have (Ma, 2005). As well as 
the hierachy, another feature of China’s institutional framework is fragmentation.  
These two features are often combined and referred to a political system characterised by 
‘fragmented authoritarianism’ (Lieberthal and Lampton, 1992) or ‘decentralised 
authoritarianism’ (Landry, 2008). This emphasises the fragmentation of power and authority 
within an authoritarian regime. The two seemingly paradoxical terms fragmentation and 
authoritarianism encompass the reality of China’s polity (Yang, 2013). ‘Authoritarianism’ 
in China’s political system refers to the superior authority of central state and upper level of 
government, barriers to participate in policy process and the concentration of decision power 
of leadership (Yang, 2013; Li and Liu, 2018). The fragmentation of authority is because the 
resources and authority are separated between various governmental sectors and bureaux at 
different levels. Therefore, the fragmentation is both along horizontal lines (kuai) and 
vertical lines (tiao) (Li and Liu, 2018). Horizontal line fragmentation means that power is 
divided into different sectors at the same level while vertical fragmentation indicates similar 
functions at different levels.  
Spatial planning in China is a typical case of ‘fragmented authoritarianism’ (see Xu, 2016). 
This means that the responsibility of planning management is divided into different sectors 
such as development and reform commissions, land management bureaux and planning 
authorities. Fragmentation has led to complicated intergovernmental relations. The detail of 
power division will be introduced in the spatial planning system section later. The 
fragmented side of planning management indicates there are many actors involved in just 
single administrative level regarding spatial development in planning making and 
implementation. Moreover, authoritarian governance in China increases external forces from 
upper level of governments and from key politicians. Both cross-hierarchical and cross-
sectoral intergovernmental bargaining and protracted negotiations are crucial in achieving 
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consensus in the policy process. These two sides or two lines of power relations are 
potentially dominant actors regarding polycentricity in the case study of Tianjin.  
5.2.2 State entrepreneurialism  
Along the vertical line, the relationship between the central state and local states has 
continuously changed due to the steady reform progress in China. Local states could include 
the provincial and municipal governments but also district governments, Subdistrict/street 
Offices (jiedao), Villages and Residents’ Committees at lower political levels (Wu, 2002). 
Due to fiscal decentralisation and marketisation reform, local states are characterised by 
entrepreneurial endeavours at a variety political levels and have greater incentives on the 
land and housing development since the early 1990s (Duckett, 1998; Wu, 2002; Hsing, 2010). 
Many new terms such as the ‘local state corporatism’ (Oi, 1992), ‘the entrepreneurial state’ 
(Duckett, 1998) or ‘state entrepreneurialism’ (Wu, 2002; Wu and Phelps, 2011) have been 
coined to describe their proactive role in China’s transitional context. 
Prior to the reform and opening-up policy, the central state retained absolute control of local 
government through resource allocation under the planned economy. Since the reform policy, 
China’s economy has shifted towards a more market-oriented economy and the organisation 
of state apparatus, capital, production materials and people has been reformed (Wu, 2002). 
Local governments have taken on responsibility for local development and expenditures 
from the central state. Since the early 1980s, the introduction of the ‘fiscal contracting’ 
system has provided strong incentives for local governments to purse economic growth, 
especially the industrial development (Oi, 1992). Fiscal reform and new revenue-sharing 
arrangements have changed the disposition of local revenue between the central state and 
local states.  
Local revenues include two categories: the ‘within budget tax revenue’ and ‘extrabudgetary 
non-tax revenue’. Most of the latter can be retained by local government and thus fiscal 
reform has promoted local states’ entrepreneurship. The Township and Village-owned 
Enterprises (TVEs) have become the major resources for revenue extraction. Oi (1992) terms 
this state-led growth as ‘local state corporatism’ and stresses its two features. First, due to 
the relaxation of central state control, local governments have shown characteristics of both 
a bureaucratic state and a business corporation. Local governments manage and coordinate 
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collective-owned enterprises in order to pursue economic development and to expand 
revenue sources. The growth benefits local economic development and alleviates budget 
constraints on becoming an effective government. Second, the role of local government at 
the lowest level such as the county, township, and village level has become more important.  
Local state corporatism has fostered numerous TVEs in rural areas. They have made a great 
contribution to industrialisation and economic take off in the 1980s and the early 1990s. 
However, fiscal decentralisation has reduced the income of central government because local 
states are more likely to reduce the tax of enterprises to support TVEs’ development in their 
own territory. Therefore, the central state launched the ‘tax-sharing system’ reform in 1994 
to consolidate its fiscal capacity. This new fiscal regime led to a new type of urban 
entrepreneurial governance, which is heavily reliant on land and housing development.  
This land finance regime emerged as a result of the new establishment of land and housing 
market in China. In the planned economy era (1949–1977), public ownership, state control 
over land distribution, free land use, and non-transferability of land-use rights were 
important characteristics of China’s land policy before 1978 (Zhang, 1997; Haila, 2013). 
Since the reform policy (from 1978 to the present), a series of experiments on the system of 
land management has led to gradual shift from a centrally planned system to a dual-track 
system (Naughton, 1994; Lin and Ho, 2005). Pilot experiments of market mechanisms of 
land use were conducted in Shenzhen, Shanghai, Tianjin, Guangzhou, Xiamen and Fuzhou 
in 1987. The State Council then announced A Tentative Regulation on China’s Urban Land 
Use Rights Lease and Transfers in 1990, which laid a foundation for the construction of a 
land market system, where the price mechanism and market competition are honoured in the 
process of land allocation, and land use rights can be transferred and traded in competitive 
markets (Zhang, 1997).These reforms thus ended the time when land use rights were free 
and land transfer was prohibited. After the announcement of Land Management Law Articles 
of Implementation in 1998, the legal system of land use and land management initially 
formed. Since 2004, land leasing is required to adopt the means of tender, auction and listing 
and any lease not involving a payment to a municipal government is illegal (Hsing, 2010). 
China’s urban land is owned by the state, while rural land is collectively owned by village 
committees. Only after land acquisition can rural land be transformed to state-owned land 
and be used for urban development. Therefore, the state (eventually commissioned by 
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the local government) is the sole legitimate land provider in China. The separation between 
ownership and use rights and allowing the trade of land use rights has had a tremendous 
impact on the growth of cities and urban development (Haila, 2013). Local governments can 
use land as a key instrument in regional competition for investment (Tao et al., 2010), 
macroeconomic regulation (Lichtenberg and Ding, 2009) and to increase the extra-budgetary 
revenue (Yeh et al., 2011).  
Corresponding with the housing reform, the significance of land was further emphasized. 
Local states often adopt the strategy of low or even zero price for leasing industrial land in 
order to attract investment and create employment but higher price for residential land 
leasing to maximise the local states’ interests. Residential development also leads to direct 
state engagement in business activities for profit-seeking (Duckett, 1998). Fiscal reform 
together with the economic decentralisation process, and land and housing market reform 
generated a pro-growth coalition between local states and developers, which has taken on 
some of the characteristics of a ‘growth machine’ (Wu, 2002).  
Beyond the land revenue regime, Wu (2018) claims that ‘GDP tournaments’ is another 
explanation for the state’s entrepreneurial behaviours. GDP growth is highly related to the 
occupational performance evaluation and promotion of local officials. This theory 
emphasises the role of local political leaders in promoting local GDP growth and argues that 
the role of centralised personnel control in actual politics is significant (Li and Zhou, 2005; 
Chien and Gordon, 2008). 
In conclusion, state entrepreneurialism is exhibited at various tiers of government in China. 
The underlying reasons and mechanisms also varied in different development stages. Tianjin 
is a municipality under direct control of the central state. It has a higher political status and 
larger geographical scope. The internal relationship between different tiers of government 
are more complex and changed with wider policy changes. Considering polycentricity 
consists of many parts and elements, Tianjin need to be dissected from constituent units 
rather than treat it as a harmony system. The interests and behaviours of lower tier of 
government also demands special attention, which may result in significant spatial outcomes 
regarding polycentric development.  
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5.2.3 Rescaling of state power  
Scale in geographical studies is no longer a fixed, pre-given concept. It could be understood 
at least in three dimensions: ‘scale as size’, ‘scale as level’ and ‘scale of relationships’ 
(Howitt, 1998; cited in Ma, 2005). Territorial rescaling has been widely applied as a strategy 
to restructure governance and power along geographical lines. Savitch (2010) summarizes 
three reasons for rescaling: (1) rescaling is a tool suited to the task; (2) rescaling sets rules 
for allocating power; (3) rescaling sets the scope for bureaucratic implementation.  
Administrative rescaling was used to fuel economic growth in Chinese cities in the early 
phase, as mentioned in previous sections. A central city could increase its urban 
administrative area and gain control of more land resources and quotas from the surrounding 
counties (Ma, 2005; Wei, 2012). Such rescaling strategies adjusted the hierarchy of political 
entities in China and thus reshaped the political and economic powers of Chinese cities (Ma, 
2005). 
The devolution of central state, economic decentralisation, and local entrepreneurial 
government has led to serious economic, environmental, and social problems because of 
regulatory deficit. For example, in order to attract foreign investment, local governments 
take advantage of special institutional arrangement for land (e.g. local government 
compulsorily acquire rural land at low-cost, then lease it) (Lin and Yi, 2011). China has 
witnessed a large-scale conversion of cultivated land to urban land, illegal rural 
industrialization, development zone fever, and low efficiency of land use (Ho and Lin, 2004; 
Li and Yeh, 2004; Cao et al., 2008; Deng et al., 2010). Meanwhile, fierce intra-regional 
competition for key industrial projects can lead to a ‘race to the bottom’ at the expenses of 
long-term sustainability (Tao et al., 2010). 
The downscaling of governance to local states has also challenged the governance capacity 
of the central state. In order to cope with the crisis in governance, governance at city regional 
scale and regional scale began to re-emerge in policy frameworks from the 2000s onwards 
(Li and Wu, 2012; Wu, 2016). The emergence of city region governance is a new state 
rescaling strategy to recentralise the state power in post-reform China.  
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According to Savitch (2010: 13), the forms of rescaling can be categorised into four types, 
namely consolidated jurisdictions, multi-tiered jurisdiction, linked jurisdiction and jumped 
scales, evolving from a monocentric system to a more polycentric rescaling. The propensity 
to adopt any type of or a combination of rescaling tools depends on the historical and cultural 
context (ibid.). In China, the ways of city-region building include administrative annexation 
for ‘metropolitanisation’, proliferation of regional spatial plans and strategies, and soft 
regional institutional building for cooperation (Li and Wu, 2012; Wu 2016).  
The recent rescaling process in China fits with the typologies of Savitch (2010), but the 
reasons and consequences of using these rescaling tools are influenced by China’s unique 
institutional framework. City region in China has become the ‘new state space’ to cope with 
the governance crisis of entrepreneurial city and pressures for sustainable development (Wu, 
2016). It is not simply a focus concentration at upper level of geography but a process of 
political reconstruction and redistribution. Rescaling strategy has led to a more polycentric 
governance mode in terms of local development. It has created a new tier of political forces 
and imposed external incentives and constraints on local development.  
These rescaling tools have also been widely applied in Tianjin. Tianjin has finished the 
consolidation process within its jurisdiction and has been involved a new region building 
strategy stressed by the central state recently. Their influences on the discursive changes and 
development strategies adjustments regarding spatial development need to be considered 
during empirical analysis.  
5.3 The changing planning system  
After setting the administrative framework, this section elaborates the evolution of spatial 
planning system in China. As mentioned above, China’s planning management is very 
fragmented and various plans are related to spatial development. Through a thorough 
analysis, the most important type of plan for this research can be identified.  
5.3.1 Spatial planning system in China  
Spatial planning is a comprehensive function and provides a long-term spatial vision in terms 
of economic, social, ecological, and environmental development at local, regional, national, 
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and international scales. For China, the spatial planning system is relatively complex and 
fragmented. Since the foundation of People’s Republic of China, the central government has 
always sought to improve the spatial planning system. Recent reform in both the planning 
system and planning governance is manifested by the establishment of a new Ministry of 
Natural Resources in 2018 and a trend towards a more integrated spatial planning system.  
Until the current reforms are implemented, there are many parallel types of plans related to 
spatial deployment in China. Content related to the spatial distribution of resources 
(industries, peoples, land) and spatial arrangement can be easily found in many formal and 
informal plans in China. Generally speaking, the spatial planning system includes social and 
economic development plans (plus major function-oriented zone plans), urban and rural 
plans, land use plans, environment plans, and infrastructure plans (Wang and Liu, 2012). 
Among them, social and economic development plans, urban plans and land use planning 
constitute the main body of the Chinese planning system while the other plans also include 
spatial elements but do not play such a decisive role. Some of these plans are conventional 
plans or the legacy of the planned economy while others are relatively new or still tentative, 
designated for special purpose in transitional context (Wang and Liu, 2012).  
Each type of plan is relatively independent and managed by a variety of departments at 
different administrative levels (Table 5.1). Planning in China is usually stratified at the 
national, provincial, and municipal level according to the administrative hierarchy. Before 
2018, the social and economic development plans, urban plans and land use plans were under 
the management of National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), the Ministry 
of Housing and Urban-Rural Development (MOHURD) and the Ministry of Land and 
Resources (MLR) and their local arms respectively (Wu, 2015; Xu, 2016). The governance 
of different types of plan also require interdepartmental coordination and cooperation 
between different tiers of government and government bodies. The existence of these 
multiple tiers and multiple departments often generates conflicts during the plan making and 
implementation processes. Therefore, government officials from these departments are also 
the key interviewees. 
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Table 5.1 Three series of plans in China’s spatial planning system before the 
establishment of Ministry of Natural Resources 
Series Type Scale 
Responsible 
authorities 
Legal 
Basis 
Status 
Social 
and 
Economic 
Develop
ment 
Social and 
Economic 
Development Plan 
(Five-year plan) 
National, 
provincial, 
municipal, 
county and 
township level 
National 
Development 
and Reform 
Commission 
and its local 
authorities 
 
Constituti
on of PRC 
Legacy of 
planned 
economy  
Regional Strategic 
Plan 
National and 
provincial level 
Non-
statutory 
Plan 
A new type of 
plan for 
specific 
regions after 
2000 
  
Major Function-
Oriented Zones 
Plan 
National and 
provincial level 
Non-
statutory 
Plan 
A new type of 
plan for 
spatial 
governance 
after 2010 
Urban 
and Rural 
Develop
ment 
Urban System 
Plan 
National, 
provincial, 
municipal, 
county and 
township level 
Ministry of 
Housing and 
Urban and 
Rural 
Development 
and its local 
authorities 
 
 
 
 
Urban and 
Rural 
Planning 
Act 
 
 
 
Conventional 
urban 
planning 
Master Plan 
Municipal, 
county and 
township level 
Detailed 
Development 
Control Plan 
Municipal, 
county, and 
township level 
Detailed 
Construction Plan 
Municipal, 
county, and 
township level 
Strategic Plan 
Municipal and 
county level 
Non-
statutory 
Plan 
A new type of 
plan after 
2000 
Land Use 
Territory Plan 
National and 
provincial level Ministry of 
Land and 
Resources 
and its local 
authorities 
 
Non-
statutory 
Plan 
In the 
exploratory 
stage 
Land Use Master 
Plan 
National, 
provincial, 
municipal, 
county, and 
township level 
Land 
Managem
ent Act 
Introduced in 
the late 1980s; 
merged with 
City Master 
Plan in some 
cities 
Source: Translated and adapted from Wang and Liu (2012) 
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The Social and Economic Development Plan 
The Social and Economic Development Plan is also well known as the Five-Year Plan (FYP) 
in China and it has the highest level of standing among all types (Fan et al., 2012). The Five-
Year Plan evolved from the socialist economic plan in the pre-reform period, but it is still an 
important plan for governing economic and social development, even in post-reform China 
(Wang and Shen, 2014). 
The FYP is compiled by the Development and Reform Commission. The Constitution of the 
PRC requires governments at national, provincial, and municipal or county level to compile 
and implement FYP. It is continuous except for the Adjustment Period (1963-1965) after the 
Great Leap Forward. As China selected a gradual and pragmatic reform approach, the social 
and economic plan transformed along with the transition of political economic context over 
the years. The first FYP (1953-1958) was made in 1953. Between 1953 and 1980 (first to 
fifth FYP), the FYP had a decisive influence on spatial development through ministry-led 
projects (Wang and Shen, 2014). In this period, the spatial element of the FYP was only a 
subordinate mechanism in planned economy (Wu et al., 2006). The central government 
rigidly controlled enterprises, residents and authorities in local areas under a planned 
economy through central budgetary process (Ng and Tang, 1999). The FYP determined 
resource allocation and economic production in the form of vertical control.  
After the market-oriented reform from 1978, the construction of the ‘socialist market 
economy’ weakened the role of the central state. To promote economic growth, National 
Social and Economic Development Plan set out specific policy areas such as specific 
economic zones, open cities in the eastern coastal region, which led to the subsequent 
enlargement of regional disparities. A project-led approach, especially for large 
infrastructure projects, was still employed to support national and regional development 
(Wang and Shen, 2014).  
Meanwhile, due to administrative decentralisation, local governments became more 
motivated in promoting territorial-based development, which led to the many problems in 
spatial development. As a response, NDRC created a new type of plan that is Major 
Function-Oriented Zone Planning in order to enhance spatial governance and integrate 
different types of plans.  
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Major Function-Oriented Zone (MFOZ) planning is a new attempt to achieve China’s spatial 
planning that has emerged since the Eleventh Five Year Plan (2005-2010). In 2010, the State 
Council approved National Major Function-Oriented Zone Planning (The State Council, 
2010). The MFOZ plan aims to promote the efficiency of the territorial system, optimise the 
general spatial pattern, coordinate regional development and more importantly provide a 
practical platform for the integration different kinds of planning through the enforced spatial 
regulation based on territorial function (Fan et al., 2012). The territorial space is divided into 
four types of major function-oriented zones, i.e. development-optimized areas, 
development-prioritized areas, development-restricted areas and development prohibited 
areas according to carrying capacity, development intensity and development potential (Fan 
and Li, 2009; Fan et al., 2010). At present, MFOZ plan has been made at the national level 
and provincial level. The national level MFOZ plan merely guides and directs development 
while the provincial level MFOZ plans clarify the development orientation in more detailed 
geographic units (Fan and Li, 2009; Fan et al., 2012).  
Urban and rural planning 
Urban and rural planning is another important planning series regarding spatial development. 
Urban planning was first introduced as a physical plan to complement FYP in urban areas in 
the 1950s. As mentioned above, under the planned economy, the FYP determines investment 
and distribution of resources. Therefore, urban planning was subordinated to the FYP and 
mainly employed as a tool to facilitate the site selection and spatial distribution of economic 
activities (Ng and Tang, 1999). In addition, owing to the unstable political environment, 
urban planning was criticised by the state and ultra-Leftists as a revisionist activity and was 
suspended during Cultural Revolution period (Qian, 2015).  
However, after the economic reforms of 1978, urban planning returned to regular and normal 
practice. The shift towards growth-oriented development and economic decentralisation 
redefined the central and local relations (Wang and Shen, 2017). Instead of being regarded 
as a means to engineer systems for central investment and ministry-led projects, cities took 
in charge of the organisation of economic and cultural activities and infrastructure 
construction (Ng and Tang, 1999). In this process, emerging planning problems necessitated 
the improvement of the legal foundation of urban planning (Yeh et al., 2011). The 1984 
Urban Planning Regulation provided guidelines for urban planning and then the 1990 Urban 
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Planning Act developed a comprehensive approach to urban planning, including economic 
strategy and policy formation. Urban Planning therefore became more important and FYP 
was marginalised, as FYP at municipal level often reiterates the content of FYP at upper 
level (Wang and Shen, 2017).  
In 2008, the old Urban Planning Act was replaced by the new Urban and Rural Planning Act, 
which transformed the urban-biased planning framework and extend the urban master 
planning from the central city to cover the entire city administrative area (city-region) 
including rural areas (Qian and Wong, 2012). To avoid negative effects and to regulate the 
increasing power of municipal governments, it became necessary to plan a city within a 
broader regional context. Therefore, the regional plan and urban system plan were revived. 
The Regional Strategic Plan was often initiated by NDRC, while the Urban System Plan was 
under the supervision of planning authorities. The Urban System Planning (chengzheng tixi 
guihua) is essentially a kind of regional plan to rationalise the ‘function, hierarchy and spatial’ 
structure of infrastructure and urban settlement (Yeh et al., 2011). The National and 
Provincial Urban System Plan is often a separate statutory plan while the urban system plan 
for cities and surrounding rural areas is often embedded into master plans as required by the 
old Urban Planning Act. The Urban and Rural Planning Act 2008 also attaches a city-
regional level plan to city master plan, which is intended to integrate the central city and 
nearby towns and counties into a coordinated city region (Yeh et al., 2011). 
Master plans usually have a 15 to 20-year planning horizon and offer a general perspective. 
The implementation of master plans is effected by detailed plans that provide regulations for 
construction projects. There are two types of detailed plans, Detailed Development Control 
Plans and Detailed Construction Plans. In addition, a new type of plan has emerged out of 
statutory planning system since 2000, called the Strategic Plan or Concept Plan. This new 
type of plan is much more flexible and can avoid the constraints of traditional statutory 
planning, such as confining to administrative boundaries, and a long approval process (Wu 
and Zhang, 2007). The aim of this plan is to organise urban space to promote urban 
competitiveness and place promotion rather than development control (ibid.).  
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Land use planning 
Compared to the two series of plans discussed above, Land use planning is relatively new in 
China. It is introduced as a sectoral plan in the late 1980s, responding to the changes in the 
land use system. Land use planning was conceived by central government and the main aim 
is to protect and conserve farmland and to control urban development (Xu and Ng, 1998). 
After the implementation of the 2008 Urban and Rural Planning Act, the subjects of City 
Master Plan and Land Use Master Plan are overlapped, resulting in conflicts in terms of 
spatial development (Wang and Shen, 2017). 
Land Use Master Plan usually has a similar planning horizon to City Master Plan. Land Use 
Master Plan obtains control power through the top-down land quota control system, which 
determines the area of new construction land and arable land. Land use planning is 
administered by Ministry of Land and Resources (MLR), established in 1998. Like City 
Master Plan, Land Use Master Plan also focuses on the control of development at city level, 
but the emphasis is more on the conservation and protection of farmland and natural 
resources. There is another regional plan at national and provincial level, called the Territory 
Plan. Territory Plan includes all activities linked to the use and development of land as well 
as conservation (Wang and Hague, 1993). Although the pilot work has been conducted since 
the 1990s, it is still in the exploratory stage (Wang and Hague, 1993; Wang and Liu, 2012). 
5.3.2 The City Master Plan: an arena for polycentric rhetoric  
Amongst all these plans, the City Master Plan (also known as the Comprehensive Plan or 
the Overall Plan) was regarded as the most important plan by planners (Yu, 2014). This is 
because the content of City Master Plan includes a description of the nature and size of the 
city, development strategy and objectives, land use and zoning, infrastructure development 
(ibid.). Moreover, the spatial elements of other plans such as Major Function-Oriented Zone 
plan are gradually being incorporated into master plans in the integrated trend of different 
types of plans. City Master Plan is required to be approved by upper tier of government and 
for municipalities and provincial capitals, their City Master Plans are required to be approved 
by State Council.  
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Significant political and economic shifts have been affecting urban planning theory and 
practice in China. The Urban Planning Act of 1990 and the latest Urban and Rural Planning 
Act of 2008 provide legal bases for the master plan making, implementation, revision, and 
monitoring. The evolution of the master plan can be classified into four phases, which shows 
the continuities and changes in planning rationality, topic, functionality, and approaches 
(Table 5.2). It is worth mentioning that there is no single clear watershed, as innovative 
planning practices are often adopted by cities in eastern China and other developed regions 
before spreading more widely.  
In the past four decades, the changes can be summarized as follows: (1) the planning 
approach has shifted from a traditional ‘build and design’ to a policy-oriented approach; (2) 
planning management has shifted from a traditional hierarchical regime to governance 
involving an increasing number of actors; (3) the rationality and functionality of the master 
plan is evolving from planning for control, to planning for growth, and most recently to 
planning for sustainable development; (4) the contents of master plan are more enriched and 
require cross-disciplinary knowledge and more skills among planning profession; (5) the 
planning area is enlarging to the whole administrative area to facilitate the integration of 
development and to strengthen control over planning. 
Due to these features, City Master Plans are identified as key planning documents to 
investigate the polycentric discourses and practices. Master Plans herald the representation 
space of the planned territories and places. They also have capacity to manifest the multi-
layered and multi-sectoral urban governance of China that has emerged in recent decades. 
This does not mean that other plans are unimportant. Tianjin, as one of four municipalities 
of China, is a provincial level city and almost all types of plans in the spatial planning system 
have been made for Tianjin. Nonetheless, the spatial elements of other plans can be readily 
identified in its City Master Plans, which further shows that the master plan is an appropriate 
policy arena for research on polycentricity.  
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Table 5.2 The changes in Chinese Master Plan 
Period 
Master 
planning 
Phases 
Planning 
Rationale 
Function of planning 
Approach and 
practice of plan-
making 
Contents Development Control 
Urban 
planning 
knowledge 
Planning 
area 
Challenges and 
problems 
Pre-
reform 
Before 
1978 
Physical and 
technical plan 
 
To guide urban 
production and living; 
To materialise economic 
planning through site 
selection and physical 
design  
Socialist planning 
system; 
Blue-print approach 
outside political 
process; 
Confidential and 
internal government 
document 
Overall spatial layout; 
Transportation, power and 
telecommunication networks, 
water supply and drainage; Parks 
and open space 
Directives and controls 
of central economic 
planning 
Architecture 
and civil 
engineering in 
terms of 
aesthetics 
City 
proper  
Subordinated to central 
economic planning; 
Without power to 
regulate the 
development within 
self-contained work 
unit and communities; 
Lack of legal basis 
Post-
reform 
1979-
1989 
Comprehensive 
plan; 
Extended technical 
interpretation 
 
To guide development of 
the city/town system and 
infrastructure; 
To prepare new space 
for the reform and 
opening-up policy; 
To minimise 
development cost under 
uncertain conditions 
Rational planning 
approach; 
Consideration of local 
context; 
Confidential internal 
government document 
Increasing content of socio-
economic development; 
Urban system plan; 
District plan; 
land zoning; 
Infrastructure plan; 
Environmental protection; 
Redevelopment plan of old central 
city 
Urban Planning 
Regulation provided 
guidelines 
Dynamics of 
cities and 
regions from 
the subjects of 
economy, 
geography and 
social science; 
Urban planning 
administration 
and 
implementation 
Urban 
system 
plan 
(regarding 
towns, 
counties 
and 
villages as 
points);  
Urban area 
plan 
 
 
Lack of public 
participation; 
Little attention to 
environmental and 
social dimensions; 
Lack of flexibility and 
time-consuming 
process for 
authorisation 
procedure; 
Outdated plans often 
lagging actual 
development; 
Weak control because 
of local discretion and 
manipulation 
1990-
2007 
Comprehensive 
plan; 
An instrument for 
growth promotion 
 
To facilitate and justify 
urban development; 
To enhance economic 
competitiveness and 
promote investment  
More strategic and 
policy-oriented; 
Political rationality 
 
Social and economic development; 
Land zoning; 
Infrastructure plan; 
Redevelopment plan; 
Historical and cultural heritage 
conservation; 
Environmental protection 
‘One report and two 
Permits’ (Site Selection 
Recommendation Report, 
Land Use Planning 
Permit and Building 
Construction Permit) 
Since 
2008 
Comprehensive 
plan; 
Strategies and 
tactics to control 
economy and 
society  
To enhance the spatial 
governance of central 
and local state; 
To pursue more 
sustainable development 
Spatial planning 
approach; 
Political rationality; 
Integrating and 
incorporating elements 
of other planning 
 
Economic globalisation and urban 
and regional development; 
The designation of 
Low carbon and eco-city; 
Coordinated urban-rural 
development 
‘One report and three 
permits’ (Site Selection 
Recommendation Report, 
Land Use Planning 
Permit and Building 
Construction Permit, 
Rural Construction and 
Planning Permit) 
The whole 
jurisdiction 
area 
Requirement of 
corresponding 
institutional reform; 
Heavy workload for the 
rural area plan planning 
making;  
Changing role of 
planning profession 
Source: Summarized by author based on literature (Xie and Costa, 1993; Ng and Tang, 2004; Qian and Wong, 2012; Gu et al., 2014; Yu, 2014; Wu, 2015; Zhao, 2015; Wang and Shen, 
2017)  
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5.4 Dynamics of peripheral space 
In the socialist period, China’s cities adopted a compact development strategy. Due to the 
market transition, Chinese cities have experienced rapid expansion and new development in 
the peri-urban areas since the 1990s. There are several major elements contributing to the 
spatial restructuring of Chinese cities: urban land use changes, the infusion of foreign and 
domestic capital, urban deindustrialisation and tertiarization, improvements in transportation, 
and new housing development (Zhou and Ma, 2000). Under the market-oriented economy, 
the demands for high-quality and luxury housing is an important factor for the outflow of 
population from city-centre (Feng et al., 2008; Shen and Wu, 2012). Moreover, the suburbs, 
especially the inner suburbs, are also important receiving areas for rural-urban migrants 
(Wang and Murie, 2000; Zhou and Ma, 2000; Wu, 2010). All these factors have led to the 
growth of suburban areas.  
Although the suburbanisation in China is increasingly driven by market factors, urban sprawl 
and suburbanisation are not driven by the private sector but are mainly the result of state 
entrepreneurialism, which directly or indirectly is involved in the institutional and spatial 
restructuring process (Zhou and Ma, 2000; Wu and Phelps, 2008; 2011; Shen and Wu, 2017). 
The intervention of the state has complicated suburban development in China. The 
development and redevelopment of city centres, mass suburbanisation and post-
suburbanisation happened simultaneously in China’s cities, unlike the sequential processes 
of western cities (Wu and Phelps, 2011). Wu and Phelps (2008) summarize several features 
of post-suburbia which may fit with a number of different national contexts. Among them 
are mixed land uses, loose geographic form, the balance of residence and work, and the 
entrepreneurial role of state. 
The suburbanisation of Chinese cities has evolved into a new stage. Recent suburban growth 
in China can be regarded as post-suburbia according to Wu and Phelps’ (2008) definition. 
Physically, a mixed and high-density development mode has been adopted in the majority 
of suburban settlements, so that new private housing development, affordable housing, 
shopping malls and retail parks, the variegated development zones spring up together in the 
suburb (Feng et al., 2008; Gu et al., 2015). Economically, the development of suburban 
enclaves is associated with the wider city-region economic development and restructuring 
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(Wu and Phelps, 2008). Socially, the appearance of new social groups or the fragmentation 
of previous classes, has restructured urban space in both central and peripheral areas (Gu et 
al., 2015). Politically, the administrative status and boundaries of these newly produced 
enclaves are contested and the contradictions between different governance bodies have 
begun to emerge (Wu and Phelps, 2011). In addition, the metropolitanisation process has 
transformed the relationship between the central city and its suburbs, and even straddled 
municipal boundaries (Wu, 2016). The coexistence of different types of suburb and a the 
new politics of suburbia require the scrutiny of the space and governance for suburban 
settlements and enclaves.  
5.5 Conclusion  
This chapter provides a broad but essential context for investigating polycentricity in Tianjin 
in the empirical chapters that follow. The background involves features of political 
framework, the evolution of spatial planning system and the emergence of a more dynamic 
urban space in the peripheral area in recent decades, which together make the polycentric 
development in China unique.  
This context corresponds to the three core elements of the research framework and helps to 
shape the analytical angles for empirical research on Tianjin’s polycentric transition. First, 
the market-oriented economy in China has not weakened the role of the state in the 
production of polycentric cities or city regions in China. Instead, the combination of market 
forces and the decentralised state apparatus has reshuffled the power relationship between 
central and local states. State spatiality in China also shows periodisation from downscaling 
to the local developmental state though to subsequent upscaling towards the city-region 
again (Wu, 2016). Therefore, the political system in China is no longer simply a hierarchical 
system, it is more accurately a form of ‘fragmented authoritarianism’. It is a political system 
involving multi-tier governments and multiple sectors and affiliated agencies. The rank and 
boundary of administrative units are two important elements that determine the power 
capacity and jurisdictions. Therefore, in the analysis, governments at multiple levels and 
their relationships must be involved as well. 
Second, it is notable that the legal and administrative elements of the spatial planning system 
in China are very fragmented. There are many different plans that need to be coordinated 
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and integrated. Among these, the City Master Plan has been identified as the most important 
plan at the city level as it provides the key arena for polycentric rhetoric. In recent decades, 
planning ideology has shown significant turns corresponding to the political reform and 
development stages. The City Master Plan has evolved from simply a technical plan in the 
planned economy to an instrument for growth. Very recently, the City Master Plan adopted 
a spatial planning approach in order to enhance the spatial governance and to pursue 
sustainable development. The changes in planning ideology as well as interdepartmental 
coordination and conflicts must therefore be considered when analysing the concrete content 
of master plans. 
Third, market-oriented development and state entrepreneurialism have both led to the 
creation of new spaces and produced dynamic landscapes in the suburbs. In the context of 
globalization and rapid urbanization, Chinese cities have experienced rapid urban growth 
and their suburban areas have become extremely dynamic and complex. New development 
in their peripheral areas have started to show some characteristics of post-suburbia, and this 
process contributes to the formation of polycentric city regions. The suburbanisation in 
China has evolved into a new stage and embryonic edge cities have emerged (Feng et al., 
2008; Wu and Phelps, 2011). Therefore, new places created in planning visions or formed 
spontaneously in the peripheral area of Tianjin require more attention when discussing 
polycentricity. Furthermore, the concrete changes and influences in space and governance 
need to be unpacked, considering the diversity of policy enclaves and the strong role of state. 
After setting up the context, the next chapter will set the specific context of Tianjin first and 
then investigate the underlying meanings and rationality of polycentric discourses by 
discourse analysis of master plans. After that, places beyond the traditional central area in 
the polycentric system are selected for further exploration in chapter 7 and 8. 
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Chapter 6 The (re)making of polycentricity in Tianjin’s 
spatial planning discourse since 1978  
6.1 Introduction 
After outlining the general political, planning and urbanisation context for polycentricity in 
China in last chapter, this chapter aims to answer the first main research question of this 
research, that is how and why polycentric development has been applied in China’s policy 
and planning realm by using Tianjin as a case study. The concept of polycentrictiy has been 
widely adopted in China’s urban planning system, especially for large cities such as Tianjin. 
There is, however, little research that investigates polycentricity in China’s urban planning 
theories and practices in its transitional context. Therefore, this chapter investigates the 
formation of distinctive discourses of polycentricity in several editions of city master plan 
in Tianjin and the mutual relationship between power, knowledge and space in the discourse 
(re)formation process by applying the analytical framework proposed in chapter four. 
Through a discourse analysis of key planning documents, the discursive changes in nuance 
and their underlying meanings are identified based on the definition framework of 
polycentricity established in chapter two. Power relations, institutionalization processes, role 
of professionals and the establishment of polycentric system are traced through planning 
archives and interviews with planners and government officials.  
This chapter first provides the specific context of Tianjin for its plan making in different 
phases. More explicitly, the brief history, recent administrative adjustments and the socio-
economic dynamic are analysed. An overview of different versions master plans and key 
planning spatial concepts are listed and clarified in the following section. Then, the 
discourses of polycentricity in each master plan are interrogated in detail by using the 
Foucault-inspired discourse analysis. The relationship between inter-scalar power relations, 
professional knowledges and the discourse formation and legitimation process are stressed 
in this process and further summarized in the following section. After that, a polycentric 
system comprising different levels and types of centres is proposed based on planning 
documents and interview materials, which provide insights for the embedded cases selection. 
Finally, a conclusion about the evolution of polycentric discourses and underlying rationale 
in Tianjin are summarized.   
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6.2 Specific context of Tianjin  
As shown in the analytical framework, the historical development process, socio-economic 
conditions, and political context are critical to frame the discourse of polycentricity. After 
contextualising polycentricity in China, the place-based specific context also needs to be 
added.  
6.2.1 A brief history of Tianjin and the origins of polycentricity 
Although Tianjin is a young city (the walled city was founded on December 23, 1404), it has 
become famous city in Chinese modern history worldwide due to its strategical geographical 
location. As the gateway to Beijing, Tianjin’s development history was highly influenced by 
Beijing and the development of a port across its whole development history. The city of 
Tianjin was formed at the so-called ‘Sanhuihaikou’ where the Grand Canal and the Hai River 
meet. Because of the opening of Grand Canal in Sui (AD 581-618) and Tang dynasty (AD 
618-907), Tianjin became an important transhipment centre. Moreover, during the Ming 
Dynasty (AD 1368-1644), Tianjin became a walled city and military base called ‘Wei’ to 
protect the capital city Beijing (Duckett, 1998). 
From 1860, following the Second Opium War, Tianjin was opened as a treaty port to foreign 
trade because of its proximity to the political centre of Beijing and the amenities of the port. 
Tianjin was forced into the process of industrialization and became a diplomatic, commercial, 
and industrial centre during the concession period. The construction of concessions 
reconfigured the spatial development of this traditional city and a new commercial centre 
was formed near Zizhulin port in the concessions (Interview, A02; G16TJ). This place has 
become the current city centre. During the concession period, Tianjin was a base for the 
westernisation movement and one of the earliest cities in China to establish the modern 
industrial system. In addition, trade related business developed rapidly and banks, shops, 
and hotels sprang up (Duckett, 1998).  
Because Zizhulin port was a river port with limited carrying capacity, a new port was 
gradually built in Tanggu, near Hai River Estuary. The relationship between old Tianjin and 
Tanggu has become increasingly tight since the early of twentieth century. In 1930, famous 
urban planners Sicheng Liang and Rui Zhang compiled the first master plan of Tianjin which 
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had already begun to consider Tianjin’s function and development strategies from a larger 
regional perspective and suggested the administrative annexation of Tianjin and Tanggu in 
future (Interview, P01). The application of polycentricity in Tianjin can therefore be traced 
back to this initial master plan, which stressed the interaction between Tianjin and Tanggu, 
two separated urban settlements (Interview, P01). When occupied by the Japanese (1937-
1945) in the Second World War, two urban plans were launched, namely Outline of Tianjin 
City Plan and Greater Tianjin Plan, which attached special attention to Tanggu and 
proposed to build a new harbour in Tanggu. Although these plans were not implemented, 
they generated significant impacts on the planning and spatial development of Tianjin after 
the foundation of People’s Republic of China (PRC).  
6.2.2 Administrative adjustments since the foundation of PRC 
The jurisdictional boundary and the political system of Tianjin have been changed many 
times between 1949 and 1979. The history of administrative adjustments is helpful to learn 
the development trajectories of Tianjin’s urban system. Here only important adjustments are 
mentioned. 
As introduced above, in modern history the city of Tianjin was quite compact and small, 
referring only to the central area at the ‘Sanchahekou’. Before the foundation of PRC, 
Tianjin was surrounded by other counties and their administration was independent. Tanggu 
was governed by two different counties which were separated by Hai River.  
After the foundation of PRC, Tianjin was appointed as a municipality directly governed by 
the central government. Tanggu was set up as one of the districts of Tianjin in the form of 
exclave with a distance of 50 km. In 1952, a county level city, Hangu, was annexed to Tianjin 
as a new district. After an unstable period between the 1950s and 1970s when Tianjin lost 
and then regained territory with a maximum jurisdictional area over 40,000 km2 (Interview, 
P01), the jurisdiction of Tianjin finally became stable since 1979. From then on, the 
administrative system consisting of inner six urban districts, four suburb districts, three 
districts in coastal area and five counties was built up, which covers an area over 11, 000 
km2.  
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Therefore, Tianjin has a significant larger spatial scope than most cities in the West. The city 
administration has extended to the rural and peripheral area. The traditional central city and 
their hinterland are included within the same jurisdiction. It is a city region essentially, and 
the local authorities were governed by the Tianjin Municipal Government directly.  
Since the economic reform policy, there have been only administrative adjustments within 
Tianjin’s jurisdictional area. From 2000 onwards, the counties in Tianjin were transformed 
gradually into urban districts. The counties of Wuqing, Baodi, Jinghai, Ninghe and Ji were 
converted to urban districts in the year 2000, 2001, 2015 and 2016 respectively. Three 
coastal districts (Tanggu, Hangu and Dagang) were merged into Binhai New Area in 2009. 
Therefore, now Tianjin is divided into 16 county-level divisions, which are all districts. 
These districts make up the second tier of the local government system, while the Tianjin 
Municipal Government represents the first tier of government. In conclusion, the course of 
several rounds of administrative adjustments has led to a rudimentary, historically created 
polycentricity in Tianjin.  
6.2.3 Socio-economic conditions for plan-making 
The overall socio-economic dynamics need to be considered when making new plans and 
policies. Facing different political and socio-economic conditions, the objectives, 
governance and the implementation of polycentric policy differs in different city and regions. 
For example, for a growing metropolitan area, the normative agenda is more likely to create 
polycentricity to sustain growth, while a relatively polycentric city or region will maintain 
the polycentricity to improve competitiveness (Schmitt, 2013).  
Tianjin’s economy fluctuated and was heavily influenced by changing national policies and 
circumstances in the pre-reformed period. Policies such as Third Front Construction and 
unstable administrative adjustments reduced the financial and material support from central 
government and restricted its development (Wei and Jia, 2003). In 1976, a severe earthquake 
led to the loss of many lives and destroyed the city's infrastructure, which further eroded 
Tianjin’s status in the national economy. The master plan was been frequently revised and 
not well implemented in this period (Interview, G03TJ). 
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Since the 1980s, like many other Chinese coastal cities, Tianjin has been experiencing 
dramatic and rapid urbanization, economic growth and spatial reconstruction. To guide 
development, four rounds of master plans have been produced since the 1980s, which also 
mark the different stages of urban change (Figure 6.1). The first important master plan 
started to be prepared in the early 1980s. Suffering from erosion of status because of the 
development bias towards Beijing (Wei and Jia, 2003) and the impacts of natural hazards, 
Tianjin had a large population but the economic base was weak. With the success of 
experimental reform policy, Tianjin’s economic development began to revive when making 
the second-round master plan. By the time of the third-round master plan, Tianjin was 
showing a great growth rate in both population and GDP. Recently, the economic and 
population growth rate has become much lower than the earlier rapid growth period.  
 
Figure 6.1 Planning cycles and socio-economic conditions in Tianjin 
Source: TJSB, Tianjin Statistical Yearbooks, various years 
The economic restructuring indicates that Tianjin is evolving from an industrial city to a 
post-industrial city. Tianjin was a traditional industrial city. Based on its industrial 
foundation and resources, a comprehensive industrial system comprising heavy and light 
industry was built up. After the reform policy, Tianjin took initiatives to adjust its industrial 
structure towards the service economy. In the 1980s, Tianjin’s secondary sector made up 
over 60 percent of GDP, while this figure dropped below 50 percent GDP in 2014. On the 
other hand, the tertiary sector composition increased from 24.3% to 58.2% of GDP (Figure 
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6.2). As a result, Tianjin saw a robust development of service industries, especially 
productive service industries. Among these industries, leasing and business service, 
scientific and technical services and financial intermediation saw the most significant 
increase. The spatial organisation and geographic distributions of economic activities also 
showed distinct characteristics in different development stages because of the changes in 
dominant industries.  
 
Figure 6.2 The evolution of industrial structure, 1978-2017 
Source: TJSB, Tianjin Statistical Yearbooks, various years  
6.3 Overview of the master plans 
6.3.1 Master plan before 1978 
During the first three decades post-1949, China’s urban development was influenced by 
Chairman Mao Zedong’s ideology. The Marxist ideology that regards the city as an evil 
place was enacted into policies and urban planning (Wu, 1993). Under the centrally planned 
economy before 1978, urban planning was perceived as a tool for translating the goal of 
economic planning into urban space (Yeh et al., 2011). The master plan in the First Five-
year Plan therefore valued the purpose of industrialisation while urban functions were 
ignored (Qian, 2015). 
Tianjin was confirmed as the secondary type industrial city in its first master plan in 1954, 
according to the national classification. The plan claimed that the redevelopment of the old 
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downtown should be a priority for urban development. The spatial proposal was a typical 
monocentric model with concentric ring roads. In this plan, China emulated Soviet planning 
and design. The city centre had a significant monumental, symbolic and political meaning, 
covering an area of 13-ha and a new public square was planned.  
Land use specialisation and construction of satellite towns were advocated in planning 
practice in the pre-reform period. Tianjin learned from the Moscow’s city plan and the 
concept of satellite towns was introduced to Tianjin (Interview, G03TJ). In 1958, Tianjin 
revised its former master plan and proposed to build four satellite towns (namely 
Yangliuqing, Xianshuigu, Junliangcheng, Dananhe), located in the near suburbs. The spatial 
vision of Tianjin has begun to evolve from one single city to a hierarchical urban system.  
However, because of radical movements and unstable political and economic environment 
in the Third and Fourth Five-year periods, urban planning was suspended until the early 
1970s but then gradually recovered to a routine practice (Qian, 2015; Xu, 2016). The urban 
construction work and development did not follow the master plan strictly and the satellite 
towns did not get substantial development.  
6.3.2 Four master plans since 1978 
Since 1978, Tianjin has had four important master plans. The master plan making in post-
reform period was a successive process. The 1986 master plan is the first official plan of 
Tianjin to be approved by the State Council. The latest plan has been compiled in 2016 and 
submitted to Tianjin Municipal Government for approval. Because of the recent political and 
planning system reform in China, it is still pending approval. With the establishment of 
Ministry of Natural Resources in 2018, the local planning departments began to reform 
accordingly. It is said that this master plan may be substituted by a new spatial plan 
(Interview, G27TJ). In order to keep the consistency and considering the timing of my 
fieldwork, this research focuses on the 2016 master plan for discourse analysis. The 
overview of these important master plans in Tianjin can be found below (Table 6.1). Key 
planning goals are exhibited for each plan.  
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Table 6.1 Important Master plans since 1949 
MP 1954 1986 1999 2006 2016 
Planning 
Horizons 
1954-1974 1984-2000 1996-2010 2005-2020 2015-2030 
Approved by 
State Council 
No Yes Yes  Yes Pending  
Planned Area Central 
District 
Central 
District and 
Binhai area 
City region 
(11919 km2) 
City region 
(11919 km2) 
City region 
(11919 km2) 
Projected 
Population 
(million) 
3 9.5 11 13.5 18 
Planned 
Urban 
construction 
land (km2) 
230 
(Central 
District) 
330 (Central 
District); 
169 (Binhai 
Area) 
556 (Central 
City) 
1450 (city 
region) 
2340 (city 
region) 
Source: Summarized by author based on planning documents from TJMG (1986; 1999; 2006; 2016), 
TJPRCC (1994) and TJLRCC and TJPB (2015) 
6.3.3 Key spatial concepts in Tianjin City Master Plans 
Before conducting discourse analysis of planning, it is also necessary to clarify several 
important spatial concepts that are usually used in Tianjin City Master Plans. Some of these 
areas are dynamic, reflecting the different development stages of Tianjin. These spatial 
concepts are components of polycentric discourse because they are related to the scales at 
which the concept of polycentricity has been applied in Tianjin.  
The first important spatial concept is ‘city region’ (shiyu). This refers to the whole area under 
the jurisdiction of Tianjin Municipal Government. As introduced in the political reform 
process in last section, Tianjin is no longer a single compact city in the central area but has 
evolved into a city-region. After 1979, it became stable and covers an area of 11,919 km2.  
Lower than the city region scale, Central City (zhongxin chengshi) is another important 
geographic unit. Central City is the key construction and development area. With the process 
of urban growth, the area of Central City has enlarged dramatically. The dynamic change of 
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the spatial scope of Central City reflects a metropolitanisation process alongside rapid 
urbanisation. At the beginning, Central City was an equivalent of Central District (zhongxin 
chengqu) before the 1999 Master Plan. Then Central City incorporated the Binhai New Area 
and surrounding suburban districts. In the latest master plan compiled in 2016, Central City 
includes the area of Central District, four suburban districts and Binhai New Area, which 
covers an area of 4,351 km2 in total.  
Central City comprises two important urban cores in Tianjin’s urban system. One is Central 
District and the other is Tianjin Binhai New Area (TBNA). Central District is relatively 
stable, and it mainly refers to the area within the Outer Ring Road. The planning area of 
Binhai New Area was also stable, but its political status changed during its development 
process. It has transformed from a functional area to an administrative district. TBNA 
generally includes the area covered by the former Tanggu, Hangu and Dagang Districts and 
parts of Dongli and Jinnan Districts. TBNA has a core area based on the original Tanggu 
District, which comprises Tianjin Economic-Technological Development Area (TEDA), 
Tanggu downtown and Tianjin port. The new CBD of Binhai New Area, proposed in 2007, 
was also included in the core area. 
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Table 6.2 Spatial concepts in Tianjin City Master Plans 
Spatial 
Concept 
Composition Area (km2) Status Application 
City Region  
(shiiyu) 
Jurisdictional area 
of Tianjin 
Municipal 
Government since 
1979 
11919.7 Stable Master Plan 
1986; 1999, 
2006, 2016 
Central City  
(zhongxin 
chengshi) 
Heping, Hedong, 
Hexi, Nankai, 
Hongqiao, Hebei, 
Jinnan, Dongli, 
Beichen, Xiqing 
and Binhai New 
Area 
4351 Dynamic Master Plan 
1999, 2006, 
2016 
Central District  
(zhongxin 
chengqu) 
The inner area of 
Outer Ring Road 
 
-- Stable Master Plan 
1986; 1999, 
2006, 2016 
Binhai New 
Area 
(Binhai xinqu) 
Binhai New Area 
(Tanggu, Hangu 
and Dagang) 
2270 Stable Master Plan 
1999, 2006, 
2016 
Binhai New 
Area Core 
Zone 
(Binhai xinqu 
hexinqu） 
TEDA, Tanggu 
downtown, Tianjin 
port and Duty-free 
District, Binhai 
New Area CBD  
-- Dynamic Master Plan 
2006, 2016 
Source: Summarized by author based on planning documents from TJMG (1986; 1999; 2006; 2016) 
Therefore, from a historical perspective, Tianjin City Region already exhibited a rudiment 
of polycentricity. At the city region scale, Tianjin has many urban settlements outside the 
original city, though the size and rank shows an evident hierarchy. The proposal of 
polycentricity in Tianjin City Region has economic and population bases to a certain degree. 
These settlements are separated by agricultural and green land. However, with the rapid 
urban growth and expansion, the central area of the city has been expanded into the suburban 
area and they fused into a metropolitan area. There exist multiple spatial scopes at different 
levels to regulate the future development in city master plans in Tianjin. In an overview of 
the application of polycentricity in different cities’ master plans in China, Cheng and Shaw 
(2017) argue that there exist at least two or three levels at which the idea of polycentricity 
could be applied. Therefore, when carrying out the discourse analysis, geographic scales, the 
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inclusion and exclusion certain places, the creation of new spatial units are all related to the 
discourse about the spatial pattern.  
6.4 The discourse of polycentricity in Tianjin’s Master Plans 
This section will carry out the Foucault-inspired discourse analysis introduced in the 
methodology chapter. The four master plans are the key objects for discourse analysis. Each 
version of the master plan in Tianjin is a three-book set, namely Outline, Atlas, and 
Statement. There are several chapters including the spatial elements in master plans. The 
language they use and the ways in which the spatial proposal is expressed and modified in 
different phrases will be investigated and compared. The interview materials will be used as 
a complementary to help researcher open the ‘black box’ of decision-making process, which 
involve politics, conflicts, rationality and planning knowledge.  
6.4.1 Confirmation of polycentric urban settlements: the 1986 plan  
From the late 1970s, China initiated a series of policies to revive urban planning. Tianjin 
was affected by the 1976 Tangshan earthquake, which held back the planning process and 
constrained the capacity of government to initiate new development. A new round of plan 
making started in 1982, much later than other large cities, and the resultant master plan was 
approved by the State Council in 1986.  
The discourse of the 1986 Master Plan refers to a polycentric urban system, aiming to 
facilitate a degree of polycentricity among existing urban settlements. This discourse was 
largely framed by historical conditions and the domination of the central state. At that time, 
the central state had dominant power and lower level governments such as municipal 
government strictly followed the wider discourses that the central state holds. This results in 
few inter-scalar struggles and the polycentric discourse is therefore very straightforward. 
The storyline on size control integrates discursive and material practices of the central state.   
Considering the historical development and administrative adjustment in pre-reform period, 
Tianjin was already a morphological polycentric city with multiple urban settlements having 
their own political seats and history. Therefore, in the 1980s, the idea of polycentricity was 
embedded in its master plans but there was no explicit application of the concept of 
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polycentricity and no intention to define these urban settlements as centres because of the 
limited size (Interview, G12TJ). As this interviewee argues:  
 ‘Because of China’s hierarchical political system, each district or county has its own 
government and therefore has a core area in its jurisdictional area. Since the 1980s, 
Tianjin has already shown a rudiment of polycentricity. With the further development 
in following decades, Tianjin is just evolving from a low degree of polycentricity to 
high degree of polycentricity, rather than from a single city to a polycentricity city. At 
the city region level, just the morphology, size and function of existing urban 
settlements changed in this process’ (Interview, G12TJ).  
At an early point in the reform era, central planning ideology shaped the main policy rhetoric 
in Tianjin. The discourse of the polycentric urban system was in line with central state policy 
that reasserted the urban development principle that had been first proposed in 1958: 
‘Control the size of large cities, rationally develop medium cities, and rigorously develop 
small cities’ (Xie and Costa, 1993). Local government was required to compile an urban 
system plan for its jurisdiction according to the top-down Urban Planning Regulation (State 
Council, 1984). In response, the 1986 master plan combines the requirements of size control 
and new establishment of urban system. This plan claimed that it was compiled strictly 
following the central state’s development principle and a multi-level urban system was 
proposed, comprising the Central District, Binhai Area (the traditional port area of the city), 
satellite towns and county towns (TJMG, 1986: 2).  
To justify this discourse, planners ascribed the urban problems of the 1980s to inefficient 
spatial layout. The purpose of the new polycentric urban system was said to be to ease urban 
problems and strictly control the size of the overcrowded Central District by the 
decentralisation of industry (TJMG, 1986: 3). The implication of such relocation was 
development dispersed to the Binhai Area and to previous satellite towns and the creation of 
a new industrial park. With reference to agglomeration diseconomies, an interpretation of 
Central Place Theory was employed to support the rationality of the future spatial pattern 
and new development outside the Central District. It was supposed that the formation of an 
urban system comprising large, medium and small settlements would become more efficient 
to promote economic development of both urban and rural areas, protect the natural 
environment and control urban size (TJMG, 1986: 3).  
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The proposed polycentric urban system was characterised by a clear hierarchy. The Central 
District was defined as the locus of politics, business, education and research, while Binhai 
Area and Satellite towns were destinations of industrial evacuation. County towns comprised 
the lowest tier and provided local service functions. In practice, planners used Central Place 
Theory less rigidly and combined it with a contradictory concept. The discourse of 
‘polycentric hierarchical settlements’ was employed to stress the morphologically dispersed 
and historically formed settlements in Tianjin and, more importantly, to justify a settlement 
size control policy. 
The adjustment of layers and rank-size distribution of urban system was intertwined also 
with power and rationalities. The upgrading of Binhai Area also reflected the central state’s 
aspirations and interventions. At this time, it had begun innovative practices in the eastern 
coastal area of China, including the Special Economic Zones, Open Cities and National 
Economic and Technology Development Zones, in order to facilitate the reform and 
opening-up process. Planners and politicians from central and municipal levels both 
recognised that the port had not been fully exploited during the early planned economy 
period. A new special zone, the Tianjin Economic and Development Area (TEDA) (Figure 
6.3), was approved by the central state in line with the designation of Tianjin as one of 14 
Open Cities in 1984. A TEDA official told me that there were five schemes for the location 
choice of TEDA, all of which were near Tangggu port (Interview, G04BH). The final site 
selection had two considerations: First, this site was located on saline and alkaline land. If 
the reform experiments failed, governments could just close this area. Second, it was near to 
Tanggu Downtown to utilise its infrastructures and there were also two railways passing 
across TEDA (Interview, G04BH). TEDA was expected to engage in foreign investment and 
trade and as a gateway to global economy. The designation and development of TEDA got 
support from central state. The central state loaned money for the construction of initial area 
and the fiscal income could be retained by TEDA for further development (Interview, 
G04BH). With the advantage of the port and preferential policies, Tanggu district played an 
increasingly important role in Tianjin. 
During the process of planning approval, the central state insisted that Tianjin include this 
designation in its master plan. A retired government official who was responsible for the 
first master plan making mentioned:  
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 ‘That Tianjin was listed as one Open City was a critical event. The master plan needs 
to be revised according to the new policy. The nature, function and structure has 
changed. I argue that the role of port should be enhanced. Tianjin port developed from 
a river port to an estuary port and to a seaport. Therefore, the central district and the 
port should be two cores. I proposed the dumbbell pattern. Mayor Ruihuan Li agreed 
with that but used another metaphor to describe this spatial pattern’ (Interview, 
G03TJ). 
Meanwhile, municipal government proposed a new large industrial park as another 
important development in Binhai Area. Consequently, the spatial development strategy of 
Tianjin was switched to ‘moving industries eastward’ (gongye dongyi) (TJMG, 1986: 3, 10), 
which consolidated the importance of Binhai Area. A metaphor of balance was employed to 
describe this new structure: ‘one stick shouldering two buckets’ (yige biandan tiao liangtou) 
(TJMG, 1986: 3). The stick covered the area of city proper, Tanggu district and the other 
four satellite towns. Two buckets referred to central district and Tanggu district, focusing on 
redevelopment and new industrial development respectively. This metaphor affected 
Tianjin’s spatial structure for the following 20 years.  
6.4.2 Designing ‘functional’ polycentricity: the 1999 plan  
The next master plan was prepared in 1994 and approved by the State Council in 1999. The 
discourse of polycentricity in this plan stressed functional specialisation among different 
clusters rather than just settlement morphology. The discursive changes were closely related 
to changes in institutional and governance form as well. The increasing power of municipal 
government reproduced its positioning and led to formation of new competing discourses. 
Therefore, new storyline on functional specialisation was proposed to organise these 
different ideas and formed a discourse of ‘functional’ polycentricity, reformed from previous 
polycentric settlement system. The new storyline also has influences on the claims of 
knowledge.  
Tianjin faced a new political and economic environment in the early 1990s. The state 
launched reform of the land use and property rights system in order to establish land and 
housing markets in cities. With the transition to decentralisation, marketisation and 
globalisation (Wei and Jia, 2003), urban planning decisions had to be made in a new context 
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of cooperation between the state and the market, as well as between political interests and a 
new economic rationality (Zhu, 2000). Due to economic decentralization, municipal 
governments as the urban land agent, began to have more autonomy and thus tensions 
between central government and local government began to emerge, but with municipal, 
rather than central, government dominating planning discourse. 
Although the central state still emphasised control of city size, the Tianjin Municipal 
Government showed great ambitions in economic growth, spatial expansion and intercity 
competition. The 1999 plan projected Tianjin as the economic centre of Bohai Region (the 
whole region surrounding Bohai Bay that includes Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region and some 
parts of Shandong and Liaoning Provinces). To achieve this, it also sought to adjust Tianjin’s 
dominant industry from manufacturing to services, projecting an increase in services from 
39% to 55% by 2010 (TJMG, 1999: 2). To meet these new ambitions, the city government 
also realised the importance of the economic and commercial role of the city centre and 
planned a new Central Business District (CBD) and a Central Commercial District (CCD). 
The CBD was a key project to boost modern service industry and it was also intended as a 
place marketing tool as China emerged into the global economy. Unlike market driven 
development in North America, the CBD in Tianjin, and indeed elsewhere in China, is a 
government project and financed for its own purpose (Zacharias and Yang, 2016). Elsewhere 
in Tianjin, another five city-level commercial centres were proposed.  
Although the overall spatial layout did not change significantly, the 1999 plan enlarged the 
planning area to the full territory of Tianjin. This plan proposed two different concepts, the 
Central District (zhongxin chengqu) and Central City (zhongxin chengshi), to distinguish the 
city centre area from the metropolitan area. The Central District focused on business and 
commercial activities and its spatial structure was adjusted to a ‘multiple nucleated and 
clusters group pattern’ (duozhongxin zutuanshi) (TJMG, 1999: 66). The spatial scope of 
Central City was extended to include the Binhai New Area and Tianjin Municipal 
Government applied to the central state to have Binhai designated as a national New Area in 
the same way as Shanghai Pudong, which was shortly rejected. Then in 1994 the municipal 
government decided to develop Binhai New Area without state help, supported by 
propaganda from key political leaders: ‘basically to build up Binhai New Area within ten 
years’ (TJLRCC and TJPB, 2015).  
113 
 
This strategy was based on the economic base of Binhai. The development of TEDA and the 
Duty-Free District was seen as a good achievement. In addition, this new strategy was a 
successor to the former plan. The newly planned Binhai New Area went far beyond the port 
to include a much larger coastal area with the intention of re-inventing its identity and 
invigorating development. A further eight urban clusters were also planned near the Central 
District for future expansion, which were projected to reach 65 km2 with a population of 
65,000 by 2010 (Figure 6.3) (TJMG, 1999). Central City was designated to be polycentric, 
comprising the Central Distric, Binhai New Area and eight urban clusters surrounding them 
(TJMG, 1999: 13). The majority of eight urban clusters were the satellite towns in last master 
plan. The main aim of surrounding clusters was still to undertake parts of Central District’s 
functions. 
The plan stressed the specialisation and functional interconnection between these urban 
centres. It encouraged service industry to agglomerate in the Central District; while Binhai 
New Area, as the new economic development focus, should develop port-related modern 
manufacturing, transportation and energy industries (TJMG, 1999: 7, 8). The surrounding 
clusters were to function as residential and centres of specialised high-tech industry. A green 
belt (Figure 6.3) was also employed to separate the Central District, its surrounding clusters 
and Binhai New Area (TJMG, 1999: 8). In summary, the overall thrust of the plan by an 
increasingly entrepreneurial municipal government was to promote the growth of Tianjin 
through the functional integration of self-funded area such as CBD and Binhai New Area. 
The central state’s principle of controlling city size was discarded on the grounds that growth 
could be well managed through functional specialisation combined with some environmental 
protection.
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Figure 6.3 Polycentric vision in the 1999 Tianjin Master Plan (1996-2010) 
Source: Produced by author based on the 1999 Master Plan. Note: CBD - Central Business District; TEDA - 
Tianjin Economic and Technological Development Area; HDIP - Haihe Downstream Industrial Park. 
6.4.3 Creating polycentric growth nodes: the 2006 plan  
Tianjin experienced significant growth of both GDP and population during the 1999 Master 
Plan period (Figure 6.1). The 2010 population target for the Central District was reached 
eight years in advance (TJLRCC and TJPB, 2015) so the 1999 master plan was quickly 
outdated. Therefore, Tianjin started a new round of plan making, culminating in the approval 
of a new master plan in 2006. 
During the planning process for the 2006 plan, a new growth-oriented discourse coalition at 
various scales formed, and the plan became suffused with an undisguised entrepreneurial 
discourse, and promoted a polycentric spatial pattern consisting of many growth nodes. The 
essence of building new (sub)centres was large scale new construction for growth (Interview, 
G07TJ). However, the discourse of polycentric growth nodes consists of variegated new 
115 
 
centres with different agents back them. The return to a harmony discourse did not mean the 
unity of the rationality and claims for knowledge for these centres. In fact, they show 
distinctive features in terms of language expression, claims of knowledge and the 
institutionalised practices.   
At the macro level, the central state had shifted its development emphasis to large cities. The 
10th National Five-Year Plan (2001-2005) proposed urbanisation as the main approach to 
economic development (Wang and Shen, 2017) and the governance mode also began to be 
upscaled to (city)-region level (Wu, 2016). To facilitate economic growth and the 
competitiveness of the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region, Binhai New Area was upgraded to a 
national level New Area in the 11th National Five-year Plan (2006-2010), representing third 
growth pole of China after the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone and Shanghai Pudong New 
District (State Council, 2006). Therefore, the development of Binhai New Area was no 
longer just a local ambition, but also articulated contested interests at regional and national 
scales. After many years’ development and accumulation, the economic scale, social 
function and status of Binhai New Area had been gradually enhanced (Interview, G06BH).  
The spatial proposal for Central City was accordingly changed to ‘two centres with multiple 
clusters’ (shuang zhongxin duo zutuan). In contrast to the earlier plans, a new ‘core’ was 
identified within Binhai New Area and designated as ‘the sub-centre of Tianjin’ (Tianjin 
fuzhongxin) (TJMG, 2006: 11) in order to provide and enhance urban functions, such as 
business and finance services as well as public services. A new ‘international’ CBD, formed 
by state-led planning and investment, was also proposed for Binhai New Area. This was 
intended to integrate into global economic networks and enhance producer service functions 
and therefore for Binhai to become the engine of economic development not only for Bohai 
Region but the whole of Northern China (TJMG, 2006: 17). The upscaling of Binhai New 
Area in the polycentric system is a response to the central state’s policy of the third growth 
pole.  
The ideological changes of the central state and the intensity of local ambition further 
activated the entrepreneurialism of government, even at the district and county levels. By 
2000, local states had become increasingly competitive, if over dependent on land-based 
finance (Zhu, 1999; Lin, 2002). At lower government levels, local growth-oriented 
discourses influenced the corresponding discourse in master plans. The classic concept ‘New 
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Town’ (xincheng) was employed in Tianjin to embrace the inter-scale growth vision. The 
2006 plan, then, proposed eleven New Towns as a new component of the urban system, 
located at the secondary tier level. The storyline of this new discourse was ‘to form a pattern 
of multiple growth poles’ (duoji zengzhang geju) (TJMG, 2006: 12), i.e. to promote 
economic and urban expansion rather than any social objectives.  
Most of the New Towns were not totally new but were formed through the expansion of 
former district and county towns. Two completely newly planned New Towns were 
proposed in Jinghai and Baodi Districts (Figure 6.4). During the interviews, officials from 
planning department and planners told me that the selection criteria for New Towns were 
based on two aspects. First, they are the administrative centre and economic centre of 
original suburban districts or counties. The construction of New Towns focuses on 
expanding the built-up areas of old towns. The second type is located where there has great 
resources endowment and some projects have been carried out there (Interview, G12TJ). For 
example, the Jingjin New Town in Baodi District is the second type of new town.  
‘The concept of Jingjin New Town originatess from a real estate company Hopson 
Development from Guangdong Province. Hopson Development launched a mega real 
estate project here. It is actually an entertainment project and high-end villas based 
on local spring water resources’ (Interview, G03TJ).  
When these two counties were converted to urban districts in 2002, both revised their own 
master plans and proposed their own polycentric development through new sub-centres at a 
distance from the traditional county centres (TJLLRCC and TJPB, 2015). The conversion of 
counties to urban districts helped to strengthen the competitiveness of the central city, solve 
internal conflicts and consolidate metropolitan governance (Wu, 2016). Therefore, these 
polycentric concepts initially emerged among district officials and business representatives, 
but then eventually were included in the city master plan. The inclusion/exclusion strategy 
is used here to articulate local discourse into policy of polycentricity. Meanwhile, New Town 
development corporations were set up to take responsibility for plan making, land leasing, 
attracting investment and construction procurement, which reflects the institutional changes 
led from disruptive changes. In a nutshell, top-down planning principles and bottom-up 
development aspirations were merged into master plans by the Municipal Government 
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through a rescaling and selective strategy. The polycentric discourse became an articulation 
of the ambition of multi-level governments for economic growth and urban expansion. 
6.4.4 The emergence of nested polycentricity: the 2016 plan  
The latest Tianjin master plan was completed and submitted to Tianjin Municipal 
Government for approval in 2016. It is still pending approval. It is evident from the draft that 
the discourse of polycentricity has become even more complicated and multi-faceted. More 
agents are involved in reshaping polycentric discourses. The power relations at interlocking 
scales have been reshuffled and multiple narratives regarding the spatial organisations have 
been deployed for distinct purposes, which leads to both the census and tensions between 
different agents. The new ideologies or wider discourses contribute to enlarged component 
elements to the new discourse of polycentricity. This plan adopts many urban development 
discourses associated with many different storylines. In this situation, the discourse of 
polycentricity shows its organising capacity to articulate them together at a variety of scales 
and dimensions. To legitimise the nested polycentricity, new planning tools and concepts 
are created and administrative system in Tianjin is restructured. 
During the preparation of the 2016 plan, the national context changed. Facing the 
consequences of fast urbanisation, central government began to adjust its development 
principles in order to achieve ‘sustainable development’ and ‘social justice’, manifested in 
the National Plan on New Urbanization (2014-2020) (State Council, 2014). In addition, 
urban agglomerations (chengshiqun), consisting of several interacting cities within the same 
region, were selected as a new state space to reassert and enhance the central state’s 
governance capacity for social, economic and environmental crisis management beyond 
economic competitiveness (Li and Wu, 2012; Wu, 2016). In 2015, the central government 
approved a regional plan for Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei aimed at diluting the over-
concentration of Beijing and promoting greater spatial balance within the region (State 
Council, 2015). This new policy rhetoric is incorporated in the 2016 Tianjin plan and 
therefore represents a new discursive turn. 
The 2016 plan shows three significant changes in content relating to spatial structure. First, 
the city positioning, and development goals are proposed within the new context. The 
regional plan envisages the planned integration of the whole Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region 
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into a polycentric urban region characterised by ‘one core, two cities, three axes, four 
districts, multiple nodes’ (yihe shuangcheng sanzhou siqu duojiedian) (State Council, 2015). 
Tianjin is identified as an important city but is subordinated to the core city Beijing and it is 
supposed to take on complementary functions.  
Second, spatial governance, equity of public service and ‘ecological civilisation’ have also 
now become important planning elements. A spatial regulation plan is proposed, the main 
content of which is the demarcation of boundaries of designated ecological, basic farmland 
and urban development areas. This is supposed to provide a platform for the integration of 
multiple plans and sets the new morphological frame, characterised by large built up areas 
separated by ecological zones and farmland. In the chapter of spatial regulation, the three 
types of zones and their boundaries (which is also literally called ‘three lines and three zones’ 
in Chinese) are defined as follows:  
• Permanent ecological area: 2,980 km2, accounting to 25% of total area 
• Basic farmland area: 3,000 km2, accounting to 25.2% of total area 
• Urban development area: 3410 km2 for Tianjin City Region and 2,350 km2 for 
Central City (TJMG, 2016: 17) 
Based on the demarcation of ‘three zones and three lines’ (sanqu sanxain), the latest master 
plan defined three categories of area with different intensity of development control. They 
are development restricted zones, prohibited zones and permitted zones. The area of 
permitted zone is roughly equal to the area within Urban Development Boundary and the 
restricted zones allow for urban development only for necessary infrastructure construction 
and civil projects. 
• Development restricted zone: 5,191 km2, accounting to 42.8% of total area 
• Development prohibited zone: 3,533 km2, accounting to 29.1% of total area 
• Development permitted zone: 3,410 km2, accounting to 28.1% of total area (TJMG, 
2016: 19) 
Third, the rescaling strategy of the central state has influenced the decision making of 
regional and urban authorities. In recent years, all counties in Tianjin have become urban 
districts for the better implementation of regional plan. There are newly planned 
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development nodes such as Jing-Jin Industrial City in Wuqing and Future Science Park in 
Ninghe have been promoted (Figure 6.4). The formation and site selection of these nodes 
results directly from a new development impetus within local district governments in the 
name of regional cooperation. However, the case of Jing-Jin Industrial City also illustrates 
the sway of central government over these newly created governance entities. Recently, 
because a green belt for environmental protection was designated in the 2018 Beijing City 
Master Plan, Jing-Jin Industrial City has had to be relocated out of way of the new green belt 
(Interview, G19WQ) (see more in chapter 8). 
The demarcation of urban development area and urban growth boundary have framed the 
overall spatial pattern, but it does not propose a detailed spatial structure in terms of urban 
clusters hierarchy, size and functional relations. Following the spatial regulation, polycentric 
spatial pattern is applied to multiple geographical scales, ranging from the regional to the 
metropolitan, down to the Central District and Binhai New Area. At the city region scale, 
the overall spatial development strategy follows the idea of the non-statutory Tianjin 
Strategic Plan of 2009 (TJLRCC and TJPB, 2015) whose discourse of ‘twin cities, twin ports’ 
(shuangcheng shuanggang) was incorporated into the 2016 draft without any change (Zhu 
et al., 2009; TJMG, 2016: 33). The relationship between Central District and Binhai New 
Area is supposed to ‘change from main centre and subcentre to two equivalent centres’ 
(TJMG, 2016, 33).  
There are two reasons for this discursive transformation. First, although the Tianjin Strategic 
Plan is not a required element of the planning system, Tianjin Municipal Government 
legitimized it in an ordinance of 2011 and thereby gave it a legal basis (Interview, P01), so 
that its new spatial discourse must be followed in other plans, including the master plan. 
Second, Binhai New Area has undergone two rounds of administrative reform to ease the 
problem of political fragmentation. It is no longer merely an economic area but rather a vice-
provincial level administrative district having more autonomy than the other urban districts, 
including the power of planning approval within its jurisdiction. 
There have also been changes in the status and governance of the lower tiers of the urban 
system. On one hand, the urban functions of the outer suburban districts are emphasized, 
with the 2016 draft Master Plan claiming to transfer development zones to comprehensive 
functional areas (TJMG, 2016: 6). As a result, the former New Towns were split into two 
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tiers, namely ‘sub-cities’ (fucheng) and ‘functional clusters’ (gongneng zutuan) (Figure 6.4). 
On the other hand, the 2016 draft Master Plan argues that ‘the subjects of spatial governance 
for Tianjin city region should revert to administrative district management from functional 
zone management’ (TJMG, 2016: 25). The administrative centres of the outer suburban 
districts remain at the secondary tier while the new secondary centres in these districts are 
downgraded to third tier, functional clusters. The integration of clusters within sub-cities is 
also encouraged to promote their absolute importance, hence facilitating agglomeration 
economies (TJMG, 2016: 31). 
This plan uses the term ‘Sub-cities’ in place of ‘New Towns’ because these places are no 
longer just function as growth poles but as centres for providing better, more comprehensive 
urban functions such as neighbourhood governance and public services (Interview, G12TJ). 
More accurately, the sub-city refers to the core urban area in the suburban districts (Interview, 
P05; G12TJ). However, the prefix ‘sub’ also implies that they are still subordinated to the 
Central District and Binhai New Area (Interview, G12TJ). The coercion on planning new 
towns or new cities from central state is another reason for the discursive changes.  
‘Because many media and press cover the ghost city and social problems countrywide 
in the ‘New Town Movement’, the MOHURD is launching a command to abate local 
enthusiasm for new plans that include a New Town programme. So, at the local level, 
the government and planners coin other concepts.’ (Interview, G11TJ)  
Newly planned new towns such as Jingjin New Town and Tuanbo New Town were then 
downgraded to a lower tier (TJMG, 2016). The municipal government is trying to save 
Jingjin New Town as much investment has been poured into it. A new high-speed railway 
connecting Beijing and Binhai New Area is under construction and a new station will be 
built in Jingjin New Town (Interview, P01). It is a kind of ‘spatial fix’ but the effect of this 
measure is still doubtful because this new town lacks industrial and employment base 
(Interview, G03TJ). Several newly planned development nodes are proposed and set as 
functional clusters. In sum, functional clusters are important development projects but there 
is a high degree of uncertainty over their future development (Interview, P05). 
In the 2016 plan, the area of Central City is also further enlarged to cover the whole of the 
four suburban districts through a process of ‘metropolitanisation’. The role of important 
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urban clusters, such as Xiqing Sub-city, Jinnan Sub-city, Airport City, Eco-city and Dagang, 
is strengthened to support ‘network’ development (TJMG, 2016: 33). Central District and 
Binhai New Area both now consist of multiple centres. The former has ‘one main centre and 
five subcentres’ (yizhu wufu) (TJMG, 2016: 34) including two subcentres proposed in 
Tianjin Strategic Plan (TJLRCC and TJPB, 2015). The term ‘sub-centre’ was employed at 
the Central District scale for the first time in the Strategic plan. This master plan retains these 
two important centres and propose other new subcentres in Central District. The storyline of 
‘balancing development of the north and south of Central District’ (nanbei junheng fazhan) 
was used to rationalise the proposal for the new Northern Area subcentre.  
The new plan treats the Binhai New Area as a polycentric sub city-region. Learning from 
Randstad, Los Angeles and Shenzhen (Huo, 2016), it is proposed that Binhai New Area 
should have a spatial structure characterised by ‘polycentric, multiple clusters and networked 
city-region’ (duozhongxin duozutuan wangluohua) (TJMG, 2016: 46). Three subcentres in 
Binhai New Area are proposed based on the storyline of ‘integrating industrial and urban 
development’ (chancheng ronghe) (TJMG, 2016: 36). 
These adjustments in location, spatial scope and governance are the result of the politics of 
scale in subtle ways. The traditional main centre in the Central District is fused with the 
mega-project called the Culture Centre (a collection of museums and other cultural venues 
alongside a new park) because of a key political leader’s special interest. Also, in the Central 
District, the Municipal Government took over the supervision of Liulin Subcentre from 
district government in order to enhance control of this key development area. On the coast, 
the Sino-Singaporean Eco-city replaced Hanggu to become one of the sub-centres of the 
Binhai New Area, as it is national project that retains a high level of support from central 
government (Chang et al., 2016).  
The emergence of nested polycentricity also reflects growing functional complexity. Beyond 
the population distribution and commercial activities, the 2016 plan sketches a ‘public centre 
system’ (gonggong zhongxin tixi). The higher-level public centres are agglomerations of 
public facilities (management, health, education, etc.) serving the whole city region. The 
case for polycentricity begins by stressing the need to improve citizens’ access to public 
services by aligning their distribution more closely with everyday activities. Therefore, 
polycentricity is emerging in Tianjin in part as a servant of social cohesion policy rather than 
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merely a means to facilitate development, as a response to the imperatives by upper level 
government. This claim also aims to persuade the public, the potential audiences of master 
plan. It is noteworthy that many of the proposed public service centres overlap with the 
commercial centres (Figure 6.4), so that urban centres are tending to become increasingly 
comprehensive. In short, the discourse of polycentricity in the most recent master plan is 
nested, with multiple spatial elements and spatial scales. This discourse generally conforms 
with the development principles stipulated by upper level government. However, these 
discourses are selectively discussed and widely placed in the final planning output, so that 
the nested polycentricity is deployed coherently throughout the 2016 plan. It is a production 
both of municipal government’s coordination between elements of the local developmental 
state and of the reassertion of regulation by the central state. 
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Figure 6.4 Polycentric vision in 2016 draft Tianjin Master Plan (2015-2030) 
Source: Produced by author, based on the draft 2016 Master Plan  
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Table 6.3 Discourse of polycentricity in Tianjin's Master Plans 
Plan Discourse of 
polycentricity 
Geo-political context Scales of 
polycentricity 
Functional 
dimensions 
Power relations Rationality and 
constitutive knowledge 
1986 Polycentric urban 
settlements 
Reform and Opening-up 
policy;  
Tangshan earthquake;  
Recovery of urban planning as 
routine practice; 
Central District; 
City region; 
Urban settlements; 
Commercial 
activities; 
Domination of Central State 
through top-down regulation and  
policy selectivity 
Agglomeration 
diseconomies; 
Spatial heterogeneity; 
Central Place Theory; 
Satellite Town; 
1999 ‘Functional’ 
polycentricity 
Re-establishment of urban 
land and housing market; 
Success in TEDA and the 
Duty-Free District; 
Success of Pudong New Area 
in Shanghai; 
Central District; 
Central City; 
City region; 
Urban settlements; 
Commercial and 
business activities; 
Domination of local state due to 
planning devolution and economy 
decentralisation 
 
 
Agglomeration 
economy; 
Rent theory; 
Growth pole; 
Green Belt; 
2006 Polycentric 
growth nodes 
Entrepreneurialism and land-
based finance; 
Authorisation of Binhai New 
Area as national development 
strategy; 
Central City; 
Binhai New Area; 
City region; 
Urban settlements; 
Commercial and 
business activities; 
Growth coalition involving various 
level of governments and 
developers 
Agglomeration economy 
(regional externalities); 
New Town; 
Growth pole; 
2016 Nested 
polycentricity 
New style urbanisation; 
City regionalism and regional 
urbanisation;  
Central District; 
Binhai New Area; 
Central City; 
City region; 
Beijing-Tianjin-
Hebei Urban 
Agglomeration 
Urban settlements; 
Commercial and 
business activities; 
Public services; 
Reassertion of central state’s 
regulation for crisis management; 
Inter-city cooperation and 
negotiation; 
Administrative and governance 
reform at local level; 
Influences of key politicians and 
planners; 
Agglomeration 
economy; 
Growth Boundary; 
Urban network; 
Sustainability; 
Source: Author’s research (Wang et al., 2020) 
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6.5 Power relations, technical knowledge, and polycentric system of 
Tianjin 
Based on the discussion above, it can be readily seen that polycentric development is 
generally a top-down process in China (Table 6.3). It is a spatial vision in planning rather 
than an outcome of urban development (Interview, P05). Over time, the relationship between 
power, knowledge and space has become increasing complicated in these master plans. 
Different stakeholders play active roles in the discursive changes and spatial practice in 
terms of polycentric development of Tianjin. This section discusses the mutual relationship 
between multi-level governments and planning professionals in the discourse or vision 
(re)formation process. It also gives a summary about how the centres are defined and used 
as new space for their interests and how the polycentric system of Tianjin was proposed 
throughout the four versions of master plans. 
6.5.1 Power relations between state actors 
Role and function of different tiers of government 
The discursive practice of polycentricity in Tianjin’s planning involves multiple scales and 
strong state intervention. During this process, the changing inter-scale power relations have 
continually reshaped the discourse of polycentricity and its concrete content. Multi-level 
governments adopt different strategies and instruments to achieve their ends and interests.  
First, the central state is located at the highest level of the policy regime. Prior to 1978, the 
central state exercised strong regulation power in spatial arrangements. Since the gradualism 
reform, the central-local relations has changed in the process of decentralisation, 
marketization and globalisation (Wei, 2012). The devolution of power has weakened the 
control of central state. However, the central state can still expand its institutional capacity 
to reassert its control and governance ability in multiple ways. Initially, the central state 
launched experimental policies in selective cities to facilitate the Reform and Opening-up 
Policy. Facing up to the new changes and challenges in macro environment, the central state 
would adjust the development principle to response to the new changes. For example, the 
land use regulation or environmental regulation would be implemented strictly. Recently, 
the new city regional governance was regarded as a tool for crisis management for central 
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state. Political system adjustment and new regional plans are utilised to enhance central state 
control (Wu, 2016). These measures alter the discourse in many policy and planning 
documents. In addition, the projects designated and facilitated by central government will 
influence the spatial decision-making at lower scales. Central government frames the broad 
discourse in planning horizons and governments at lower levels will follow and incorporate 
these discourses in their own planning, considering the hierarchical administrative and 
planning approval system.  
Secondly, the process of regionalisation is becoming significant with the rapid urbanisation 
and compression of time and space due to the technological advances in transport and 
communication. In addition, the rescaling strategy of the central state has transformed the 
(city) region into the key spatial unit for development and organisation. The emergence of 
regional governance and planning are generating great impacts on cities’ positioning and 
spatial pattern. For the original peripheral areas, they find new opportunities for cross-
boundary cooperation and attempt to build new functional relations with other areas during 
the regional coordinated development. The proposal for new development programmes and 
new regional plans will influence the discourse at municipal level, as they are good examples 
of regional coordination. 
Thirdly, Tianjin Municipal Government is the most important agent in this scaled political 
system. Since the post-reform era, municipal government has taken responsibilities for 
economic growth and urban development. On one hand, they must embrace the national 
development principles and consider national projects in the plan making process since 
master plans have to be sanctioned by higher administration. On the other hand, the 
municipal government needs to coordinate inter-city relationships and simultaneously 
balance the bottom-up internal interests. In order to stimulate economic growth, Tianjin 
Municipal Government often proposes key development projects and arranges them in 
strategic locations. It also gives support to local district government. However, the municipal 
government cannot meet all the demands of districts because of resources and financial 
constraints and the pressure from the upper level, so it often adopts an inclusion and 
exclusion strategy to give priorities to selected projects. In this way, interests can be 
coordinated between municipal government and local districts government.  
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Last but not least, the local district governments also play an important role in the discursive 
formation. Current research emphasises inter-city competition and coordination. But in fact, 
the place selectivity for polycentricity at municipal level leads to rivalries between local 
district governments as well. To be or not to be a centre in the city is vital for local economic 
development. Polycentricity can be employed as a method of place promotion or city 
marketing so that local district governments can attract investment and economic 
programmes with the endorsement of municipal government (Interview, G07TJ; P03; P04). 
In addition, the centres are usually newly planned and developed. That means a large quota 
of construction land and a large amount of investment will be allocated to the selected places 
on the promise of economic prosperity and new fiscal income streams. In contrast, other 
districts that are not selected may carry many more social burdens such as public services 
provision and population management. This may lead to larger fiscal expenditure and fiscal 
deficit of district government (Interview, G17NK). Therefore, the mechanism for 
coordination between local districts competition and benefit redistributions are very 
important (ibid.). Moreover, due to the market-oriented reform, the local state tends to use 
its own resources to achieve economic growth. They may create new nodes by themselves 
or strive for mega projects (Interview, G09TJ). Their interests can be fulfilled by scaling up 
these projects to get supporting land use quota and policy approvals.  
Role and function of different government departments 
According to the spatial planning system in China, there exist multiple departments 
responsible for different kinds of plans making and approval. For example, the Development 
and Reform Commission is responsible for the Social and Economic Plans and Major 
Functional Area Plans. The Land Resources Bureau is responsible for the Land Use Master 
Plan and the Planning Bureau takes in charge of City Master Plan. Overlapping planning 
functions and planning subjects often cause conflicts over land use and spatial development 
(Wang and Shen, 2014; 2017). Both the technical and political factors lead to the deficiency 
of planning system and may lead to the uncoordinated implementation (ibid.). 
As the spatial elements have been created in different plans, conflicts are inevitable. 
According to the polycentric research in Europe, the power contests and struggles take place 
between EU institutions, within EU institutions, within each sectoral policy area due to many 
reasons such as the divergence of planning and administrative cultural or the position of 
128 
 
countries and regions (Richardson and Jensen, 2000). However, based on my fieldwork, the 
conflicts between different departments in China regarding the polycentric vision are not as 
significant as the West, especially under the context of the integration trend of different plans.  
According to the interviews with governmental officials and professionals, there exist three 
main reasons for the well-coordinated relations between different departments. First, as the 
polycentric development is a relatively macro development strategy, there is no obvious 
conflicts. The different departments have their own responsibility and resources to support 
the polycentric development. For example, the transport sector is responsible for improving 
connectivity of new centres through road and public transport construction (Interview, 
G09TJ; G10TJ). The conflicts often emerge for concrete projects because different 
departments have their own codes of practice and regulation (Interview, G15DL; G4BH). 
The incompatibly of land use between the land department and urban planning department 
is the most significant.  
 ‘The Tianjin Planning Bureau leads the master plan making and decides the future 
development strategy and spatial pattern. Once the plan is completed, the planning 
bureau will seek opinions from related departments, district governments. After that, 
all departments achieve consensus and the plan will be submitted to municipal 
government for approval. But sometimes, when constructing concrete projects 
according to this plan, some departments or district governments began to realise 
problems and to bargain with other departments.’ (Interview, G16TJ) 
Secondly, because of the integration trend, the incompatibility between different plans has 
decreased. For the latest plan cycle, the overall spatial structural was determined by the 
‘three zones and three lines’ (Interview, P01; P02). The boundaries are determined by the 
negotiation of Tianjin Bureau of Land Resources and Housing Administration (TJBLRHA) 
and Tianjin Development and Reform Commission (TJDRC), Planning Bureau and 
environment departments. This provides the accurate quota and strict control for 
development and therefore the conflicts between land and environment protection and 
development has been reduced.  
Third, different departments and district governments are all governed by the municipal 
government (Interview, G14DL; G12TJ). As the government official argued,  
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‘There is only one single municipal government behind them. Therefore, in terms of 
urban development strategy, they will not break or violate municipal government 
strategy.’ (Interview, G12TJ)  
Even conflicts emerge in the implementation process, they can be solved through the 
negotiation between different departments and coordination by municipal government 
(Interview, G04BH).  
6.5.2 Role of planning professionals  
Since the 1980s, urban planning in China has been required to be developed by professional 
planning institutes, which were separated from government. Governments commission the 
plan making to professional institutes through government procurement and they are mainly 
responsible for planning approval, management, and implementation. City Master Plans are 
developed by Chinese planning institutes. These institutes absorb western planning ideas 
and cooperate with international and domestic institutes and companies in the plan-making 
process. Academics also participate in the master plan-making process. They may act as 
professionals to undertake subject plans (parts of master plans) and strategic plans, or they 
may be employed as specialists in planning review and approval process.  
The task of plan making in Tianjin is usually assigned to the China Academy of Urban 
Planning and Design (CAUPD) and Tianjin Academy of Urban Planning and Design 
(TAUPD). CAUPD and TAUPD are public institutions affiliated to Ministry of Housing and 
Urban-Rural Development and Tianjin Planning Bureau. According to interviews with 
planners from these two institutes and academics participating in plan making process, 
planning professions are intertwined with the political powers to shape the discourse of 
polycentricity. 
In the planners’ academic training, the multiple clusters (duozutuan) spatial pattern is taught 
as a rational and ideal spatial pattern in the textbook (Interview, G07TJ; G12TJ). As one 
planner who was responsible for the master plan and strategic plan making said, 
‘The subject of urban planning lacks theoretical foundations. China’s physical 
planners use the traditional urban ecology theory proposed by Chicago School to 
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guide the physical urban structure because this school focuses on the physical spatial 
pattern.’ (Interview, P05)  
Considering the large size of Chinese cities, a multiple cluster development mode was 
regarded as a universal principle for urban planning (Interview, P04). The polycentric spatial 
pattern is regarded as a more advanced multiple clustered pattern, which highlights several 
key clusters with important urban or economic functions (Interview, G12TJ). Urban sprawl 
which is also called ‘pancake’ spatial pattern in large cities has received much criticism and 
therefore the shift from monocentricity to polycentricity is a kind of political correctness 
(Interview, P04; P05). 
Also, planners recognise the politicians’ intentions and provide professional advice to them. 
On one hand, planners employ classical and updated planning concepts or coin new concepts 
to justify the politician’s pursuit, as discussed in the discourse analysis (Table 6.3). In China, 
planners are representatives of government according to the principles of ‘governmental 
organisation, expert leadership, departmental coordination, public participation and 
scientific decision-making’ that should be complied with in the formulation of any city 
planning (Interview, P05; MOC, 2005). Governments organise the plan making process and 
has the final decision-making power. The political leaders in Tianjin tend to impose their 
own ideas on planners. The planning department in Tianjin is very powerful because many 
municipal leaders (such as mayors) were promoted from planning departments (Interview, 
G03TJ; P01). On the other hand, planners provide rational schemes for consideration, such 
as the site selection of new centres. Planners have their ethics and emphasise rationality and 
public interests. They compromise with political power, but meanwhile try their best to make 
the final plan more feasible and scientific. For example, when the political leaders of Tianjin 
decide to develop subcentres in Central District, planners suggested the number of sub-
centres should not be too many. 
‘At beginning, Tianjin’s government want to propose five or six centres. After several 
round of discussion, we recommended two subcentres considering the constraint of 
finance and resources.’ (Interview, P05)  
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6.5.3 Polycentric system and conceived centres in Tianjin  
After four rounds of master plans, Tianjin has shown a significant polycentric vision. The 
polycentric system in Tianjin consists of different types of centres. Due to the changing 
planning concepts, and the unclear boundaries and of dynamic status of key nodes, the 
polycentric system is complex and difficult to understand. Generally, the polycentric system 
can be divided into two types at two scales. At the city regional level, the polycentric system 
refers to the multiple urban settlements and newly planned clusters. Almost each district in 
suburban area has two key nodes now. As one of interviewees told me, it just looks like 
micro ‘twin cities’ at district level (Interview, P01). 
At Central City level, the centres in polycentric system refer to the agglomeration of urban 
functions such as commercial and business activities and public services (Interview, G07TJ; 
G08TJ). Table 6.4 below lists the key nodes identified by the analysis of planning documents. 
According to the historical foundation, the development could be categorized to two groups, 
namely historical settlements with continuous expansion and entirely newly planned nodes. 
The evolution process of centres in the planning is heterogenous because of the different 
roles they play in the polycentric system. Therefore, the difference in rationales, 
development trajectories and consolidation approach between centres demand much more 
detailed research.  
More importantly, interviewees’ perceptions about these centres, in terms of their 
development status and development potentials, are quite different. At a rough scale, Central 
District, Binhai New Area Core Zone and Wuqing District are regarded as centres in 
Tianjin’s urban system. The key nodes located within Central City, such as West Station 
Sub-centre, Liulin Sub-centre, Airport City and Eco-city are believed have greater potentials 
to become emerging centres after a long-term preparation (Interview, P03; G06BH). In the 
outer suburban districts, Jinghai District is expected to become an important node in 
Tianijn’s urban system as it is close to the new national mega project, Xiong’an New Area 
(Interview, A02; G03TJ). The identity of centres provides criteria for embedded case 
selection in the following chapters.  
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Table 6.4 Selected characteristics of the centres 
Scale Centres Development mode Evolution process in Planning Identity  
City 
region 
Central 
City 
Central District 
Xiaobailou Newly planned  CBD + public centre √ 
West Station Sub-centre Newly planned Sub-centre+ public centre ○ 
Liulin Subcentre Newly planned Sub-centre + public centre ○ 
Northern Area Subcentre Newly planned Public centre  
Binhai New Area 
Binhai New Area Core Historical settlement + new expansion TEDA + Yujiapu CBD + Public centre √ 
Airport City Newly planned Sub-centre + public centre ○ 
Eco-city Historical settlement + new expansion Sub-centre + public centre ○ 
Dagang City Historical settlement + new expansion Sub-centre + public centre  
Suburban Districts 
 
Xiqing Sub-ctiy Historical settlement + new expansion Satellite Town →New Town→ Sub-city+ public centre ○ 
Jinnan Sub-city Historical settlement + new expansion Satellite Town →New Town→ Sub-city+ public centre ○ 
Dongli Lake Newly planned Functional cluster  
Dashuang Newly planned Functional cluster  
Exurban 
Districts 
Wuqing District 
Wuqing Sub-city Historical settlement + new expansion County town → New Town→ Sub-city √ 
Jing-Jin Industrial City Newly planned Functional cluster  
Jinghai District 
Jinghai Sub-city Historical settlement + new expansion County town → New Town→ Sub-city ○ 
Tzy-ya Newly planned Functional cluster  
Tuanbo New Town Newly planned New Town→ Functional cluster  
Baodi District 
Baodi Sub-city Historical settlement + new expansion County town → New Town→ Sub-city  
Jing-Jin New Town Newly planned New Town→ Functional cluster  
Ninghe District 
Ninghe Sub-ctiy Historical settlement + new expansion County town → New Town→ Sub-city  
Future Science Park Newly planned Functional cluster  
Jizhou District Jizhou Sub-city Historical settlement + new expansion County town → New Town→ Sub-city  
Source: Summarized by author. Note: √ means the centres are regarded as centres of Tianjin in interviewees’ perception. ○ means the centres have greater development potential in 
near future. 
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6.6 Conclusion and discussion  
This chapter employs discourse analysis to explore the construction and evolution of 
distinctive discourses of polycentricity in Tianjin City Master Plans. Through an analysis of 
four versions of master plans supplemented by planning archives and interviews, the changes 
in nuance and underlying power relations in the discursive remaking process are examined. 
The experience of Tianjin shows understanding polycentric practice in China should not be 
restricted to a technical interpretation because it also involves scalar politics, the creation of 
new urban identities, and normative rhetoric.  
First, polycentricity is a malleable concept and its conceptual substance evolved over time 
(Table 6.3) (Wang et al., 2020). Tianjin has a long tradition to pursue polycentric 
development because of its specific history and political system. These specific contexts also 
lead to a rudimentary polycentric spatial pattern characterised by historical urban settlements, 
which also complicated the application of polycentricity in Tianjin. Since the reform policy, 
Tianjin has made four key master plans in different development stages. Significant 
discursive turns can be identified in these master plans. In the first official master plan, 
polycentricity was an embedded urban system concept. With the transition to the socialist 
market economy, urban planning then became an instrument for growth. In the 1999 Master 
Plan, specialisation and exploitation of the advantages of the CBD and port became the focal 
point of the polycentric spatial pattern. In the 2006 Master Plan, the discourse of polycentric 
growth nodes was enhanced by an emerging pro-growth coalition including the central state, 
municipal government, local district governments, and developers. In the most recent draft 
plan, the meaning of polycentricity has become much more complicated, influenced by city-
regionalisation theory and the ideology of sustainability, while still holding on to the idea of 
polycentricity as a ‘rational’ approach to spatial planning. Polycentricity has become a 
normative agenda among a wide range of geographic units, with conflicting objectives. 
Another new dimension is that polycentric planning no longer only applies to population and 
economic activity, but also to the delivery of public services, which has been converged into 
the concept of polycentricity. Meanwhile, the hierarchy between centres is supposedly 
becoming less significant so the networked and integrated relationship between centres is 
emphasised. Therefore, Chinese intra-urban polycentricity is emerging as a hybrid of the 
polycentric city and the polycentric urban region as practiced in Western planning. 
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Secondly, evidence from Tianjin also shows that the production and legitimation of distinct 
discourses is primarily a political and multi-scalar process, although it considers urban 
reality to a certain extent (Wang et al., 2020). With respect to rationality, the decentralisation 
trend that was the result of the development of modern infrastructure and market reform was 
a key driver of an increasingly polycentric spatial pattern. The distinctive Tianjin city 
administrative framework also provided a prototype for polycentric urban settlements. 
Successive plans defined the major problems and corresponding solutions under given geo-
political conditions through attempts to optimise the urban structure. The plans do employ 
theories like agglomeration economies and urban network theories to support the spatial 
proposals. Nonetheless, the recent discursive transition of polycentric development reflects 
political intentions to a much larger extent. Many newly planned and developed centres have 
become ‘conceived space’, as proposed by Lefebvre (1991) that is place for practices of 
power. The state and a technological bureaucracy dominate their development, identity, and 
governance. 
Thirdly, the study shows that inter-scalar power relations and conflicts are masked by the 
technical rationality of planning. The formation of polycentric discourse reflects the shift of 
planning ideologies but also the power embedded in the institutionalisation process. Within 
changing central and local relations and the interaction of planning factors and market factors, 
there are increasing numbers of agents participating in the production of planning rhetoric. 
Multiple scalar states and important actors adopt different strategies to achieve distinct aims 
and to legitimate their practices. The discourses of polycentricity, acting as ‘policy glue’, are 
an articulation of multi-scalar power in China, rather than a process of systematic, technical 
analysis. The fuzziness and fluidity of the concept creates space to accommodate consensus 
or to allow the play of contested interests and policy experiments. 
Lastly, the planning rationality, evolution process and spatial outcome of these centres are 
heterogenous (Table 6.4). The heterogeneity is derived from their different political and 
economic power, different locations, strategies, and development tools they adopt. Therefore, 
based on the centre system in Tianjin’s polycentric vision, next two chapters will focus on 
specific centres in more detail. Centres in Binhai New Area Core Zone, Wuqing District and 
Dongli District will be selected, as they have shown their importance in new planning 
discourse as well as in the actual development of Tianjin. 
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Chapter 7 Forging a new centre in TBNA: the birth and 
death of Yujiapu Central Business District  
7.1 Introduction  
According to the overview of Tianjin City Master Plans in last chapter, the discourses of 
polycentricity have been used as ‘policy glue’ to articulate multi-scalar power relations and 
interests in Tianjin. Therefore, centres in the polycentric system of Tianjin were created and 
formed according to different logics and contexts. A portfolio of tools and instruments were 
employed by various main actors and new centres experienced distinct development 
trajectories during the implementation process. This chapter and next chapter focus on 
several new centres in Tianjin’s planned polycentric system to explore why and how specific 
centres have been planned, developed and consolidated by investigating the political process, 
planning rationalities and spatial materialization process. The analytical framework 
proposed in chapter five is also suitable for the analysis of specific centres. Key elements in 
the analytical framework are also the major themes analysed in these two chapters, which 
frame the formation process of individual centres. Interviews with governmental officials, 
planners and academics, developers, and documents from both public sources and internal 
reports provide detailed and in-depth information. 
This chapter employs a new CBD in Tianjin Binhai New Area (TBNA) as the first embedded 
case. TBNA has always played an important role in Tianjin’s urban system throughout the 
post-reform period. Its core area has been upgraded from an industrial base to Tianjin’s 
subcentre and then to a parallel city to Tianjin Central District recently. Since the 2006 
Tianjin City Master Plan, a new CBD has been proposed in order to rebuild the function and 
identity of TBNA Core Zone and hence to encourage Tianjin towards a more polycentric 
urban form. The newly planned Yujiapu CBD, a synthesis centre of TBNA Core Zone, an 
international CBD and a regional public centre, is regarded as one of the most important 
centres in Tianjin in its spatial vision. It is also a symbolic place frequently mentioned by 
interviewees when discussing polycentric development of Tianjin. As the flagship project of 
TBNA, Yujiapu CBD has been under construction for more than ten years. During this 
period, it has experienced substantial changes in terms of built environment, function and 
identity. Recently, new clues about the future of Yujiapu have emerged. Therefore, it is an 
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opportune moment to review its formation and consolidation process and to assess its 
contribution to the polycentric development of Tianjin.   
This chapter aims to investigate why and how Yujiapu CBD has been proposed and 
developed in TBNA and, more importantly, to explore the underlying power relations, 
development approaches and consequences during the materialization process. This chapter 
first introduces the development history of TBNA in terms of its rising socio-economic and 
political status, corresponding governance reform and planning revisions. This part expands 
these three aspects in more detail based on the general development history of TBNA that 
have been mentioned in chapter six. The detailed context provides the historical and political 
background to the proposal for Yujiapu CBD. Then, the chapter introduces the plan making 
process of Yujiapu CBD in detail. More importantly, it introduces the political and technical 
rationales for the construction of Yujiapu CBD. Following that, the chapter attaches greater 
attention to the governance mode of Yujiapu CBD and discusses how the new CBD was 
built under coalition of multi-level governments with different resources and capacities to 
consolidate its new centrality. After that, the changes in physical built environment, social 
components and identity of the CBD are analysed and a critical assessment of whether it has 
successfully become a genuine centre for both TBNA and Tianjin was given finally. The 
analysis is mainly based on the interviews with government officials, planners and public or 
internal documents collected in the field. 
7.2 Context for the designation of a new CBD in TBNA  
TBNA, located to the Bohai Bay, is the coastal area of Tianjin. It was initially an economic 
development zone proposed for industrial development, which comprises three old coastal 
districts: Tanggu, Hangu and Dagang and the adjacent parts of Dongli and Jinnan District, 
covering an area of 2,270 km2 (Figure 7.1). After several rounds of administrative 
adjustments, TBNA has been converted to an administrative district through the annexation 
of Tanggu, Hangu and Dagang. Although the administrative area is equivalent to the area of 
former three districts, around 1,900 km2, its jurisdiction and planning area of TBNA goes 
beyond its administrative boundary and still includes parts of Dongli and Jinnan District.  
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Figure 7.1 Planning area of TBNA and the location of Yujiapu CBD 
Source: Adapted by author, based on map from Huo (2016) 
TBNA is treated as a sub city-region rather than simply an urban district of Tianjin by 
planners (Interview, P01). TBNA exhibits several features of a city-region. First, it covers a 
large geographical area. Its spatial scope, economic importance, built-up area and population 
are even larger than normal cities. Second, due to historical and political factors, TBNA 
consists of several historical separated urban settlements and new designation of functional 
zones. Before the administrative annexation, they were governed by different governments 
at the same level. This area is still characterised by the coexistence of multiple governance 
bodies after the governance reform in TBNA. Third, the functional area and jurisdictional 
area of TBNA have penetrated its administrative boundary.  
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The features of TBNA make the urban structure of Tianjin unique in China. From the view 
of the Chief Planner of Tianjin Academy of Urban Planning and Design Binhai Division, 
TBNA is a significant secondary urban centre in Tianjin’s urban system. As he argued,  
‘Tianjin is the most typical polycentric city in China to my knowledge. It is difficult to 
find another city in China whose secondary urban centre has such a large scale as 
TBNA. There are no other cities that have shown spatial structure characterised by 
two major central areas (twin cities) within its jurisdiction.’ (Interview, P01) 
Moreover, these features also complicated the internal relationships within TBNA 
(Interview, P01; G04BH). Therefore, this section reviews the evolutionary process of TBNA 
to clarify its spatial organisation and internal governance, especially the relationship between 
Yujiapu CBD and TBNA.  
7.2.1 The rise of TBNA as a new city (region) in Tianjin  
TBNA is not totally new. This area became an industrial and military base in the 19th century 
and the coastal area around Tanggu was the birthplace of modern industries in North China 
(Huo, 2016). After the foundation of PRC, Tanggu District was established here and then 
annexed to Tianjin in 1952. Historical industrial establishments such as Tianjin Alkali 
Factory, Tianjin Chemical Factory, and Tianjin Dagu Chemical Factory remained the 
backbone of industry in the coastal area. Hangu district became a district of Tianjin in 1962, 
which was converted from a county level city. Since the 1960s, the coastal area has become 
an energy production and related manufacturing industrial base because of the discovery and 
exploitation of Dagang Oilfield (Wei and Jia, 2003). Based on the construction of Dagang 
Oilfield and new development of oilfield settlements, a new administrative district Dagang 
District was founded in 1979. By then, the coastal area of Tianjin comprised three districts 
characterised by separated urban settlements and specialised industrial activities. 
Before 1978, Tianjin’s development was concentrated within the central area of Tianjin. 
Since the implementation of Reform and Opening-up policy, TBNA has gained much more 
attention from governments and planners. It has played an increasingly important role in 
both urban and regional development because of its abundant land and natural resources, 
access to the port of Tianjin and good industrial foundation (Interview, G06BH). As early 
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as the 1980s, the importance of the coastal area in Tianjin urban system was emphasized and 
this area was confirmed as the future development focus for industry in Tianjin City Master 
Plan. In 1984, Tianjin was designated as one of fourteen Open Costal Cities, which enjoy 
more free-market-oriented policies to foreign investment and business. Corresponding to 
this policy, the Tianjin Economic-Technological Development Area (TEDA) was 
established in Tanggu. TEDA has contribute to the economic development of TBNA and 
further enhanced the importance of costal area in Tianjin’s urban system.  
Until 1994, the explicit concept of ‘Tianjin Binhai New Area’ was first proposed by Tianjin 
Municipal Government, which marked the beginning of transition of TBNA from separate 
urban districts and development zones to an integrated sub-region of Tianjin. By this time, 
TEDA had become the leading development zone nationwide. It had attracted many large 
multinational companies such as Motorola and Samsung (Interview, G04BH). The ambitious 
plan of TBNA was based on the success of TEDA and the Free Trade Zone of Tianjin Port 
(TJLRCC and TJPB, 2015). To support the development of TBNA, Tianjin Municipal 
Government gave priority to TBNA and allocated resources such as the airport and key 
industrial projects to the jurisdictional area of TBNA.  
After becoming the municipal development strategy for twelve years, TBNA finally gained 
the central state’s support and was upscaled to a national level New Area in 2006. TBNA 
was the second national-level New Area in China after Shanghai Pudong New Area, 
designated in 1992. The reasons for upscaling TBNA as a national strategy involved the 
interests of governments at many levels (Interview, A02). Tianjin Municipal Government 
attempted to seek policy and financial support from the central state, especially after several 
previous political leaders, such as Party Secretary of Tianjin Lichang Zhang, were promoted 
to the Politburo of the Communist Party of China (Interview, G03TJ). If it were to succeed, 
TBNA would receive preferential treatment and financial support. For the central state, the 
development of Tianjin Binhai New Area would help to improve the region’s 
competitiveness and facilitate regional balance. The re-emergent of regionalisation since the 
2000s is regarded as a response to administrative fragmentation and excessive competition 
between cities caused by urban entrepreneurialism (Li and Wu, 2012). At that time, the other 
two urban agglomerations, Yangtze River Delta and Pearl River Delta, were developing 
much faster than Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Region. Also, the competition between Beijing and 
Tianjin had becoming increasingly intense (Interview, G07TJ). Therefore, Tianjin Binhai 
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New Area could be employed as the ‘common element’ (jiegou gongtong dian) for the 
regional development (Huo, 2016). Therefore, in the document Suggestions on Promoting 
Binhai New Area Development and Opening Up (State Council, 2006), Tianjin Binhai New 
Area was regarded as the third growth pole of China, which would allow the region to catch 
up with the Pearl and Yangtze River Deltas as well a means to facilitate regional cooperation 
within Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Region.  
With support from municipal and central states, TBNA has experienced a rapid economic 
growth and urban expansion since 2006. In 1994, the GDP of Binhai New Area was less 
than 17 billion Yuan, which accounted for 23 percent of Tianjin’s GDP. By 2015, this figure 
had increased to 927 billion Yuan, accounting 56 percent of GDP (Figure 7.2). So far, the 
central state has approved nineteen national level New Areas in total and TBNA is the second 
largest in terms of GDP. The built-up area of TBNA almost doubled between 2005 and 2016 
(Huo, 2016). Together with the economic development, the permanent population also 
increased dramatically, with the total population nearly reaching 3 million by 2015, the 
majority of whom are new migrants (Interview, G06BH). According to these statistical data, 
TBNA is transforming from a traditional industrial base to a new central urban area of 
Tianjin.  
 
Figure 7.2 The economic growth of Binhai New Area 1994-2014 
Source: TBNASB, Tianjin Binhai New Area Statistical Yearbooks, various years 
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7.2.2 Governance reform in TBNA  
Along with the different development stages, TBNA has experienced several rounds of 
governance reform. Initially, TBNA was an economic zone with few responsibilities for 
social development. The functional zones (e.g. TEDA, TPFTZ) and three districts (Tanggu, 
Hangu, Dagang) were administratively independent, each governed by their own district 
governments and administrative committees. After TBNA was proposed in 1994, Tianjin 
Municipal Government established a steering office in the following year to coordinate 
affairs and conflicts. However, the administrative power of the steering office was weak. In 
2000, the Administrative Committee of TBNA replaced the steering office and took 
responsibilities for plan making, industrial projects, infrastructure construction and 
coordination between the different districts and functional zones. The difference is that the 
director of the Administrative Committee was an appointed member of standing committee 
of the CCP Tianjin Committee. That means the leadership of TBNA was upgraded from 
bureau level to deputy-ministerial level in the political system, so that higher-level cadres 
have ability to perform the coordination function for TBNA (Zhu and Sun, 2009). 
Nevertheless, the fragmented administration system was still blamed as the most significant 
block to the development of TBNA (ibid.). After TBNA was upgraded and included in the 
national development strategy, one of the main tasks was to manage conflict between local 
governments and hence to facilitate the development and opening up of TBNA. In 2009, 
learning from Shanghai Pudong New Area, TBNA District Government, a sub-provincial 
district, was established by the annexation of Tanggu, Hangu and Dagang districts (Interview, 
G04BH). The parts in Dongli and Jinnan Districts were also put under the jurisdiction of 
TBNA Government and included into the planning area of TBNA for economic development 
purposes (Interview, G04BH). To guarantee that administrative innovation could be 
implemented smoothly, the lower level governments within TBNA were organised in two 
types. The first type was Administrative Committees of Tanggu, Hangu, Dagang, which 
were the legacy of previous district governments and were mainly responsible for the social 
affairs in their jurisdiction. The second type was the Administrative Committees of 
functional zones (gongnengqu), which mainly undertook economic functions. In TBNA 
second round administrative reform in 2013, the Administrative Committees of Tanggu, 
Hangu, Dagang were abolished and the power of social governance was further decentralised 
to the towns and sub-districts.  
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Through a series of administrative reforms, the boundary effects caused by the co-existence 
of several districts have been further weakened. Governance reform in TBNA also lifted the 
status of TBNA and gave much more autonomy to TBNA Government (Interview, P01). 
With the abolishment of former district governments, functional zones have become major 
components of TBNA. Yujiapu CBD is one of the most important functional zones, which 
was newly established after it was upscaled to a national level New Area. The governance 
framework of Yujiapu CBD was reshaped during the administrative reform in TBNA, which 
had great impacts on its development and management. 
7.2.3 The role of Yujiapu CBD in TBNA 
TBNA made its first master plan after it was proposed as a municipal development strategy. 
In TBNA Master Plan (1999-2010), the spatial pattern of TBNA was still characterised by 
three separated urban districts (Table 7.1). Existing urban areas were the development focus 
at that time. There was no intention to develop a CBD in the TBNA Core Zone. When TBNA 
became a national development strategy, the status of TBNA was upgraded to the sub-centre 
of Tianjin, as discussed in chapter six. Correspondingly, the second TBNA Master Plan 
(2005-2020) proposed that the development of a CBD was needed to promote its urban 
functions. Initially the CBD was a loose area that comprised the business district of TEDA, 
Yujiapu and Tanggu downtown. The role of Yujiapu was not specially highlighted and the 
development scale was not as grand as current plan. This edition master plan was revised 
quickly because of administrative adjustment. The more recent TBNA Master Plan (2009-
2020) attached more attention to the development of Yujiapu and adjusted the traditional 
spatial pattern of TBNA. City region theories have been applied to this TBNA Master Plan. 
Planners drew upon the planning of the Randstad, San Francisco Bay Area and Shanghai 
Pudong New Area and proposed that TBNA would develop into ‘a polycentric, multiply 
clustered and networked urban region’ as its long-term spatial development outcome (Huo, 
2016). Among several separated urban areas within TBNA, TBNA Core Zone, which 
consists of the Tianjin port, TEDA, Yujiapu CBD and Tanggu old downtown, was proposed 
as a parallel city to Tianjin Central District. Yujiapu CBD was established as an independent 
functional zone with its own administrative committee and defined as the centre of TBNA 
Core Zone in this plan. 
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TBNA has adopted many new practices in urban planning. The planning system of TBNA 
was reformed along with the political system reform. A comprehensive planning system has 
been developed since the upscaling of TBNA (Huo, 2016). This new planning system 
requires both the master plan and the detailed plan of TBNA to cover the whole territory. In 
addition, functional zone authorities need to make their own master plans. Urban design of 
key development projects is required to be completed before construction with the aim of 
improving the function and image of TBNA. As a functional zone and flagship development 
project, the master plan, detailed plan and urban design of Yujiapu CBD need to be 
completed to a very high standard. The following sections will analyse these aspects in much 
more detail.  
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Table 7.1 TBNA Master Plans and the role of the new CBD 
Plans  Spatial proposal  Projected 
population 
Positioning goals Role of 
Yujiapu CBD 
TBNA 
Master 
Plan 
(1999-
2010) 
• One core: Tanggu urban 
area 
• Three nodes: Hangu 
urban area, Dagang urban 
area and Hai River 
Downstream Industrial 
Park 
 
1.65 
million 
• A modern industrial 
base 
• A logistic centre 
• An international 
port city 
N/A 
TBNA 
Master 
Plan 
(2005-
2020) 
• One axis: Hai River 
development corridor 
• One belt: Coastal 
development corridor. 
• Three urban districts: 
Tanggu, Hangu and 
Dagang; 
• Seven functional zones; 
3 million • Gateway of North 
China 
• An advanced 
manufacturing and 
R&D 
transformation base 
• An international 
shipping and 
logistic centre 
• A liveable and 
ecological new city 
 
• First proposal 
for a new CBD 
in TBNA 
• Yujiapu is part 
of the CBD 
 
TBNA 
Master 
plan 
(2009-
2020) 
One city (TBNA Core 
Zone), twin ports and three 
areas (Liveable and 
tourism area in the North; 
Petrochemicals and 
ecological area in the 
South; Airport and 
advanced industrial area in 
the West) 
A polycentric, multiple 
clusters and networked 
Bay urban region 
6 million • Gateway of North 
China 
• An advanced 
manufacturing and 
R&D 
transformation base 
• An international 
shipping and 
logistic centre 
• A liveable and 
ecological new city; 
• Proposal for 
Yujiapu CBD 
• One 
independent 
functional zone 
• International 
finance and 
business 
district 
Yujiapu 
CBD 
Master 
Plan 
(2010-
2020) 
• One river, two banks and 
six districts 
• Core area: Yujiapu 
Financial District and 
Xiangluowan Business 
District 
• Populatio
n: 0.5 
million 
• Employm
ent: 0.6 
million 
• City centre of 
TBNA 
• China’s financial 
innovation base 
• International 
finance and 
business district 
• City centre of 
TBNA 
• Key part of 
TBNA Core 
Zone 
Source: Summarized by author based on Huo (2016)
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7.3 The rationale and governance of Yujiapu CBD  
In the context of entrepreneurial urban governance, mega urban projects, such as new city 
centres, new CBDs and development zones have been designated in most Chinese cities with 
the aims of improving the city competitiveness and to market the city as an attractive place 
to invest and live in (Qian, 2011). CBD projects have been favoured in major Chinese cities. 
Unlike the CBDs in the West, which are often self-generated albeit aided by public policies, 
Chinese CBDs, especially the new and second-order CBDs far from traditional city centres 
are often policy-led and state-led projects (Zacharias and Yang, 2016). City governments 
have sponsored the plans and financed the design and construction of infrastructure and 
modern buildings in these new central places for their own purposes (ibid.). The formation 
and development of Yujiapu CBD is not an exception. 
Yujiapu CBD is the secondary CBD of Tianjin. The first CBD, Xiaobailou, located in the 
city centre was proposed in the 1990s. Compared to the Xiaobaolou CBD, Yujiapu CBD 
was entirely new and built from ground-up and was proposed in line with TBNA’s upscaling. 
The construction of a new CBD in TBNA was regarded an important measure to facilitate 
the development and opening-up of TBNA in line with national aspirations. Therefore, 
Yujiapu CBD shows some particularities compared to other new CBDs in China. Although 
the Yujiapu CBD bears the hallmarks of city-sponsored initiatives, the central state is also a 
key player in its development process (Kim, 2014; Interview, G01BH; G13BH; A02).The 
production of Yujiapu CBD involves interests of multiple-level governments and key 
politicians from local government to national levels. In practice, its plan and governance are 
largely beyond Tianjin’s purview. In this section, the process of decision making and 
political and technical rationality for the new CBD proposal will be discussed in detail. 
7.3.1 Decision making and the master plan of Yujiapu  
The proposal for a new CBD in TBNA was under discussion and in preparation for several 
years. It was first proposed by Tianjin Municipal Government in 2005. Municipal 
government decided to develop a new CBD in TBNA, but neither the Tianjin Master Plan 
nor TBNA Master Plan clarified the preferred scheme for its development (Table 7.1). Due 
to the involvement of the central state, the new CBD received special attention from higher 
level governments and the proposal for the new CBD became more ambitious. The final 
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scheme was gradually formed which drew from the expertise of international professionals 
and considered the demands of governments. The revised master plan of the new CBD was 
approved in 2012.  
Yujiapu was selected as the site for the new CBD. The spatial scope and functionality of the 
new CBD in TBNA were determined explicitly in this new plan. Tanggu downtown and 
TEDA were excluded from its spatial scope. Yujiapu CBD includes not only the financial 
and business districts as its core but also the residential and ecological areas surrounding it. 
Its overall spatial layout is summarized as ‘one river, two banks and six districts’ (yihe 
liang’an liuqu). Both sides of the Hai River are major development areas for the 
agglomeration of service sectors and modern office buildings. The planned CBD covers an 
area of 38 square kilometres to accommodate six sections, namely Yujiapu Financial District, 
Xiangluowan Business District, Tianjian and Jiefang Road Commercial District, Dagu 
Residential Area, Xingang Residential Area and Blue Whale Island (Figure 7.3). Later, the 
planned area was enlarged to 47 square kilometres which includes old residential area, 
serving to increase its population (Interview, G02BH). Yujiapu Financial District and 
Xiangluowan Business District lying on the oxbow of Hai River, are the core areas of CBD 
and the initial development area. The remaining districts such as Xingang and Dagu are 
mainly planned as residential areas.  
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Figure 7.3 Overall layout of Yujiapu CBD in its master plan (2010-2020) 
Source: (TAUPD, 2017) 
There were three positioning goals for Yujiapu CBD (Table 7.1). First, the CBD aims to 
become the city centre of Binhai New Area, responsible for administration, cultural activities, 
business and commercial activities. Second, it aims to function as a financial innovation base 
of China. New preferential and pilot policies regarding to finance and trade will be 
experimented in Yujiapu CBD. Third, the new CBD aims to become a world-class CBD in 
a short period. It is touted as China’s ‘New Manhattan’ and ‘Shanghai Lujiazui CBD’ in 
North China. The CBD district is planned to provide 0.6 million jobs, which is more than its 
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projected population (Table 7.1). It is said that the planned office space in its core area is 
already more than one third of the total in Manhattan (Sanderson and Forsythe, 2012).  
7.3.2 Rationality of the new CBD proposal 
Yujiapu CBD was a top-down designated and newly planned centre based on the discussion 
above. The rationality for building this new CBD involves local entrepreneurial governments, 
intervention of the central state, planning professional and pragmatic considerations. It has 
become an important centre in both TBNA and Tianjin because it is expected to achieve 
several purposes simultaneous.  
To promote urban identity of TBNA 
After more than ten years’ endeavour, TBNA became an economic growth pole of Tianjin. 
It contributed more than 40 percent of total GDP of Tianjin in the early 2000s (Figure 7.2). 
However, TBNA was still a heavily industrialised port region with secondary industry 
accounting for 72% of the total GDP of TBNA in 2005. The traditional industrial structure 
and weak public service provision did not match its new positioning as a national New Area 
and as a parallel city of Tianjin. Demands for better public services and producer services 
increased due to the rapid economic and population growth. Therefore, it was identified that 
there was a need to build a new central area within TBNA in a short period (Interview, 
G04BH). According to the local official, Yujiapu is a mega urban project in TBNA to 
enhance the urban identity of TBNA Core Zone. As she noted,  
 ‘The traditional city centre in the Central District is formed in a long history and the 
best public facilities are agglomerated there. According to the development situation, 
there is still a huge gap between the Central District and TBNA Core Zone. The 
construction of the centre of TBNA Core Zone commenced just a few years ago. It was 
built in a new place according to new standards. You can see that the infrastructure 
and image of old Tanggu did not change a lot.’ (Interview, G04BH)  
‘Ten Great Battles in TBNA include the development of new industrial districts and 
new urban areas. Yujiapu is one of the ten projects to develop a new urban area in 
TBNA.’ (Interview, G04BH)  
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As the positioning goal of Yujiapu CBD shows, it is designed to become the city centre of 
TBNA. Through building a new CBD in TBNA, producer service sector is intended to be 
agglomerated here and therefore the economic structure can be upgraded in TBNA. 
Moreover, the function of the Yujiaopu CBD is planned much more diverse than other CBDs 
which typically emphasise business and retail functions. It provides a number of high-end 
shopping centres, culture amenities, theme parks and iconic buildings. In this way, the image 
of TBNA as a globalised modern city is intended to be enhanced and therefore the ‘twin 
cities’ spatial pattern of Tianjin can be achieved.  
To create new development across the Hai River 
The decision to develop the new CBD in Yujiapu rather than in TEDA or Tanggu Downtown 
was based on several considerations. First, the governments and planners adopted a 
pragmatic approach. New development in an empty place will save on demolition costs and 
compensation fees and avoid expected resistance (Interview, P03, P04). The landscape in 
the old Tanggu downtown was considered unsuitable for a global financial centre and would 
involve large amount of relocation. In the Yujiapu area, only a few factories and residents 
needed to be relocated (Interview, P01). Second, Yujiapu is a waterfront area, which 
provides a possibility of combining its river morphology with modern urban design 
(Interview, G01BH; G04BH). A comprehensive and fancy scheme could be carried out in 
Yujiapu. Third, beyond the feasibility and urban design considerations, the other important 
aim of the Yujiapu CBD is to integrate the development of the north and south banks of Hai 
River (Huo, 2016). Before the plan, public facilities, residential communities and economic 
zones were mainly located in the north of Hai River. The south bank of Hai River was a 
lagging area because of the divide of Hai River and the concentration of heavy industries. 
To facilitate the balanced development within TBNA, the governments preferred to expand 
across the Hai River so that the new development on the south side can serve larger 
hinterland. In the spatial proposal of Yujiapu CBD, an important element is the so-called 
‘two banks’. One part of the core area, Xiangluowan Business District is located on the south 
side of Hai River (Figure 7.3).  
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To improve competitiveness of TBNA  
The designation of Yujiapu reflects the central state and municipal state’s ambitions to 
increase the importance of TBNA at a regional and global scale. As Kim (2014) argued in 
his comparison of new city development in Songdo, Yujiapu and Lingang, the creation of 
new CBD at Yujiapu reflects the endogenous competition between and within regions. In 
the Bohai Region, there lacks dominating cities beside Beijing. The competition between 
other important cities in Bohai Region such as Dalian, Tangshan, Tianjin, Qingdao is fierce 
because they all have ports and the industrial structure in these cities are homogenous 
(Interview, A03).  
To enhance the economic status of TBNA as the ‘third growth pole’ of China, the central 
state approved to establish a financial centre and a free trade zone in TBNA. Special financial 
and trade related policies could be exclusively tried and applied to Yujiapu CBD. Tianjin 
Municipal Government and TBNA Government also supported the implementation of these 
special policies so that TBNA can stand out from homogeneous competition. The policy trial 
and the industrial adjustment could also facilitate the cooperation between the coastal cities 
in Bohai Region. Yujiapu CBD also provides a window for Bohai Region to participate in 
global economy and to catch up with PRD and YRD as well.  
Central state’s crisis management  
Political leaders at central state level played an important role in the decision-making and 
development process of TBNA and Yujiapu CBD. The formation and development of 
Yujiapu is influenced by the fourth-generation political leaders as well (Interview, A02; 
G01BH; G13BH). Compared to other planning projects, several projects in TBNA such as 
the Yujiapu CBD and the Sino-Singapore Tianjin Eco-city gained a great deal of support 
from the central state during Wen’s tenure. 
Yujiapu CBD is reputedly a political product of previous Premier Jiabao Wen (Interview, 
A02; G01BH; G13BH). On the one hand, Tianjin is the hometown of Premier Jiabao Wen 
so he tended to direct key projects to Tianjin (Interview, A02). Several members of Politburo, 
such as Gaoli Zhang, were promoted based on their performance as Tianjin’s political 
leaders. Therefore, Tianjin has a close relationship with key leaders in the central state. On 
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the other hand, in 2008, the Global Financial Crisis also influenced the socio-economic 
stability of China. Premier Jiabao Wen launched the ‘Four Trillion RMB Stimulus Plan’ to 
cope with the financial crisis. Yujiapu CBD was one of the most important and large-scale 
projects requiring massive investment at that time. To ensure a successful implementation, 
President Jintao Hu and Premier Jiabao Wen visited TBNA and also specially visited 
Yujiapu CBD many times to inspect its development progress (Interview, G01BH). 
7.3.3 Governance of Yujiapu CBD 
Due to its unique formation process, the governance mode of Yujiapu CBD was distinct 
from usual mega urban projects. Along with the administrative reform in TBNA, the 
governance mode of Yujiapu CBD is moving towards a variegated multi-level governance 
mode. The multi-level polity involves different tiers of governments such as the central state, 
Tianjin Municipal Government and TBNA Government, the dispatched office such as the 
administrative committee and non-government actors like development corporations (Figure 
7.4). The shift to multi-level governance is related to two paradoxical processes of 
institutional reform that are power devolution and the direct intervention from higher level 
governments. Because of the upscaling to a national New Area, Tianjin Municipal 
Government was encouraged to devolve power of to TBNA to enhance its autonomy 
(Interview, P01). However, because of the setting of special pilot zones in Yujiapu, the 
central state and Tianjin Municipal Government both have authority to supervise and 
interfere with its development. The increasing communication between different actors 
involved in Yujiapu’s development has become an important feature of its governance mode. 
This becomes more evident during the process of financing and policy pilot process, which 
will be discussed in next section.  
Because of several rounds of administrative reform, the complicated and fragmented 
relationships between TBNA and its components such as development zones and urban 
districts were gradually clarified. Following the foundation of TBNA Government, Yujiapu 
CBD was set up as one of functional zones and an administrative committee was established 
correspondingly in 2010. The CBD Administrative Committee is a ‘dispatched office’ 
(paichu jigou) of TBNA Government, which is mainly responsible for economic 
development affairs including plan-making, infrastructure construction and industrial 
projects arrangement in the planned area of Yujiapu (Interview, G02BH). Social affairs 
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within Yujiapu is in the charge of sub-districts, the ‘detached agencies’ (paichu jiguan) of 
TBNA Government (Interview, G02BH). Currently, Tanggu and Dagu Sub-district Offices 
collaboratively govern the Yujiapu CBD with Yujiapu Administrative Committee. 
Yujiapu CBD Administrative Committee consists of several bureaus and offices 
corresponding to TBNA District government arrangement and they are responsible for 
routine work. However, approval power in terms of planning and development control is 
still retained by TBNA Government (TAUPD, 2017). Besides, administrative bureaus and 
offices within the Yujiapu CBD Administrative Committee, Tianjin Yujiapu Investment and 
Holding Group Co., Ltd (TJYIHGC) were affiliated to the committee as the primary 
development corporation undertaking the construction and investment of the new CBD. It is 
the key implementor on the behalf of administrative committee. This company has four 
subsidiary companies, which have similar functions as their parent company but are 
responsible for different districts and resources (TAUPD, 2017).  
 
Figure 7.4 A variegated multi-level governance of Yujiapu CBD 
Source: Produced by author  
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7.4 Approaches to developing a new centrality  
7.4.1 State-led financing and financialising of new development  
TBNA gained a great deal of financial support from the central state and Tianjin Municipal 
Government in its initial development. The financial support was given in a variety of ways 
such as tax refunds and special funds (XNARI, 2017). Since it succeeded in upscaling to a 
national strategy, the central state provided a special fund to TBNA since 2005, which 
provided initially one billion RMB per annum, reduced to 0.8 billion since 2014 (ibid.). This 
special fund has financed around 14 billion RMB in total by 2019, which is equivalent to 
£1.6 billion, according to the average exchange rate of 2019 (1 GBP=8.81 RMB). 
This long-term special fund support from central state contributed only a small part of the 
investment. Being a centrally endorsed New Area, TBNA could also take advantage of credit 
guaranteed by government to draw more money from the financial markets by using different 
financial instruments (Figure 7.5). The major funding sources for developing Yujiapu CBD 
include bank loans, local government investment and construction bonds, and Local 
Government Financial Vehicles (LGFVs). China Development Bank (CDB), a policy bank 
affiliated to the central state played a crucial role in supporting the construction of TBNA 
(Sanderson & Forsythe, 2012). It issued a loan of 50 billion Yuan to TBNA in 2005 and 
consequently a new development corporation named Tianjin Binhai New Area Construction 
and Investment Group Co., Ltd (TBNACIGC) was newly created to manage CDB’s loans, 
which also became the most important Local Government Financial Vehicle (LGFV) and 
developer in TBNA.  
LGFVs are established by local governments or their departments and agencies to perform 
the function of financing government-invested projects. State-owned land acts as a collateral 
as well as a source of paying back their debt. They are usually major developer of land and 
projects under the control of local government and their agencies. Because of the ‘Four 
Trillion RMB Economic Stimulus Plan’ implemented after the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, 
the central state relaxed the constraint and regulations on creation of new financial tools and 
LGFVs by local government. This ‘government led and market-oriented operation’ 
financing mode has become popular in TBNA since 2008. For example, TBNA has launched 
‘Ten Great Battles’ with a total investment of 1.5 trillion yuan between 2008 and 2012 (Huo, 
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2016). ‘Ten Great Battles’ refers to ten key projects located in different functional zones, 
each with its own LGFV (Interview, G04BH). Yujiapu CBD was listed as one of the key 
projects and an investment group corporation was established as the primary financing 
platform and developer. 
Key infrastructure such as Yujiapu Transport Hub and Cultural Centres were financed by 
the development corporation of TBNA Government (Figure 7.5). In 2011, TBNACIGC also 
issued construction bonds to the value of 10 billion RMB via the financial market and 1 
billion of this was used to fund the construction of Yujiapu Transport Hub (Sanderson & 
Forsythe, 2012).  
Beyond the investments from central government, municipal government, local government 
and development corporations, other provincial governments and state-owned companies 
participated into the capital circle to achieve central state’s vision through funding the 
construction of skyscrapers. Xiangluowan Business District was planned to accommodate 
headquarters of companies from other regions and cities. Based on the previous negotiation, 
48 buildings and 39 projects have been planned. According to a municipal government 
official,  
‘the buildings in Xiangluowan Business District were mainly occupied by central 
state-owned companies or institutes. In the initial development, the central state 
required each province to invest and build an office building and encourage them to 
relocate their representative offices or state-owned companies to Xiangluowan.’ 
(Interview, G08TJ)  
In a nutshell, the Yujiapu CBD is an entirely state-financed project and multiple level 
governments have been involved in the financing and financialization process in the past 
decade. Through the employment of financial tools, it was claimed that the government has 
poured more than 200 billion RMB to Yujiapu CBD in total by 2014 (Lu, 2018). 
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Figure 7.5 Financing and financialising the development of Yujiapu CBD 
Source: Produced by author 
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7.4.2 Policy incentives to attract new business and talents 
In addition to the financial support from multi-level governments, Yujiapu CBD is also a 
pioneering place where pilot policies have been implemented. Not only has Yujiapu CBD 
enjoyed the preferential policies designed for TBNA, but also it has been incorporated into 
other important new national strategies recently. These policies aim to enhance its 
positioning as an international financial centre and to stimulate business growth through 
policy incentives.  
When TBNA was confirmed as a national level New Area in 2006, central state approved 
TBNA as National Comprehensive Reform Pilot Area (NCRPA) and allowed it to try new 
initiatives to facilitate the reform and opening up of TBNA (State Council, 2006). The 
NCRPA involved the institutional reform in domains of finance, rural collective land use 
right, foreign trade and tax preferential policies. For example, high-tech enterprises 
established in TBNA could enjoy lower corporate income tax rate, reduced from 25 percent 
to 15 percent (State Council, 2006). The NCRPA policy also encouraged TBNA to carry out 
pilot policies in venture capital, offshore finance and foreign exchange management. Since 
the new CBD in TBNA was proposed, Yujiapu has become the most important platform for 
the implementation of new financial reform and innovation.  
With rapid physical construction and completion of several key projects, Yujiapu CBD 
began to show a certain degree of speciality and privileges in the policy realm as well. It was 
incorporated into recent new national strategies, such as Coordinated Development of 
Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei, the Belt and Road Initiative and Pilot Free Trade Zone. In this context, 
many preferential policies have been designed to attract enterprises, research institutes and 
talents to Yujiapu CBD, aiming to consolidate its centrality and importance within TBNA 
as well as in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Region. Because of its importance in the national 
policy, the policies for the new CBD are well customised and very attractive (Table 7.2). It 
is expected that many enterprises and talents will be attracted to this CBD and the 
commercial buildings will be fully occupied. 
Among these policies, the new approval of Tianjin Pilot Free Trade Zone (TJPFTZ) and 
integration development of Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Region have significant impacts on 
Yujiapu CBD in terms of its financial innovation and international trade. According to a 
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document Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Industrial Relocation Guide launched by the Ministry of 
Industry and Information Technology in 2016 (MIIT, 2016), Yujiapu CBD has been 
identified as an important platform for the relocation of financial business, headquarters, 
international trade, and e-commerce enterprises from Beijing.  
In December 2014, Tianjin Pilot Free Trade Zone (TJPFTZ) was approved by the central 
government. It is one of three Free Trade Zones approved following Shanghai Pilot Free 
Trade Zone in 2013. TJPFTZ was proposed based on previous Duty-free Zone in Tianjin 
port and the Airport Economic Area and extended to Yujiapu CBD. The whole zone covers 
a total area of 119.9 square kilometres and consists of the three districts now, namely the 
Yujiapu CBD, Dongjiang Port Zone and the Airport Economic Area. Compared with Duty-
free Zones, TJPFYZ implements much more relaxed regulations on foreign enterprises 
management and financial innovation. For this reason, Yujiapu CBD was defined as the core 
area of TJPFTZ, which is responsible for foreign investment and trade related financial 
reform and innovation. Moreover, measures such as custom integration, lower transaction 
cost across different cities within the region are implemented in the TJPFTZ to facilitate 
integrated development of Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Region (Table 7.2).  
The designation of TJPFTZ leads to the increasingly mutual interaction between Yujiapu 
and other functional zones and between different tiers of governments. The central state 
devolved several foreign economic affairs management powers to Tianjin Municipal 
Government and encouraged it to further decentralise them to TJPFTZ. To coordinate the 
relationship between the central state, municipal government, TBNA Government and three 
component zones, a new TJPFTZ Administrative Committee were founded (Figure 7.6). 
Yujiapu CBD and other two functional zones are under the control of their own 
Administrative Committees. The directors of these three Administrative Committees have 
seats in the TJPFTZ Administrative Committee board. TJPFTZ Administrative Committee 
is led by Deputy Mayor of Tianjin Municipal Government. The Mayor of TBNA 
Government and Director of Municipal Commerce Commission are executive deputy 
director. The coordination could be achieved through the communication within the 
administration board, which consists of related leaders at different levels and from different 
departments and functional zones.  
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Figure 7.6 Tianjin Pilot Free Trade Zone Administrative Committee 
Source: Produced by author based on TJPFTZ official website (http: //china-tjftz.gov.cn). Note: TJDFTPZ: 
Tianjin Dongjiang Free Trade Port Zone; TJAEA: Tianjin Airport Economic Area  
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Table 7.2 Preferential policies in Yujiapu CBD 
Policy Domain Aim Items 
Twenty Initiatives 
on Promoting 
Commercial 
Development in 
Binhai New Area 
Central 
Business District 
Commerce To improve the 
utility rate of 
commercial 
buildings; 
To enhance the 
urban vitality of 
CBD 
For enterprises registered, operated or paying tax in Yujiapu Financial District and Xiangluowan Business 
District: 
✓ Subsidy for enterprises 
✓ Subsidy for tenants 
✓ Subsidy for employees 
For talents working in Yujiapu Financial District and Xiangluowan Business District: 
✓ Talent premium 
✓ Housing subsidy 
✓ Household (Hukou) registration preferential policy 
 
Opinions on 
Promoting 
Development of 
Film, TV and 
Cultural Industry 
in Binhai New 
Area Central 
Business District 
 
Film, television 
Cultural industry 
To attract 
relocated film and 
cultural industries 
from Beijing; 
To facilitate the 
development of 
film and cultural 
industry in the 
CBD 
Fiscal support: 
✓ Subsidy for enterprises and institutes  
✓ Talents premium 
✓ Subsidy for individual income tax 
Special fund (200 million yuan): 
✓ Subsidy for service platform projects 
✓ Low interest loans 
✓ Premiums to enterprise or institutes for IPO or prize-winner 
✓ Housing and events subsidy 
Talents policy: 
✓ Talent premium 
✓ Household (Hukou) registration preferential policy 
Industrial Guide Fund 
Customised policies and services 
 
 
160 
 
Table 7.2 (Continued) 
Policy Domain Aim Items 
Twenty-Two 
Initiatives on 
Promoting 
Technological 
Innovation and 
Development in 
Binhai New Area 
Central 
Business District 
Innovation and 
entrepreneurship 
To promote the 
development of 
innovate industry; 
To improve the 
regional 
innovation 
capacity 
For all kinds of scientific and technological innovation platform, enterprises and service institutes: 
✓ Fiscal subsidy 
✓ One-time grants 
✓ Office subsidy 
✓ Patent reward 
✓ Subsidy for entrepreneurs’ individual income tax 
Industrial Guide Fund 
Customised policies and services 
Regulation on 
China (Tianjin) 
Pilot Free Trade 
Zone 
Financial 
innovation; 
International trade 
To support the 
establishment of 
China (Tianjin) 
Free Trade Zone 
Investment and opening up: 
✓ Reduce or remove restrictions on investment for certain industries 
✓ Adopt ‘Negative List’ management for foreign investment  
✓ Encourage oversees investment 
✓ Encourage innovation and entrepreneurship 
International trade: 
✓ Implement the international trade ‘single window’ service 
✓ Encourage cross border e-commerce 
✓ Improve the custom declaration efficiency 
✓ Financial innovation 
✓ Cross-border use of RMB 
✓ Foreign exchange administration 
✓ Leasing business 
Integration of Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Region: 
✓ Customs integration 
✓ The registered enterprises can expand the exhibition and trade in the region 
✓ Special funds 
✓ Lower the financial transaction cost across different administrative area 
Source: Summarized by author based on TBNA Government Official Website available at http: //www.tjbh.gov.cn/.htm 
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7.4.3 Place marketing through ambitious urban planning and design 
Modern and ambitious urban planning and design have been employed as an important 
government technique for place marketing and for building public consensus for new city 
image through spatial and social restructuring in Yujiapu. The prevailing paradigm of the 
development of mega-urban projects in China, especially newly developed zones such as 
CBDs, has become a tactic for localities to increase city competitiveness and to market the 
city as an attractive place to invest and live in (Qian, 2011). Yujiapu CBD is an image project 
proposed to improve the attractiveness and competitiveness of TBNA. Because of local 
entrepreneurial states and the involvement of central state and other interest groups, the 
planning and design of Yujiapu CBD have been completed to a much higher standard and 
on a larger scale. Ranging from master plan, urban landscape design, transport design to 
design of individual skyscrapers, the role of urban design was stressed throughout the 
development process. 
In the early preparation and decision-making process, the central state and local state’s 
aspirations can be reflected by the rationale for site selection. The selected location of the 
new CBD was originally mainly undeveloped area, occupied by old factories, dockland, 
warehouses, villages and derelict land. It provided enough space for planners and designers 
to draw a grand blueprint. Geographical proximity to the Hai River was also one of main 
factors in forming the choice of site, resembling the location of London Docklands and New 
York City, with a river bounding three sides. Waterfront space has enabled the planners, 
urban designers and architects to produce great design to improve the vitality of the new 
CBD. Canary Wharf in London Docklands and Manhattan Financial Centres in New York 
City were employed as paradigm models for Yujiapu CBD. For example, the development 
themes and design principles of Yujiapu are essentially an imitation of Canary Wharf, where 
Skidmore Owings and Merrill (SOM) employed similar development themes and strategies 
(Interview, G02BH). Yujiapu was also promoted as the ‘New Manhattan’ in China. The 
grand designs and unique geographical features give supremacy to Yujiapu within TBNA.  
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To promote a high level of planning and design, renowned international and domestic 
institutes and professionals were invited to participate in the planning and design process. 
Tianjin Municipal Government and TBNA Government adopted a variety of forms such as 
international workshops, consulting meetings, and international competitions to help 
improve the modernity of Yujiapu CBD (Huo, 2016). The planning and design work in 
Yujiapu CBD were organised in an innovative way to guarantee that the whole process has 
continuity and the final schemes could be feasible to be implemented. Urban design has 
become part of public policy of Yujiapu CBD. Tianjin Municipal Government and TBNA 
Government and their planning departments formed the Operating Committee to make final 
decision about key projects. Professionals in planning, architecture, transport fields 
consisted of Expert Committee, who provide review and consulting services in the whole 
process. Concrete design projects were assigned to international design institutes and 
companies according to their expertise. The American design firm Skidmore Owings and 
Merrill (SOM) was entrusted to design the Yujiapu Financial District; the transportation 
planning was assigned to MVA of Hong Kong; the landscape design along the Hai River 
was commissioned from EDAW design company; the Japanese architectural firm Nikken 
Sekkei led the underground space design and Hargreaves Associates, who designed the 
landscape of the London Olympic Park, was in charge of landscape design. Local planning 
and design institutes including Tianjin Academy of Urban Planning and Design and Tianjin 
Bohai Urban Planning and Design Institutes also participated to provide their local 
knowledge and technical support.  
In addition, TBNA government also held an international design competition for Yujiapu 
Financial District worldwide with the help of the International Union of Architects (UIA). 
The competition called for proposals for Yujiapu Financial District from 93 countries. The 
competition ended with an award ceremony and international forum, which invited Gaetan 
Siew (president of UIA), Peter Hall (president of British Town and Country Planning 
Association), professors from domestic universities, delegates from Canary Wharf, La 
Défense and planning and design firms to discuss and introduce their experiences in building 
a new CBD (TBUPDI, 2008). The international design competitions, award ceremonies and 
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forums held by government will be covered by media, which offers opportunities for place 
marketing to national and global audience.  
The participation of overseas planning and design firms, academics and professionals 
brought in their experience, technology and expertise. Tailored global themes of 
sustainability and intelligence mode of imaging urban space were articulated into planning 
discourse of Yujiapu. Based on the idea of the winning competition proposals, SOM made 
the conceptual plan for Yujiapu Financial District in 2008. The design of Yujiapu adopted 
classic ideas of new urbanism, characterised by ‘narrow streets, a dense road network and 
open space’ (Interview, G02BH). New urbanism was associated with ‘transit-oriented design’ 
and therefore Yujiapu transport hub was arranged within the initial area of Yujiapu Financial 
District. Mixed land use including commercial, leisure, hotel, exhibition activities was also 
stressed in the design process. These design themes aim to improve the vitality of human 
activities and provide a pedestrian-oriented living environment. The plan also implements a 
green development strategy, which emphasizes the ecologically conscious and 
technologically advanced urbanism (Kim, 2014). Yujiapu was the first place to be selected 
for ‘Low Carbon Model City’ by Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation as it adopted advanced 
green building technologies and world-leading transit system (ibid.). Other famous architects 
for individual skyscraper design also cooperated with SOM to carefully orchestrate the 
skyline and outlooking of buildings (Figure 7.7). They compiled Urban Design Guideline 
for Yujiapu and then it was implemented as a regulatory control just like the Detailed Plan 
in Yujiapu (Huo, 2016). The grand and high standard plans and designs help to promote 
Yujiapu as a global city, a green city, and a place for better living and working.  
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Figure 7.7 Landscape design of Yujiapu CBD 
Source: (Huo, 2016: 413) 
7.4.4 Public bodies as new entrants  
To promote the supremacy status of Yujiapu CBD within TBNA, functions such as 
administration and public services have also been consolidated through intragovernmental 
negotiation and arrangement. Public sectors which are usually under control of the state or 
funded by the state are much easier to negotiate with than private enterprises (Interview, 
G01BH; G04BH; G12TJ; G13BH). It has transpired that government agencies and public 
funded projects were main space users in the CBD after Yujiapu CBD was put into use. 
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The majority of departments and affiliated agencies of TBNA Government have moved into 
the Yujiapu CBD (Figure 7.8). The district government itself has moved to the new 
government office building located within Yujiapu CBD. The newly designated TBNA 
Administration Examination and Approval Bureau and TJPFTZ Administrative Committee 
have been relocated to Yujiapu Financial District. Several departments of district 
government such as Statistical Bureau, Development and Reform Commission, Commerce 
Commission, Planning and Land Resource Bureau were relocated to Xiangluowan Business 
District. TBNA Government rented space in Guotai Mansion as the offices of government 
departments and was also the main tenant of this office building (Interview, G06BH).  
The relocation of government is an effective way to facilitate the development of new CBD. 
On one hand, it enhanced the CBD’s administrative function and improved the occupancy 
rate of the office buildings. Meanwhile, the incoming civil servants as well as the new 
business trips to these government departments improved the vitality and stimulated local 
consumption. On the other hand, the new government arrangement enhanced the image of 
the CBD, was intended to raise private investors’ confidence.  
Yujiapu CBD was also planned to provide high quality and self-contained services to TBNA 
through the construction of several key cultural and public facilities. A large urban cultural 
complex was designed and built in the CBD, supported by public funding. The new Binhai 
New Area Cultural Centre, which consists of an art gallery, a library, a science and 
technology museum, a performance centre, a civic centre and a cultural gallery, has become 
a landmark. This mega project was constructed on industrial land previously occupied by 
Tianjin Soda Plant, adjacent to the new district government office building. The Cultural 
Centre improves the civic identity and image of Yujiapu CBD as well as the whole TBNA. 
In addition, Yujiapu International Financial Conference Centre has been completed for 
holding conference and events. Yujiapu Lincoln Centre, and the Tianjin Juilliard School, all 
funded by the CBD’s affiliated development corporations, will start building in the Yujiapu 
Financial District soon. These international cooperation projects are intended to make the 
CBD feel more globalised, fashionable and modern.  
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Public facilities like hospitals and schools are often insufficient and of poor quality in a 
newly constructed area in China. However, through the efforts of government, the new 
branches of Affiliated High School of Tianjin Normal University and Yaohua High School, 
will be built in Dagu Residential District (Interview, G06BH).  
In combination with existing public resources, the new CBD is expected to be developed 
into the administrative centre, cultural centre and public service centre of Binhai New Area. 
The introduction of government agencies and construction of public amenities have 
improved the soft environment and boosted the investors’ confidence to a certain extent. 
 
Figure 7.8 Distribution of public sectors in Yujiapu CBD 
Source: Produced by author based on interviews, google maps and the consultancy report from TAUPD 
(2017). 
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7.5 The socio-spatial outcome of Yujiapu CBD 
However, the urban reality in Yujiapu CBD does not conform with government aspirations 
and expectation. To assess the progress of this project, the produced space in Yujiapu need 
to be explored critically. TBNA Core Zone is well recognised as an important urban centre 
of Tianjin, but there is no conclusive answer that where should be its centre within this area 
(Interview, P01). TEDA was a leading development zone in China and was proposed in the 
early phase of reform policy. It also planned and built a Modern Service District (MSD) to 
provide financial and producer service. Tanggu downtown is a traditional urban settlement 
where most residents and migrants still live. Yujiapu CBD is supposed to be the flagship 
project in line with the multi-level state’s ambitions. Although Yujiapu CBD was quite often 
mentioned as critical place by interviewees regarding polycentric development of Tianjin, 
they show their concerned rather than confidence with Yujiapu CBD’s future (Interview, 
G01BH; G02BH; G03TJ; G13BH; G16TJ; A02; P03). From their perception, Yujiapu CBD 
has not yet become a real central area for TBNA, Tianjin and even larger region.  
Yujiapu shows that building a new CBD at such a large scale in only few years is a difficult 
mission. State bodies at different scales have made great efforts to forge Yujiapu CBD to 
become a national and (sub)-regional centre. The state-controlled production has led to 
dramatic spatial changes in Yujiapu, which also indicates the challenges it was facing.  
7.5.1 ‘New Manhattan’ with a fake prosperity 
The built environment of Yujiapu CBD has changed dramatically. The first phase of 
construction in Yujiapu CBD has been completed and these new buildings began to be put 
into use gradually. Key infrastructure projects such as Yujiapu Transport Hub, Culture 
Centres have finished construction and opened. When I first entered the CBD through the 
underground transport hub, concentrated skyscrapers heaved into sight. Physically, it looks 
like the ‘New Manhattan’ in China though a few projects are still under construction (Figure 
7.9). So far, the initial area in Yujiapu Financial District and the whole area of Xiangluowan 
Business District have been basically built-up, while other districts are still in the planning 
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stage. The land parcels in other undeveloped area were protected by dust protection nets or 
lawns.  
Yujiapu has the largest agglomeration of office buildings in Tianjin. It is supposed to be 
occupied by headquarters of domestic and foreign large-scale companies. However, when 
doing site viewing in these two districts, most office buildings were closed and only few 
were in use. It can be easily identified that economic vitality is relatively low in Yujiapu 
CBD. 
 
Figure 7.9 A glance at Yujiapu CBD 
Source: Photographed by author 
Nevertheless, the development of CBD is promising, at least according to the official 
statistical data (TBNASB, 2017; TAUPD, 2017). The GDP of Yujiapu CBD soared after it 
started substantial construction. The GDP of the new CBD increased dramatically, from only 
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0.55 billion in 2011 to 27.28 billion in 2016. Its contribution to the total GDP of Binhai New 
Area increased to almost 3%, while this figure was close to zero in 2011. 
The prosperity of Yujiapu CBD may be related to the physical completion of the mega 
projects in this designed centre. Initially, large amount of fixed asset investment facilitated 
the growth of GDP. After the completion of the first phase construction, the economic 
growth mainly came from tertiary sector. But in fact, there exists a significant gap between 
statistical data and actual situation. The main reason for the rapid growth is policy incentives 
rather than economic rationality. After the CBD was established as a part of TJPFTZ and 
Innovation and Entrepreneurship Zone (IEZ) by the central state, the quantity of registered 
enterprises in Yujiapu increased dramatically. Many enterprises would like to register at 
Yujiapu CBD to enjoy preferential policies (Interview, G01BH; G02BH; P01). In 2016, 
more than 500 enterprises were newly established in Yujiapu (TAUPD, 2017). A large 
proportion of investments were made by domestic enterprises rather than foreign direct 
investment. Moreover, almost all of registered companies in Yujiapu CBD are private and 
small businesses (TAUPD, 2017). Many business incubators have also been established as 
the response to the IEZ policy, which provides platforms for new and start-up company 
registration. However, their real offices are in the Central District or elsewhere rather than 
in CBD. One planner in TBNA branch mentioned that he often took shared cars to TBNA 
and met many people who went to TBNA government departments to handle business affairs 
because their companies are registered there (Interview, P01). Stimulated by the policy 
incentives, finance, cultural and creative industry and science and technology appear to have 
become the pillar industries of Yujiapu CBD. By 2016, the CBD had around 900 financial 
and 700 high-tech enterprises (TAUPD, 2017).  
However, the economic statistics showed that the sense of prosperity was entirely artificial. 
The development of CBD depends on the rent-seeking behaviours of agencies. It is not a 
long-term solution. Recently, TBNA government has adjusted its tallies downwards and the 
total GDP of TBNA was reduced by one third.  
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‘One of the main reasons for the adjustment of GDP in TBNA is because the statistics 
exclude the enterprises that registered but not operated in the CBD. That’s why the 
GDP of Tianjin still increased regardless of the decrease in TBNA.’ (Interview, P01) 
7.5.2 Internal and external fragmented space 
TBNA was treated as an urban-region and the polycentric principle was also applied to 
TBNA by local planners as well (Interview, P01). Polycentric development may lead to 
fragmentation if not well organised (Jenks and Kozak, 2013). Yujiapu CBD as a planned 
centre of TBNA showed significant internal and external fragmentation administratively and 
physically, which prevented its long-term development.  
Administrative fragmentation has led to excessive competition between functional zones, 
which are each responsible for planning, development, and investments on their own. The 
coordination was mainly achieved through coordination of TBNA Government, which is 
relatively inefficient (Interview, G13BH). Competition in terms of new investment, talent 
attraction and the housing market between Yujiapu and other functional zones is still fierce. 
One interviewee mentioned an interesting phenomenon.  
‘The high indebtedness forced functional zones in TBNA to be enthusiastic about real 
estate development. Even in places not suitable for buildings like the Dongjiang port, 
they still build and sell housing anyway. We often make jokes that we’d better buy the 
first or second floor because it will become the ground floor a few years due to the 
settlement of land.’ (Interview, G01BH) 
Administrative fragmentation also resulted in the industrial development among different 
functional zones becoming homogenous. Yujiapu CBD is only one of several functional 
zones to develop financial and business services. Although the finance and business 
functions were planned to be agglomerated in Yujiapu CBD, other functional zones have 
their own plans to build a CBD as well (Figure 7.10). To satisfy the demands of industrial 
companies within the development zone, TEDA built up the MSD providing 688 thousand 
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square metres of floor area. The Sino-Singapore Eco-city project was initially a public 
housing community in nature (Chang et al., 2016), but it was difficult to attract residents 
because of lack of industry and employment (Interview, G03TJ). Therefore, it proposed to 
develop a green CBD to attract animation industry. In the Beitang Economic Area, the 
Tianjin Binhai-Zhongguancun Science Park, a project to facilitate the integration of Beijing 
and Tianjin, was settled down there, which also provides massive office space. Overall, 
oversupply of office space in TBNA makes Yujiapu CBD just another ordinary business 
district. It is difficult for it to compete with TEDA MSD, which has had 20 years of 
development history and strong industrial base, let alone for it to compete with Xiaobaolou 
CBD in Central District of Tianjin, or CBDs in Beijing at a larger scale. 
 
Figure 7.10 Office space in TBNA  
Source: (TAUPD, 2017) 
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Physically, Yujiapu CBD is segmented into separate parts and isolated by Hai River, 
railways and elevated roads (Interview, G13BH; P01). The intentional design of distribution 
two business districts within the CBD on opposite banks of Hai River increased the barrier 
for physical connection. The most frequent destination within the CBD was Xiangluowan 
Business District as many government departments have been relocated there, but the transit 
hub was in Yujiapu Financial District. These two districts are connected by Hai River 
Moveable Bridge (Figure 7.11). Although the average traffic flow is not huge in Yujiapu 
CBD, the single transport channel still causes traffic jams in the rush hour or when the bridge 
needs to open (Interview, G02BH).  
The accessibility between CBD and other functional zones of TBNA is poor regardless by 
public or private transport because of space fragmentation. For instance, the Eco-city is 
designed as a large-scale residential community and Yujiapu CBD is planned to be a 
financial and business centre. If the commuting time between them is acceptable, both 
projects can develop better (Interview, P01). However, it takes around 50 minutes from the 
Eco-city to Yujiapu CBD for only 20 kilometres distance by private cars, while it takes 
similar time from Central District to Yujiapu CBD which is about 50 kilometres. Thus, few 
functional relations have been formed between them.  
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Figure 7.11 Hai River Moveable Bridge between Xiangluowan and Yujiapu 
Source: Photographed by author. Note: The electronic sign says that the open time of the bridge would be 
adjusted. 
Although Yujiapu CBD is connected with Beijing and Tianjin Central District by High-
speed Railway, there are complaints about the train schedule and flexibility (Interview, 
G01BH). As the iconic project of Yujiapu Financial District, Yujiapu Transport Hub was 
completed in 2015 and the high-speed railway between Beijing and Tianjin was further 
extended to Binhai New Area. It takes less than one hour from Beijing South Station to 
Yujiapu and less than 30 minutes from Tianjin Station to Yujiapu. It is the most efficient 
way to travel between these places, but it is also one of the very few public transport options. 
A local government official explained that, 
 ‘Like the twin cities about 60 km far away from each other in Tianjin, subways and 
light rials should be the main modes of public transport to enhance the functional 
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connections between them. Tianjin should learn from Tokyo Metropolitan Area, the 
transport of which are more efficient and flexible and has longer operation time.…But 
because the Yujiapu Transport Hub is underground, the cost of extension new lines is 
very high. In addition, there may be not enough space to extend.’ (Interview, G01BH)  
It is planned that other public transport such as subways will connect Yujiapu with Tanggu 
old downtown, TEDA and other functional zones to mitigate the fragmentation (Figure 7.12). 
However, majority of these projects are still in the preparation stage and cannot be achieved 
in a short-term. Yujiapu Transport Hub is the only rail transport station in the CBD and the 
busiest place in the CBD. Passengers need to take taxis to get to their destinations in the 
CBD to save time and energy after they arrive Yujiapu Transport Hub. 
 
Figure 7.12 Public Transport Accessibility in Yujiapu CBD 
Source: (TAUPD, 2017) 
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7.5.3 Identity of a ‘ghost city’  
‘Ghost city’ or ‘empty city’ are the most famous identities for Yujiapu CBD from both my 
interviewees’ perception and media publicity (e.g. The New York Times, 2019). Yujiapu 
CBD has been built-up with many modern buildings and skyscrapers in a short time. Such a 
large-scale advanced construction has attracted negative media coverage and critiques from 
academics, albeit sometimes exaggerated. The publicity enhances the ghost city identity of 
Yujiapu CBD. Almost all interviewees recognised that Yujiapu CBD was not the real centre 
of TBNA and regarded it as a failed government image engineering project. Thanks to 
government support, the population and employment in the CBD increased indeed, 
especially in the public sectors. The government officials’ salary in TBNA is much higher 
than jobs at the same administrative level in other districts due to the government subsidy 
(Interview, A01). Nevertheless, few staff live or shop in the CBD. They prefer to live in the 
Central District where they can access to better services and living conditions (Interview, 
A01; G04BH; G13BH). In the daytime, many people commute to the CBD for work or 
business affairs, which increases the vitality to a certain degree. In the night, it becomes an 
entire ghost city without people and light. It is said that Yujiapu has become the best place 
in Tianjin for roller blading because it provides good public space with little traffic and few 
people (Interview, A03). 
Several high-end shopping malls have newly opened recently but only few people visit them. 
Global Go is one of the important underground commercial clusters, which is directly linked 
to the underground transport hub (Figure 7.13). You can only see the shop staffs or some 
passengers passing through it in the business hours (Interview, A02). There is a broad screen 
exhibiting a film about the history and achievement of Yujiapu in the corridor between 
Global Go and Yujiapu Transport Hub, but the sluggish scene in the shopping mall is an 
ironic contrast to this ‘miracle’.  
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Figure 7.13 Global Go Underground Shopping Mall 
Source: Photographed by author 
Beyond lack of urban vitality, the utility facilities actually cannot support the operation of 
large-scale building complex. One interviewee who is responsible for infrastructure 
construction said that, 
‘We found big problems in terms of the utility facilities in CBD. The CBD is full of 
modern skyscrapers and buildings. If the office buildings of Xiangluowan Business 
District and Yujiapu Financial District were fully occupied and used, the CBD will be 
paralysed because current water, electricity and heat supply system and transport 
cannot afford that yet.’ (Interview, G13BH) 
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7.6 A disappearing CBD 
The development of Yujiapu CBD is now being challenged by new ideologies regarding 
Chinese urban planning and urbanisation. Unlike Lujiazui CBD in Shanghai Pudong New 
Area, which was also criticised and questioned in its early development phase but finally 
developed into a flourishing CBD, the failure of Yujiapu CBD is becoming inevitable. It 
seems that this ambition plan is being abandoned by the central state because of political and 
ideologies changes. This section discusses three new changes that reflect the weakening of 
the importance of Yujiapu CBD, which are namely the adjustment of governance and 
function, and the shift of central state’s attention. 
7.6.1 Incorporation into TEDA  
To solve the development conflicts and problems, TBNA Government implemented three 
rounds of administrative reform and integrated nine functional zones into seven in 2013 and 
further to five in 2018 (Table 7.3). It has been decided to incorporate CBD into TEDA 
(Interview, G02BH; G04BH; G13BH). It is claimed that further integration of functional 
zones will improve the coordination between TEDA MSD and Yujiapu CBD, which will 
benefit for the development of TBNA because TEDA has developed much better than 
Yujiapu, and TEDA can sustain a more sustainable and stable growth. As one government 
official argued, 
‘Although the growth of TEDA has been reduced but it still has many enterprises and 
its tax income has surplus. For Yujiapu, its large debts can be internalised into TEDA, 
a functional zone with better repayment capability. The tax surplus of TEDA can be 
used to repay the debts of Yujiapu CBD.’ (Interview, G13BH) 
The TEDA Administrative Committee already has moved some departments into the office 
building of CBD administrative committee (Interview, G02BH; G04BH). The leadership 
and personnel of TEDA were also adjusted because of the incorporation. The annexation 
also means that Yujiapu CBD is gradually disappearing in policy rhetoric. Yujiapu CBD’s 
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official website has been shut down and on the TEDA’s official website, information about 
Yujiapu is also quite limited. The Yujiapu Transport Hub was also renamed as Binhai Station 
in 2019 in a silent way without getting too much public attention. 
Table 7.3 Administrative adjustments of functional zones in TBNA 
2010 2013 2018 
Advanced Manufacturing 
Area TEDA 
TEDA 
Nangang Industrial Area 
Binhai New Area CBD Binhai New Area CBD 
Binhai Hi-tech Industrial 
Development Area 
Binhai Hi-tech 
Industrial Development 
Area 
Binhai Hi-tech Industrial 
Development Area 
Lingang Industrial Area Lingang Industrial Area 
Tianjin Port Free Trade Zone 
Airport Economic Area 
Tianjin Port Free Trade 
Zone 
Sino-Singapore Tianjin 
Eco-city 
Sino-Singapore Tianjin 
Eco-city 
Sino-Singapore Tianjin Eco-
city 
Binhai Tourist Area 
Tianjin Port Logistics Area 
Dongjiang Free Trade 
Port Zone 
Dongjiang Free Trade Port 
Zone 
Source: Summarized by author 
7.6.2 Positioning adjustment 
Corresponding to the administrative adjustment, the positioning of Yujiapu CBD has been 
adjusted. At the regional scale, the newly launched national plan ‘Coordinated Development 
of Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei’ has defined Beijing as the core of the region (State Council, 2016). 
As discussed in chapter six, Tianjin has abandoned the aspiration of becoming the economic 
centre of North China. Yujiapu CBD in TBNA adjusted its positioning accordingly. The 
ambition to become an international financial centre has been debased to a demonstration 
zone for financial innovation.  
The financial and business functions of Yujiapu will be weakened in future because of low 
occupation rate of completed buildings and the existing large amount of vacant land within 
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the CBD. Since 2014, Yujiapu CBD had already only leased residential land surrounding 
Yujiapu Financial District and Xiangluowan Business District (TAUPD, 2017). After 
incorporated into TEDA, the undeveloped business and commercial land in the core area of 
the CBD has also been adjusted into residential land in the revised detailed plan (Interview, 
P02; G02BH) (Figure 7.14). Yujiapu CBD can now provide new and modern estates near 
the completed modern landscapes to attract new residents and immigrants. The influx of 
population will activate the vitality and utility rate of business and commercial buildings and 
the residential land leasing income can also be used to repay the huge debts of the last decade. 
Essentially, the plan for a CBD has been aborted when its financial and business functions 
were curbed.  
 
Figure 7.14 Land use adjustment in Yujiapu CBD 
Source: (TAUPD, 2017) 
7.6.3 Challenge from Xiong’an New Area  
Yujiapu has received great support from multi-level governments in the last decade. 
However, its privileges are being eroded recently. Since 2010, the central state has approved 
New Areas intensively. Similarly, the FTZ policy has also been expanded to inland regions 
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very soon after Tianjin Pilot Free Trade Zone was approved. One planner worried about 
Yujiapu as well as TBNA’s future. He said that:  
‘The opportunity window of preferential policies in TBNA has been shortened as they 
were copied and implemented in other places as well. If the ‘policy dividend’ has 
disappeared, the development of Yujiapu CBD will become more difficult.’ (Interview, 
P01) 
The establishment of Xiong’an New Area in the south of Beijing in Hebei Province is 
replacing TBNA to become the new development focus in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Region, 
which exacerbates the failure of Yujiapu CBD. The contradiction and discontinuity of central 
state’s policy between the new generation of leaders and their predecessors also contributed 
to led to the failure of Yujiapu (Interview, G13BH). The central state has shifted its attention 
from TBNA to Xiong’an New Area, which was newly established by top-down designation 
in 2017 to set up a model for new style of urbanisation in China. Xiong’an is indeed the third 
New Area proposed by the central state directly. Shenzhen Special Economic Zone and 
Shanghai Pudong New Area were established by top-down designation to pilot test new 
policies in the initial stage of China’s reform programme. Other 16 New Areas are essentially 
the products of municipal or provincial government and approved by the central state. 
Xiong’an New Area is now regarded as the most important New Area after Shenzhen Special 
Economic Zone and Shanghai Pudong New Area. As mentioned above, a similar slogan was 
used to TBNA in 2006, but it must give way to Xiong’an New Area now for political reasons. 
Not only the central state, but also municipal governments within the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei 
Region are required to support the development of Xiong’an New Area. Tianjin Municipal 
Government and TBNA Government also showed their positive attitude to support Xiong’an 
New Area (Interview, A02; G09TJ; G16TJ). The proposal for Xiong’an is detrimental to the 
development of Yujiapu. As one interviewee noted:  
‘Many new projects that are supposed to be relocated to Tianjin have been attracted 
to Xiong’an New Area. Our Mayor also said Tianjin would give full support to the 
development of Xiong’an New Area no matter what resources it wants. So, in this 
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phase, Tianjin is negatively affected by the ‘siphon effect’ of Xiong’an New Area.’ 
(Interview, G09TJ)  
Yujiapu CBD is therefore facing new competition in terms of preferential policies and 
investment. It should exploit the advantage of proximity to port and play a complementary 
role in port-related financial and business function for Xiong’an New Area.   
7.7 Conclusion and discussion 
This chapter answers why and how Yujiapu CBD has been proposed and developed as the 
centre of TBNA by investigating the political process, planning rationalities and spatial 
materialization process. Yujiapu CBD was proposed in the context that TBNA was 
experiencing rapid growth and dramatic socio-economic transition. TBNA was upscaled to 
a national New Area and been converted from an economic zone to a sub-provincial 
administrative district when this new plan was proposed. Yujiapu CBD was entirely newly 
established as an independent functional zone of TBNA, which was identified as the centre 
of TBNA Core Zone. Reflecting on the context and rationale for this new proposal, Yujiapu 
CBD is a state-led mega project that is a result of a combination of multi-level governments’ 
efforts for multiple purposes. It is a political product to a large extent that is related to local 
entrepreneurial governments and direct intervention of the central state which aims to 
provide comprehensive and high-end services to TBNA, create new development across the 
Hai River, improve competitiveness of TBNA and act as a response to crises management.  
To forge the new centre in TBNA, different approaches have been adopted by the central 
state, Tianjin Municipal Government and Tianjin Binhai New Area Government based on 
their own power, resources and capacities. Preferential policies, large amounts of financial 
support, financialization instruments, a high standard of planning and design, and 
manipulation of public sectors were useful tools to build up and reshape the built 
environment, function and image of Yujiapu CBD. Multi-level governance was a significant 
feature when applying these instruments and the central state played a key role in this process.  
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However, this chapter demonstrates that the Yujiapu CBD failed to develop into a genuine 
CBD and is now disappearing within TBNA’s future development strategy manifested by 
its spatial outcomes and recent new changes. The built environment of Yujiapu has been 
improved significantly and its core area looks like ‘New Manhattan’ physically with the 
completion of building complex and transport hub in the initial development phase. It 
produced a fake, temporary prosperity by inventing new special policies. However, in fact, 
the economic and urban vitality of Yujiapu is weak although many small and private 
business registered at Yujiapu due to the policy incentives. The internal and external space 
of Yujiapu CBD were fragmented because of the administrative fragmentation and physical 
barriers. Fragmented governance in TBNA has dispersed the investment to several different 
development nodes and impaired the agglomeration economy (Interview, G01BH). 
Oversupply of homogeneous space in the coastal area, a lack of industrial base and physical 
barriers between the new CBD and its hinterland led to the failure of this grand plan. The 
government has realised that it is far easier to manipulate the public sectors than the private 
sectors. Recently, the political and cultural function of Yujiapu CBD has been strengthened 
because the relocation of district government and construction of cultural facilities. This new 
attempt has brought a certain vitality to Yujiapu, but it is still not enough make it a real 
centre. The modern urbanism and urbanity did not persuade that this was a ‘place for work’ 
or ‘place for living’. On the contrary, the discrepancy between the grand physical space and 
people’s perception of it enhances its identity of a ghost city and a failed government image-
building project. 
Because of political reasons, the Yujiapu CBD has been withdrawn in a stealthy way. It has 
been integrated into TEDA and its function has been adjusted from financial and business 
services to residential. Optimistically speaking, the modern skyscrapers, green technological 
facilities, fantastic landscape in waterfront space and the transport hub have already been 
there. With the improving function of administration and public services, it can be become 
a popular living space and an important part of TBNA Core Zone. After incorporated into 
TEDA, the conflicts and competitions can be internalised and the new function of Yujiapu 
CBD became more feasible to achieve. However, the opportunity cost of this grand project 
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is huge. Due to the waste of resources, it certainly hindered the development of Tianjin 
Binhai New Area. 
The case of Yujiapu also reveals that the formation of a new CBD needs a long development 
process and support based on market rationality and historical accumulation, even in 
authoritarian China (Interview, P05; A02; G02BH; G08TJ). In the absence of market factors 
to drive it, state investment and policy incentives proved to be futile. The identity of being a 
new centre needs to be based on everyday experience and close physical and functional 
relations. The planning and flagship design cannot form the identity of a new centre. 
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Chapter 8 The emergence of centres in-between: the 
retrofit of Dongli and Wuqing in the polycentric 
development of Tianjin 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter transfers research focus to the emerging new centres beyond the historical city 
centre and TBNA Core Zone in the polycentric system of Tianjin. Based on discussion in 
chapter six, Tianjin has shown a significant chained polycentricity structure in both its 
planning vision and actual development along its major development corridor. Due to the 
rapid urban expansion and complicated social and economic relations, the traditional 
suburban and peripheral locations of Tianjin have become the new focuses of development 
very recently. Several different types of centres have emerged in the suburban and exurban 
districts of Tianjin along the development corridor, which draw together with other urban 
centres into a revised new polycentric configuration for Tianjin. Moreover, these centres are 
often recognised as the most promising emerging centres by many informants in the 
fieldwork because of their political importance and their development conditions.  
This chapter aims to investigate how and why these new centres in intermediate places have 
become important in the context of polycentric development of Tianjin, and what kinds of 
new governance arrangements and planning practices have been deployed in their 
development process for a better delivery of polycentric strategy and what spatial changes 
have been resulted in. Instead of choosing specific centres as cases, this chapter selects 
Dongli and Wuqing as embedded cases for the following considerations. First, these new 
rising centres are coincidentally located within the territories of two urban districts of Tianjin, 
Dongli and Wuqing. Secondly, it is the district government that oversees local planning and 
development affairs and therefore they provide a general political and space economies 
background for the policy making and spatial practices regarding the implementation of 
polycentric spatial vision. Finally, unlike the Yujiapu CBD case in chapter seven, some of 
these centres are still at a preliminary stage or have no substantial development. There are 
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no explicit and stable governance bodies, no official statistical data or documents that could 
be accessed to implement fine-scale analysis. Interviews with district government officials 
allowed me to get enough materials about the dynamics of these centres. In addition, these 
two districts also show some commonalities and differences in terms of their histories, 
geographical features and governance arrangements, which have resulted in different spatial 
logics and outcomes. By investigating these two case districts together, the big picture of the 
role of suburban and exurban districts in Tianjin’s polycentric development can be figured 
out. 
Drawing upon planning documents, interviews and field survey, this chapter first introduces 
the context of Dongli and Wuqing and compares their characteristics in terms of location, 
histories and administrative and governance frameworks. Then this chapter reviews their 
planning and development trajectories and attaches greater attention to their spatial 
transformation in the last decade. An outline of these urban centres as conceived space in 
each district will be given based on that. After that, this chapter analyses the spatial logic 
and the governance modes that have been adopted in the new development nodes. More 
explicitly, the impacts of inter-government relationships and of the planning profession on 
the urban space in these centres will be emphasized. Finally, this chapter compares the 
similarity and differences between two cases in terms of their spatial development mode and 
origin. The discussion will help to understand the complexity and heterogeneity of 
polycentric development in Tianjin and reveal opportunities and challenges for the future of 
in-between places. 
8.2 Location, history and governance framework of Dongli and Wuqing  
In this section, the general geographic situation, histories and governance frameworks of 
Dongli and Wuqing will be introduced to set a context for the following analysis. Historical 
development, geographic conditions and distinct power relations have great impacts on the 
formation of local development strategy and policy practices. The features of Dongli and 
Wuqing will be bundled together and be contrasted to stress the similarities and differences 
between them.  
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8.2.1 The geography of Dongli and Wuqing 
In terms of geographic location, both districts are located along Tianjin’s major development 
corridor from the northwest to the southeast along Hai River (Figure 8.1). They are both 
closely tied to major regional centres within and outside Tianjin physically and functionally. 
Dongli is one of the four suburban districts located between the so-called ‘twin cities’ of 
Tianjin, the Central District and TBNA Core Zone. Wuqing District is adjacent to Beijing 
Tongzhou District, Langfang in Hebei Province and Tianjin Beichen District. At a coarse 
scale, Wuqing is located between the central area of Beijing and Tianjin, two dominant urban 
centres in Beijing-Tianjin-Heibei Region. The centre of Wuqing District is 40 km away from 
Tianjin city centre, around 70 km from the central area of Tongzhou District, and around 90 
km to Beijing city centre. 
Although these two districts have similar location between well-developed urban centres, 
there also exist differences in their geographic characteristics. First, Dongli District is a near 
suburb while Wuqing District is an outer suburb or exurban area. Second, the major centres 
they are tied to have different levels of political and economic power. Beijing is the capital 
city of China as well as the dominant city in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Region. TBNA is a 
sub-provincial level urban district and a new rising urban centre within Tianjin’s jurisdiction. 
Third, the area of Wuqing District is 1570 km2 about three times larger than Dongli District. 
That means Wuqing has more available space for new development. 
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Figure 8.1 Location and major centres of Dongli and Wuqing 
Source: Produced by author, based on the draft 2016 Master Plan  
8.2.2 The history and urban process of Dongli and Wuqing 
In history, rural settlements have been established in the area of Dongli, but they were under 
the jurisdiction of other counties. Until 1953, Dongli has been built up as a designated 
suburban district called East Suburb (dong jiaoqu), indicating its location and development 
status. The designated suburban district was soon abolished because of the establishment of 
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People’s Commune in 1958 and then recovered in 1962. Since then, Dongli District had 
become a stable administrative district which was directly governed by Tianjin Municipal 
Government and was renamed to Dongli in 1992. 
Because of its closeness to the Central District (Figure 8.1), it was the primary destination 
for decentralisation of industries and population. In the pre-reform period, the first-
generation ‘Satellite Towns’ were planned and built up in the 1950s in suburb of Tianjin. 
Junliangcheng Satellite Town was one of industrial towns planned to be built in the East 
Suburb, but it did not develop very well due to lack of public facilities and transport 
connection. With further expansion of central city and improvement in infrastructure, the 
urbanisation and industrialisation process in Dongli began to accelerate. In 1992, Tianjin 
Municipal Government set up a development zone in Dongli along the Beijing-Tianjin-
Tangshan Highway. Dongli Development Zone became an important industrial district 
between Central District and Tianjin Binhai New Area and was upgraded to national-level 
Economic and Technological Development Zone in 2014. Since the 2000s, Dongli District 
has become the focus of new development of Tianjin because of its locational advantage. 
Several mega development projects such as the Airport Economic Zone, the TBNA Hi-Tech 
Development Zone, the TEDA Western Zone, Huaming Model Town and Liulin Subcentre, 
which have been newly planned and developed, can all be found within the territory of 
Dongli District. 
Wuqing is one of the oldest counties in North China. It was established in Western Han 
Dynasty (BC 202 to AD 9) and called Quanzhou and Yongyang historically. The name was 
changed to Wuqing in Tang dynasty (AD 742) and retained until now. However, its 
administration has continuously changed, and its jurisdiction has become much smaller since 
the foundation of PRC. After 1973, Wuqing County was resubordinated from Hebei to 
Tianjin Municipality and led by Tianjin Municipal Government. This governance mode was 
a pioneer of ‘city leading counties’ mode, as Tianjin is a municipality under the direct control 
of the central state, and it covers very a large area. In 2000, Wuqing was converted to an 
urban district from a county. ‘Abolishing county and establishing city administrating district’ 
is a common strategy for large cities to facilitate the decentralisation or urban industries and 
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urban rural integration (Ma, 2005). Wuqing was the first county in Tianjin to be subjected 
to this rescaling strategy so as to be better integrated with metropolitan and regional 
development.  
As a traditional county, Wuqing was dominated by agriculture related activities and its 
population was mainly rural during its long history. Since the China’s open door policy, it 
has experienced rapid economic growth and it has evolved to an urbanised economy, with 
development concentrated on the county town, Yangcun. In 1991, Tianjin Municipal 
Government also set up a development zone in the west-north of Yangcun town, which was 
upgraded into a national-level Economic and Technological Development Zone in 2010. 
Wuqing Development Zone has developed very fast and has become the economic engine 
in Wuqing. Besides Wuqing Development Zone, several other development zones such as 
Jing-Jin Technology Valley, Jingjin E-commerce Industrial Park, Tianjin Wuqing 
Automobile Industrial Park, Jingbin Industrial Park have been planned and constructed since 
2000s. These development zones were the extension of important towns for industrial 
development in Wuqing.  
Due to the development of economic enclaves, the economic structure and the urban form 
of Dongli and Wuqing has been restructured since the 2000s. These two districts were in 
transition from marginal areas to hotspots for new development. According to the official 
statistical data between 1995-2015 (Table 8.1), both districts have experienced astonishing 
growth and urbanisation, and differences in nuance can also be identified. 
In terms of economic development, Dongli and Wuqing have both made a great contribution 
to the economic growth of Tianjin. As shown in Table 8.1, the GDP in Wuqing and Dongli 
District increased at a much faster rate than Tianjin in the past decade. Wuqing’s GDP 
accounted for 6.21 percent of the total GDP in 2015, while this figure was only 3.1 in 2005. 
Dongli showed a similar trend, its proportion of Tianjin’s GDP increased from 2.76 percent 
in 2005 to 5.29 percent in 2015. Economic growth in both districts was manifested in both 
the industrial and the service sectors while the primary sector declined. Agricultural 
activities have almost disappeared in Dongli, to only 0.48% in 2015.  
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In terms of urbanisation, Dongli and Wuqing showed a steady increase in both the permanent 
and registered population during the last two decades. The permanent population grew much 
faster than the registered population in both districts. That means these two places have 
become popular places for migrants. By 2015, the permanent population in Dongli was 0.75 
million, twice the registered population and the figure for Wuqing was 1.18 million. 
Compared to Wuqing, a large proportion of population in Dongli come from other districts 
within Tianjin or other cities. The proportion of non-agricultural population can be used as 
an indicator to reflect the urbanisation level. In this respect, Dongli has shown dramatic 
growth since 2010 and the proportion of non-agricultural population had reached 69.23 by 
2015. More gradual growth can be seen in Wuqing, with the proportion of non-agricultural 
population reaching 26.25% in 2015. 
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Table 8.1 Main socio-economic indicators for Wuqing and Dongli 
Area Year 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 
Dongli  
GDP (billion) 2.66 6.4 10.22 54.01 87.50 
Percentage of Tianjin (%) 2.89 3.90 2.76 5.86 5.29 
Industrial Structure (%)      
Agriculture sector 7.13 3.89 2.65 0.67 0.48 
Industry sector 48.18 45.36 51.73 65.79 52.82 
Tertiary Industry 44.69 50.77 44.62 33.54 46.7 
Permanent Population (10,000)    57.08 75.37 
Registration Population (10,000) 29.71 30.41 31.82 35.1 36.72 
Non-agricultural Population (10,000) 9.2 10.76 12 14.85 25.42 
Non-agricultural Population (%) 30.97 35.38 37.90 42.31 69.23 
Wuqing 
GDP (billion) 5.01 8.12 11.45 24.11 102.68 
Percentage of Tianjin (%) 5.44 4.95 3.10 3.70 6.21 
Industrial Structure (%)      
Agriculture sector 22.58 18.53 18.90 8.52 3.88 
Industry sector 49.51 47.10 43.11 55.25 54.82 
Tertiary Industry 27.91 34.36 37.99 36.23 41.30 
Permanent Population (10,000)    94.99 118.11 
Registration Population (10,000) 79.05 79.87 81.72 84.7 90.08 
Non-agricultural Population (10,000) 8.13 9.95 12.48 15.73 23.65 
Non-agricultural Population (%) 10.28 12.46 15.27 18.57 26.25 
Tianjin 
GDP (billion) 92.01 163.94 369.76 922.45 1653.82 
Industrial Structure (%)      
Agriculture sector 6.87 4.49 3.04 1.58 1.26 
Industry sector 54.47 50.03 55.47 52.47 46.58 
Tertiary Industry 49.11 45.48 41.49 45.95 52.15 
Permanent Population (10,000) 941.83 1001.14 1043 1299.29 1546.95 
Registration Population (10,000) 894.67 912 939.31 984.85 1026.9 
Non-agricultural Population (10,000) 507.94 532.51 562.4 604.42 656.6 
Non-agricultural Population (%) 56.77 58.39 59.87 61.37 63.94 
Source: TJSB, Tianjin Statistical Yearbooks, various years 
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8.2.3 Governance framework of Dongli and Wuqing  
Currently, both Dongli and Wuqing are two urban districts of Tianjin. They are at the same 
level in the Chinese hierarchical administrative system. However, the power and governance 
modalities of their local governments vary significantly due to their differences in location 
and history mentioned above.  
The location adjacent to two major urban agglomerations of Tianjin generates significant 
influences on Dongli’s administration. The jurisdictional area of Dongli District is only 477 
km2 but is fragmented to three parts governed by Tianjin Municipal Government, TBNA 
Government and Dongli District Government respectively (Figure 8.2). After the completion 
of extension of the Outer Ring Road in the Northern Area of Central District, around 69 km2 
area within the Outer Ring Road is under the direct supervision of Tianjin Municipal 
Government. In addition, in order to support the development of Binhai New Area, the 
Airport Economic Zone (225 km2) was allocated to TBNA as well. Over half of the 
jurisdiction of Dongli was outside the control of Dongli District Government. So, the 
governance in Dongli District is fragmented because of the interventions of Tianjin 
Municipal Government and TBNA Government. The detailed responsibilities and 
management are as follows:  
• TBNA part: 225 km2 is included in Tianjin Binhai New Area as an economic 
functional zone. The planning and development are in the charge of TBNA District 
Government. TBNA Government negotiates with Dongli District Government about 
the benefit and tax sharing in this area (Interview, G28DL); 
• Central District part: about 69 km2 is located within Central District. The planning 
and development of this area are mainly controlled by Tianjin Municipal 
Government directly; 
• Dongli District part: Dongli District Government is responsible for the social affairs 
in its whole jurisdiction and the economic function of remaining area. 
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Figure 8.2 Fragmented governance in Dongli District 
Source: Adapted by author based on map from TJLRCC and TJPB (2015) 
In contrast, the jurisdiction of Wuqing is integrated and well-defined. Wuqing District 
Government has more effective control and management on its local development. It is 
because Wuqing was a historical county, a relative autonomous authority compared to urban 
districts. The administrative adjustment from a county to a district has accelerated the 
transformation of Wuqing from a rural economy to an urbanised economy. This state-led 
reterritorialization in China is usually a gradual process and yet incomplete (Luo et al., 2010). 
Although counties lose a certain degree of administrative autonomy, Wuqing as a new 
exurban district converted from counties still retains a greater independent economic and 
political status compared to suburban districts like Dongli in Tianjin (Interview, G20TJ). 
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They have more autonomy in the management of public finance, land resources and plan 
and policy making.  
Land is often used as an important instrument in economic development and extra-budgetary 
revenue generation by local governments in China (Wu, 2002; Yeh et al., 2011). It has 
become the foundation of the entrepreneurialism and developmentalism in China due to the 
monopolised provision by municipal and county governments. In Tianjin, the land power 
configurations are reshaped because of the mismatch of administrative and governance 
framework. The jurisdiction of Tianjin has been generally divided into four parts in the 
planning and policy realms, namely six urban districts (zhu chengqu), four suburban districts 
(jiaoqu), Binhai New Area and five exurban districts (yuan jiaoqu). The governance of 
different parts varies (Figure 8.3) (Interview, G15DL; G20TJ; G28DL). The Central District 
(within the Outer Ring Road) is an important planning concept that includes six urban 
districts and parts of four suburban districts. Tianjin Municipal Government takes charge of 
this area directly in terms of projects development and land management. That means the 
land leasing revenue within Central District belongs to the municipal fiscal revenue. 
Similarly, parts of Dongli and Jinnan are controlled by Tianjin Binhai New Area 
Government. TBNA Government is a sub-provincial level government with a higher 
political hierachy than other district governments. The approval power for detailed plans and 
development control has been decentralised to TBNA Government, along with the land 
concession revenue (Interview, P01; G20TJ). Five exurban districts are originally counties 
which have relatively independent fiscal systems. The public fiscal revenue and land leasing 
income are assigned to local states. These districts retain a certain degree of autonomy in the 
transition state, but municipal government can more efficiently interfere with the local 
planning and development than before.  
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Figure 8.3 The governance of planning, development control, land management in 
Tianjin 
Source: Produced by author 
8.3 Spatial transformation in Dongli and Wuqing  
Dramatic growth in Tianjin has not only affected major urban centres but also affected 
historically smaller settlements and new locations in peripheral area. Tianjin has gone 
through suburbanisation and peripheral urbanisation along with its rapid economic transition. 
The suburb and peripheral areas of Tianjin have been densified, complexified and diversified. 
The spatial configurations of Dongli and Wuqing have also been reshaped during this 
process. A significant turn could be identified from both the recent new polycentric discourse 
in Tianjin City Master Plan and from local planning practices.  
Following the analytical framework proposed in chapter five, the context, development 
process, approaches, and scales are key elements to frame the discussion of polycentric 
policy and practices. After setting up the general political and socio-economic background 
of Dongli and Wuqing, this section reviews the spatial transformation and the emergence of 
important development nodes in Dongli and Wuqing.  
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It is necessary to clarify that polycentricity is a scale-sensitive concept here. In these cases, 
polycentric development has become apparent at both municipal level and local district level. 
Newly developed and planned centres at the municipal level have significant impacts on the 
development strategies and planning discourse at the local level and vice versa. The 
polycentric spatial pattern is becoming increasingly significant within the embedded cases, 
especially in their recent spatial visions. The historical foundations, interactive scales and 
government relations together determine the approaches and process of the formation of new 
centres. Therefore, the analysis involves local polycentric policy and development as well 
but still mainly highlights centres at municipal level and related policies. In this way, the 
origins of formation new centres, the role of local government, the contested interests 
between involved actors and spatial practices to facilitate polycentric development can be 
investigated in more detail.  
8.3.1 From multiple enclaves to polycentric spatial pattern 
From an evolutionary perspective, the suburban and exurban districts of Tianjin are 
constellations of many enclaves. These enclaves can be categorised into two types. The first 
is settlement enclaves such as historic towns, subdistricts and townships, which form the 
urban system at the local level. The second type is industrial districts, which are often well-
defined territories and enjoy preferential or exceptional policies for new development. These 
enclaves were historically separately distributed and showed a scattered pattern. 
In the pre-reform period, Dongli District comprised mainly rural settlements such as 
townships and villages, and urban activities were still limited to the Central District. At the 
beginning of reform period, Junliangcheng Town, a former ‘Satellite Town’ was the only 
place in Dongli that was of any importance in Tianjin’s urban system. After the 
establishment of Dongli Development Zone, Xinli, where Dongli Development Zone is 
located, was rapidly urbanised and its administration was adjusted from a township to town. 
Together with Junliangcheng, Xinli was defined as one of eight urban clusters for 
decentralisation of population and industries from Central District in Tianjin City Master 
Plan 1999. Since the turn of the new millennium, Dongli has been fast filled up by many 
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new economic enclaves designated by Tianjin Municipal Government and its own district 
government. In addition, with several mega residential projects built up in Dongli, the 
majority of former rural settlements have been upgraded to subdistricts (jiedao) because of 
increasing population, modernised landscapes and adjustment in economic structure. In 
Dongli District Master Plan (2008-2020), the future spatial structure was simply defined by 
six contiguous economic districts with different leading industries (TJLRCC and TJPB, 
2015). Dongli Lake was one of six districts proposed for tourism. Polycentric spatial pattern 
was not applied to the spatial development of Dongli, but four settlements, Huaming, 
Junliangcheng, Xinli, Jinzhong (Figure 8.4), were stressed as four important clusters in its 
future urbanisation process. In the latest Tianjin City Master Plan, three centres located in 
Dongli were identified in the polycentric discourse of Tianjin. They are Liulin Subcentre, 
Dongli Lake Functional Cluster and Airport City.  
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Figure 8.4 Major centres and enclaves in Dongli District 
Source: Adapted by author based on map from TJLRCC and TJPB (2015)  
Similar to Dongli, Wuqing comprised several towns, townships and villages before Reform 
and Opening-up policy. It used to be a self-contained entity dominated by rural population 
and agriculture, which was even not included in Tianjin’s first approved master plan. 
Yangcun Town has been the seat of government since 1950 and was the administrative, 
economic and cultural centre of Wuqing County. The establishment of Wuqing 
Development Zone in 1992 further enhanced the status of the county town. The county town 
and Wuqing Development Zone formed the central area of Wuqing. This central area and 
other central towns, general towns and villages consist of the local hierarchical urban system. 
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Wuqing has had four editions of its own master plan approved by Tianjin Municipal 
Government in 1988, 1998, 2002 and 2008 respectively (TJPRCC, 1994; TJLRCC and TJPB, 
2015). The first two plans mainly focused on development of the central area of Wuqing. 
After Wuqing was converted to an urban district, Wuqing faced a new situation and revised 
the former plan. Considering the investment in real estate and industrial development has 
increased, the master plan approved in 2002 began to suggest industrial development in other 
surrounding towns. In Tianjin City Master Plan (2005-2020), Wuqing was defined as one of 
eleven new towns as new growth poles, which led to a new round of master planning revision 
in Wuqing. In the revised Wuqing Master Plan (2008-2020), multiple clustered spatial 
structure has been proposed. Beyond the core area (that is the Wuqing New Town), it also 
stresses the development of other seven clusters to form a multiple clustered and networked 
urban system in Wuqing. The clusters often include central towns and the new extensions of 
industrial development zones next to them (Figure 8.5). However, this spatial pattern is 
essentially a hierarchical urban system plan and the Wuqing New Town is still the dominant 
centre. The real change in reshaping the spatial pattern can be identified in the newly 
emerging succession master plan in which a new spatial layout has been proposed by 
Wuqing District Government. The discourse of the spatial proposal has been shifted to ‘one 
axis, two cities and multiple clusters’ (WQDG, 2018). ‘Two cities’ refer to Wuqing Sub-city 
and Jing-Jin Industrial City, which are two important nodes in the latest Tianjin City Master 
Plan. However, at the local level, newly planned Jing-Jin Industrial City is not defined as a 
Functional Cluster subservient to Wuqing New Town. The spatial layout of Wuqing was 
planned to evolve towards the ‘two cities’ pattern, just like Tianjin’s ‘Twin Cities’ structure 
(Interview, P01). The subtle changes between municipal and local discourse reflects the 
ambitious of Wuqing District Government.  
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Figure 8.5 Major centres and enclaves in Wuqing District 
Source: Adapted by author based on map from TJLRCC and TJPB (2015)  
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8.3.2 Origins and conditions of new centres 
Polycentric transition in Dongli and Wuqing has become significant since the late 2000s. 
Through the analysis of planning documents and interviews at municipal and district level, 
several important development nodes have been identified in these two embedded cases. 
Each case has more than one municipal level centre identified in Tianjin’s polycentric system. 
Polycentric policy and development in Dongli and Wuqing are not only reflected by new 
designation of mega projects, but also led by the intensification and recognition of important 
local enclaves through formal planning process. This part analyses the origins and conditions 
of these new centres in much more detail.  
8.3.2.1 A collage of multiple centres in Dongli 
The polycentric configuration of Dongli District has been produced by the interaction and 
negotiation between governments at multiple tiers and between several adjacent district 
governments. Dongli District has three different types of centres governed by different 
authorities due to its location and governance framework. Three municipal level centres in 
Dongli are distributed in three different parts governed by the Tianjin Municipal 
Government, TBNA government and Dongli District government respectively. Therefore, 
the existence of multiple municipal level centres is essentially a collage of centres with 
distinct purposes and political and institutional arrangements that happen to be in Dongli’s 
territory.  
The first is the Liulin subcentre that is first proposed in Tianjin’s Strategic Plan. This centre 
is planned to be a new agglomeration of business and public services in Tianjin Central 
District. Liulin Subcentre is an important inner subcentre of Central District, located on the 
south-east fringe of Central District. It is an area of 14.5 km2 straddling four administrative 
districts, Dongli, Hexi, Hedong and Jinnan. The decision to building new subcentres in 
Central District was made by the political leaders of Tianjin when making the strategic plan, 
because many large cities like Beijing and Shanghai had already started to build new sub-
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centres or CBDs at that time (Interview, P04). The site selection and the number of 
subcentres were suggested by planners (Interview, P03, P05).  
Liulin Area was selected because of land availability and a good location. Tianjin Steel and 
Iron Corporation had been relocated to Binhai New Area and its land was available for 
development. Moreover, Liulin was a scenic area, the majority of which was occupied by 
parks and green space. These factors made it much easier for new development to proceed 
pragmatically (Interview, P04). This area also has a good accessibility to city centre thanks 
to the connection of subways. Theoretically speaking, the designation of subcentres has two 
benefits. First, the new subcentres can function as the substitutes of the main city centre to 
provide business and public services to surrounding area. Second, it is also a tool for place 
marketing to improve the image of these new developable places. As one planner recalled 
of the decision-making process relating to subcentres, 
‘It is impossible to say how these two centres are determined. But there indeed exist 
many schemes and they have been discussed and compared many rounds. I think the 
final scheme was made for two considerations. First, Tianjin’s development should 
follow the Hai River corridor. Second, the relocation of Western Station and works of 
Tianjin Steel and Iron Corporation provides two parcels of developable land within 
Central District.’ (Interview, P04)  
Tianjin Municipal Government has been responsible for this development since it was 
proposed. At the beginning, Municipal Government set up a steering office as the 
administrative body with the deputy mayor of Tianjin as the director. Officials from different 
departments of municipal government, development corporations, and deputy district mayor 
of Hexi, Dongli and Jinnan are the members of the steering office. The establishment of the 
steering office aims to facilitate planning approval process and project construction. 
However, due to the political reasons, all steering offices for mega projects were withdrawn 
in Tianjin few years ago (Interview, P03).  
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The jurisdiction of Liulin subcentre then reverted completely to the Municipal Government 
and required revisions to plans and introduction of new projects to be approved by Tianjin 
Municipal Government (Interview, G12TJ). Meanwhile, the land leasing revenue belongs to 
Tianjin Municipal Government. Dongli District itself has little power and incentive for the 
development of this sub-centre. 
‘Unlike exurban districts like Wuqing and Baodi, Dongli District Government does 
not have too much incentive in the sub-centre development and land leasing of this 
area.’ (Interview, G15DL) 
Surprisingly, the scale jumping governance did not generate much conflict of interests 
between different districts and municipal government. This is because the special political 
and institutional arrangement of Central District had been determined before the proposal 
for a subcentre. However, the positioning of Liulin subcentre was changed many times, 
which postponed its development (Interview, P03). A planner who has been in charge of 
plans for this subcentre for last ten years believes that Liulin subcentre has a greater 
development potential in near future:  
‘There is no substantial development so far, but the land in the planned area has been 
well prepared for new development thanks to the strict development control of 
Municipal Government. There is no other place that has such a massive amount of 
vacant and mature land like this area within Central District. The substantial 
development will start soon.’ (Interview, P03) 
The second important centre is Airport City, which is defined as one of subcentres of TBNA. 
A large amount of land outside the Outer Ring Road is occupied by the functional zones of 
TBNA to support the development of TBNA as it has been defined as a regional growth pole. 
For example, the Western Zone of TEDA was set up as an exclave due to the shortage of 
land resources in TEDA (Interview, G04BH). The Administrative Committee of TEDA is 
in charge of this area. In addition, Tianjin Binhai High-tech Development Area and Airport 
Economic Zone also took up land in Dongli District. These functional zones have their own 
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administrative committees as functional zones of TBNA are ultimately governed by TBNA 
Government. It is said that TBNA Government and Dongli District Government have 
entered negotiations about a sharing mechanism for land leasing revenue and tax revenue 
because TBNA occupied Dongli’s land for industrial development, but because of the 
ambiguity of administration of Dongli and the higher political tier of TBNA, TBNA 
Government governed this area and the land revenue were allocated to TBNA (Interview, 
G28DL). Dongli share 50% of total tax revenue (ibid.). These three functional zones 
constitute the Airport City, which is the important location for industrial development, 
especially for the aviation and logistics industries. Airport City has taken advantage of the 
proximity to airport and preferential policies of Tianjin Pilot Free Trade Zone and Tianjin 
Binhai New Area to become a comprehensive development area with balance of work and 
residence.  
Dongli Lake Functional Cluster is the third urban centre, which is under the control of Dongli 
District government. It is also planned to develop into a suburban centre by exploiting its 
good resources. It is a place where high-end real estate and financial and tourism industries 
should be developed and agglomerated (Interview, G14DL). The status of Dongli in 
Tianjin’s urban system is less important than other suburban and exurban districts due to its 
fragmented governance arrangements. In recent Tianjin City Master Plans, the core area of 
Dongli was defined neither as New Town nor as a Sub-city in Tianjin’s urban system (see 
chapter 6).  
8.3.2.2 Two parallel centres in Wuqing 
Wuqing District has two centres at municipal level, namely Wuqing Sub-city and Jing-Jin 
Industrial City. The rising of Wuqing New Town and the development of new centre at the 
edge are the main component centres of Wuqing’s spatial configurations. Wuqing has gone 
through different political economy stages. Since its administrative adjustment, the 
positioning of Wuqing has changed to an important new town between Beijing and Tianjin. 
Wuqing Sub-city is a new concept in the latest Tianjin City Master Plan, which refers to the 
central area of Wuqing district. Sub-cites are core urban areas at local district level but play 
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a similar role of Central District and the TBNA Core Zone (Interview, P05). Wuqing Sub-
city has his antecedent that is former Wuqing New Town or explicitly speaking the old 
county centre, which has been continuously consolidated and expanded during last four 
decades. Wuqing Sub-city has become a new economic engine of Tianjin.  
On the contrary, the parallel Jing-Jin Industrial City was entirely newly planned. It is defined 
as a functional cluster in the Tianjin’s City Master Plan because of its short history and weak 
socio-economic conditions. This new urban centre is born in the context of central state’s 
rescaling strategy. As Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Region has become ‘new state space’, Wuqing 
District Government attempted to seize the good development opportunity and proposed the 
new planned centrality at the edge. Then Wuqing District’s aspiration got support from 
Tianjin Municipal Government. The new city was planned to be built up in the border of 
Tongzhou District in Beijing, Langfang in Hebei Province and Wuqing District and the Jing-
Jin express way passes it (Figure 8.5). Different from Wuqing Sub-city, Wuqing District 
Government selected vacant land beyond the existing central towns and development zones 
for new development. The planned area reaches 37 km2 and it aims to develop into a leading 
zone for industrial innovation, a pilot zone for city and industry integration and more 
importantly, a demonstration zone for regional coordinated development. It was conceived 
amid a resurgence of demands for regional cooperation and reflected entrepreneurial 
government at the district level. Until now, this new centre is still in the proposal phase as 
the new round of master plan is still in the making progress.  
8.4 Strategy adjustment at the local level  
As discussed in chapter four, District and County Master Plans are required to comply with 
master plans at the city level in China’s planning system. Although the general outline and 
development strategies are usually made according to higher level master plans, nuances in 
the discourses of local master plans can still reflect the development strategies and 
development focuses at local level in the short-term.  
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Affected by the break-up of its territory and strong intervention by higher tier governments, 
the governance mode and development strategies of Dongli have been adjusted. Dongli 
District Government has begun to restress the administrative value. As most key economic 
development areas have been taken over by Municipal Government and TBNA Government, 
the major development targets for Dongli District have been adjusted to achieve ‘complete 
urbanisation’ and improve the ability of urban governance and social affairs management. 
As one government official in Dongli explained:  
‘Dongli District Government does not have too much ambition about economic 
development. More than half of jurisdictional area has been occupied by Municipal 
Government and TBNA District Government. There are few places for economic 
development. Like urban districts in Central District, Dongli has been urbanised in 
advance. The major responsibilities are neighbourhood management and population 
management. The district government has become a service government to a large 
extent.’ (Interview, G14DL) 
In addition, because of limited land under its own control and limited financial capacity, 
Dongli District Government relies more on Tianjin Municipal Government in the operation 
of concrete projects. It also plays a cooperative role in executing policies and coercions 
implemented by Tianjin Municipal Government. 
Unlike Dongli, Wuqing District Government has become more entrepreneurial recently. Due 
to the incomplete reterritorialization, Wuqing’s land leasing revenue is managed and 
retained by Wuqing District Government (Interview, G20TJ). Each case of land leasing is 
recorded by Tianjin Municipal Government and leased publicly and exclusively by Tianjin 
Land Exchange Centre, an agency subordinate to municipal government. However, in 
practice the first-class land development and land leasing scheme are usually entrusted to 
the local Land Arrangement and Reserve Centre Centre or development corporations under 
the supervision of district governments (Interview, G20TJ). Compared to Dongli, Wuqing 
District has more incentives as well as more available space for new development. Moreover, 
Wuqing District Government has actively initiated new development projects and adjusted 
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future development direction. It is always trying to capitalise on its locational advantage and 
to reform the regional cooperation mechanism in order to pursue further development.  
Wuqing positioned itself as ‘an important new town in Jing-Jin development corridor’ in its 
master plan (2008-2020). As early as the early 2000s, Wuqing had already started positively 
to embrace the development of Beijing and attempted to be fused into its hinterland. There 
are three main reasons for this strategy. First, Beijing developed much faster than Tianjin 
because better resources and talents tend to be agglomerated in Beijing as a capital city. The 
economic impacts of Beijing began to extend beyond its administrative boundary. Second, 
the main development direction of Tianjin has been south-east towards Binhai New Area 
(Interview, P03; G07TJ). Because of inter-city competition in recent decades, Tianjin’s 
development focused on Central District, TBNA and places between them. That means that 
Wuqing was marginalised to a certain degree. Third, the opening of the Jing-Jin High Speed 
Railway in 2008, the first inter-city highspeed railway in China significantly reduced the 
spatial barrier of regional integration. Functional ties and relations have been enhanced 
between Beijing and Wuqing because of the improvement in accessibility. 
Since the two cases have adopted new development strategies and values towards 
administration because of their place speciality, spatial practices regarding polycentric 
development at both municipal and local district level varies. In next two sections, critical 
approaches each case adopts will be summarized. These approaches reshape the space and 
structure of Tianjin and local districts simultaneously. New politics, planning practice and 
their influences on spaces in the implementation process are main aspects this research 
emphasises.  
8.5 Approaches to polycentricity in Dongli: power reshuffles, planning 
practice, and spatial changes 
In recent planning and development practice, two developmental approaches have been 
applied to Dongli, which have reshaped the spatial pattern of Dongli and had significant 
influences on polycentric development at both local and municipal level. The first is to 
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consolidate the rural settlements to designated towns and subdistricts. The second is to build 
up a new green belt between the Central District and TBNA Core Zone. 
8.5.1 Rural consolidation and urbanisation  
Since 2005, rural consolidation policy has been widely implemented in Tianjin in the 
suburban and exurban districts, so this development approach is not exclusive to Dongli. 
However, Dongli district was the first and the only agricultural-related district which 
proposed ‘complete urbanisation’ within its territory. The merger of villages and towns has 
become an important measure to achieve this goal and to accelerate the process of 
urbanisation.  
Land plays a fundamental role in the rural consolidation development mode. Through village 
mergers, land use rights are renewed from rural collectives and vested with municipal 
government. The original purpose of resettlement policy in Dongli was to create land for the 
construction of the Tianjin Airport Economic Zone (Ma and Chiu, 2018). A mechanism 
called ‘linking the increase and decrease of the land for construction use’ (zengjian guagou) 
is applied which requires that the reduction of rural construction land will be matched with 
an increase of urban construction land. Meanwhile, the decrease in agricultural land must be 
compensated by providing rural construction land. This process involves many stakeholders 
including municipal government, local governments, developers, rural collective 
committees and rural residents, and the governance modes of these projects varies because 
of the scale of projects, local socio-economic capacity and the power of rural communities 
(Ma and Chiu, 2018). 
The rural consolidation projects in Dongli were the subject of strong intervention by Tianjin 
Municipal Government and by District Governments in the process of planning, financing 
and construction. Huaming Town in Dongli, the flagship rural consolidation project, 
encountered direct intervention from Tianjin Municipal Government. Although protests 
emerged during land expropriation and compensation process and negative influences on 
landless peasants’ lives, this project was regarded as a success by municipal government 
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with positive image (Heger, 2018). ‘Huaming Model’ was promoted an example for other 
resettlement projects to follow and was exhibited at the 2010 Shanghai World Expo under 
the slogan of ‘same land, different life’. It is divided into several different functional areas. 
The relocation area is for the resettlement of villagers, and the commercial housing area and 
affordable housing area next to it are used to balance the investment for land expropriation 
and development. The residential areas are combined with industrial and business areas. The 
agricultural zone was constructed to offset the losing of arable land.  
There are many reasons that explain the intervention of Tianjin Municipal Government in 
the construction of Huaming Model Town. First, the rural resettlement project aimed to 
provide land for the Airbus A320 assembly line in Airport Economic Zone (Interview, 
G28DL), a strategically important inward investment. Second, it was expected to be 
completed within a short period. The project started in 2005 and the relocation of farmers 
was completed in 2007 (Wang and Wang, 2014). Third, it is a large-scale project, which 
involved 12 traditional villages. Almost 42,000 farmers and 805 hectares residential land 
were affected (ibid.). Fourth, Huaming was a vanity project of previous political leader 
Xingguo Huang who worked in Tianjin as deputy mayor and mayor between 2003 and 2016. 
Huaming Model Town also got support from municipal government in many aspects. For 
example, political leaders of Tianjin Municipal Government will use their personal 
relationships to attract industrial projects to Huaming High-tech Zone (Interview, G28DL).  
Huaming Model Town represented a radical reform and a comprehensive development 
approach, which led to the formation of a new development node in Dongli. First, it cut down 
the number of villages and consolidated the size and density of the new residential district. 
The relocated farmers have urban residential status and their houses have full urban property 
rights (Wang and Wang, 2014). The old villages in Dongli has been replaced by urbanised 
resident settlement and management structure. With the increasing population and improved 
urbanity, Huaming town has been adjusted into a subdistrict. Accordingly, higher quality 
and larger scale of public facilities will be allocated required by the standards for public 
facilities planning. Secondly, the model town also stresses the economic function, public 
services and open space to balance the work and life of local residents. The development of 
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model towns facilitated the economic development and exploited the land value in good 
locations. For example, because of its location opposite the airport, Huaming High-tech Zone 
has attracted many top research institutes and high-tech companies (Figure 8.6) and has 
become the leader among 31 municipal level development zones (Interview, G28DL).  
The built environments in Huaming has been significantly reshaped. Previous dispersed 
villages and small and heavily polluted township industrial parks were demolished and 
integrated into the Model Town. Both old resettlement communities and newly built high-
end real estate projects can be found in Huaming (Figure 8.6). There is also large shopping 
mall in the town centre serving the whole model town. An Expo Huaming Pavilion was 
newly built in the business area to introduce the development history and plans of Huaming, 
with parks, schools and other public space surrounding it. Compared to the business area, 
the industrial zone developed much quickly, and many office buildings and factory buildings 
have been built on both side of main road in Huaming Hi-tech Zone (Figure 8.6). Due to its 
close proximity to the Central District, Huaming Model Town also attracts many new 
migrants, because of the improvement to the built environment and more affordable housing 
price. Huaming Subdistrict Office has decided to build an inclusive society for the ‘Huaming 
New Residents’ (relocated farmers)’ and ‘New Huaming Residents’ (New migrants) 
(Interview, G28DL).  
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Figure 8.6 Built environment changes in Huaming Town and Huaming Hi-Tech Zone 
Source: Photographed by author. Note: (From left to right) Top row: Expo Huaming Pavilion, Town 
shopping mall. Middle row: new commodity housing in Huaming, Research Institutes in Huaming Hi-tech 
Zone. Bottom row: office buildings and factory buildings in Huaming Hi-tech Zone. 
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Government officials recognise that this is an approach that forms a multiple clusters pattern. 
The model towns integrate the urban settlements, the public infrastructure and industries. A 
government official who have worked in the planning and land use department over twenty 
years argued that:  
‘In my perspective, the construction of Model Town is also a type of polycentric 
development. The Model Town means resettlement of several small villages together. 
It generally comprises one settlement area, a reclamation area and a leasing area. In 
this way, the scattered village will reorganise into a larger node, like a small society 
with comprehensive functions.’ (Interview, G11TJ) 
Dongli District Government attaches more attention to the establishment of new model 
towns based on the success of Huaming Model Town, with three others to be completed in 
the following five years. According to the Mayor of Dongli District:  
‘Dongli District plans to abolish all 109 villages in Dongli in the following five years 
and to build Huaming, Junliangcheng, Jinzhong and Xinli into four New Small Towns. 
Around 200,000 peasants will be relocated to New Small Towns. In the 458 km2 
jurisdictional area of Dongli, Zhangguizhuang governmental centre, Dongli Lake 
Cluster, and these four New Small Towns will form six important urban clusters. 
Dongli will be completely urbanized after that. In this process, we will guarantee the 
farmers interests and make the slogan ‘same land and different life’ a reality.’ (TJDRC, 
2018) 
Through this process, the district government has become a main actor in charge of the policy 
implementation based on the success of Huaming. However, some local government 
officials showed their concern about Dongli Districts’ new plan (Interview, G23DL; 
G24DL). For example,  
‘It is difficult to complete these projects without strong support of municipal 
government. These new Model Towns are different from Huaming Model Town. The 
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key point is the speed of land turnover. Huaming could construct the resettlement flats 
and lease out the land in a short period because of the support from municipal 
government. But this is impossible for these new Model Towns and therefore they are 
suffering from funding problems and lack support from farmers.’ (Interview, G23DL) 
In a sum, the construction of model towns will lead to a multiple clusters pattern in Dongli, 
but they are not a spontaneous process involving the rural population moving to these towns 
and thereby increasing their importance in Dongli and Tianjin. On the contrary, they are 
cases of a government-led urbanisation related to revenue-generation land development, 
land expropriation and a new urban management.  
8.5.2 A new green belt between Central District and TBNA 
Tianjin Strategic Plan proposed the development strategy of ‘twin cities and twin ports, 
expansion towards each other’ (shuangcheng shuanggang, xiangxiang tuozhan), which has 
been institutionalised and applied to the latest Tianjin City Master Plan as well (Interview, 
P01). The area of the middle reach of Hai River was defined as a strategic area for future 
development. It was supposed that, with the further development of Central District and 
Binhai New Area, some important functions like administration would be relocated in places 
between them to promote coordinated development. Therefore, in the Tianjin Strategic Plan, 
a third main centre for Tianjin was planned along Hai River (Interview, P05). It is also the 
geometric centre of Central District and Binhai New Area, which is 20 km equidistant from 
Central District and the core area of TBNA (Shen, 2010) (Figure 8.7).  
 
Figure 8.7 The planned third main centre in Tianjin Strategic Plan 
Source: Adapted by author, based on Shen (2010: 12) 
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This third main centre is planned to become the future administration and international 
communication centre of Tianjin. It is envisaged that Tianjin Municipal Government will be 
relocated here and high order public facilities such as an exhibition centre and stadiums 
would be built for potential mega events such as Olympic Games and Expo. Following this 
polycentric vision, Tianjin Municipal Government decided to implement strong control on 
an area of 100 km2, to reserve this area for future development (Interview, P03).  
However, the original positioning of the planned third centre has been withdrawn recently. 
Instead, a green belt is planned to be established in the near future. The former space reserved 
space for development has been adjusted to an ecological space. This change is again a 
response to the new national development principle that stresses ecological civilisation. As 
one interviewee mentioned:  
‘It follows the ecological civilisation stressed by the central state. The area of middle 
reach of Hai River was supposed to be the key urban development area. But why has 
the development been halted? Moreover, a large proportion of this area will be 
forested. In the long run, some villages will be demolished and substituted by green 
space as well. It is in conformity with the national strategy and requirement.’ 
(Interview, G11TJ) 
‘Polycentricity is related to the size, development phases and positioning goals of 
Tianjin.…The positioning and definition of centres changed in different phases. There 
was supposed to be a new centre between Central District and TBNA with a large-
scale development to link the core area together. But since last year, it has been 
revised to a green belt and has already implemented.’ (Interview, G09TJ) 
This reflects an ideological shift by Tianjin Municipal Government as well. It began to 
regard a high-quality environment as an important resource to attract people and investment 
(Interview, G27TJ). It is intended that the designation of green belt will benefit the overall 
development of Tianjin. Technically, the construction of the ecological corridor can provide 
green space for the public. It can also help to curb the unlimited sprawl of Central District 
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and Binhai New Area and connect the fragmented ecological area together to form a green 
belt.  
‘The demarcation of Basic Farmland and Ecological Area is intended to contain the 
sprawling expansion. Through the arrangement of agriculture land and planting trees, 
each centre will be separated. Tianjin adopted a strategy called ‘two rings and three 
corridors’. That means the tree planting is conducted surrounding towns and along 
roads, railways and the river. In other words, each urban area will become an 
independent and separated urban society. This planning principle will not change.’ 
(Interview, G11TJ) 
Tianjin Municipal Government now affords great attention to the intermediate area in 
regulation and actual development. Municipal Government carried out ‘Tree planting 
Campaign’ to occupy the former reserved land in case of any new development (Interview, 
P03). In terms of planning and regulation, a detailed scheme was compiled in 2018 and was 
legitimated as a regulation to enhance government control. According to ‘Planning and 
Regulation on the Intermediate Area between Binhai New Area and Central District’, the 
in-between area was divided into three types with different control intensity (Figure 8.8). 
The regulated area involves five administrative districts with an area of over 700 km2. The 
green belt plan proposed the forest and water coverage rate should reach 65% of the total 
area by 2021 and higher than 70% by 2035 (TJMG, 2019). Tianjin Municipal Government 
leads the plan and construction and implements strong control on this area. Each district is 
required to co-operate with Tianjin Municipal Government in operation. Dongli District is 
one major district to implement this policy as it accounts for large part of the total area 
(Interview, G15DL). The planned area is divided in to three different types of control area 
with different regulations. The basic farmland, river system and ecological area in this area 
are defined as primary control area. Except for necessary infrastructure, new development is 
strictly forbidden in this type of control area. The secondary control area mainly includes 
existing small towns and their size will be strictly controlled. The third level control area are 
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mature residential area and development zones. Small and polluted industrial parks in the 
secondary and tertiary control area will be forced to be relocated or upgraded.  
 
Figure 8.8 The green belt plan and regulations on places between Central District and 
Binhai New Area 
Source: Adapted by author based on map from website available at 
https://k.sina.com.cn/article_5177065796_13493c14400100kbue.html?from=news 
Green spacing is an important element of the polycentric city and urban region (Hall, 2014; 
Parr, 2008). For Dongli District, the major change is that the original location for the third 
main centre in the middle reach of Hai River has been categorised into the primary control 
area (Figure 8.8). It means any new development will be strictly controlled. It is a big change 
for Dongli’s future and status because the formerly conceived administration centre will be 
substituted by green space (Interview, G15DL). However, the new green belt will facilitate 
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the physical polycentric development of Tianjin and Dongli. At the city level, two major 
urban centres have been separated by agricultural green space and by wetland. Also, the 
boundaries of functional clusters, development zones and New Small Towns in Dongli will 
be demarcated by the green space. As one government official further explained, 
‘All urban clusters and towns are required to be surrounded by a certain area of Basic 
Farmland, otherwise the planning will not be approved. The agricultural land can 
encircle the urban area and prevent further expansion.’ (Interview, G11TJ) 
8.6 Approaches to polycentricity in Wuqing: power reshuffles, planning 
practice, and spatial changes  
The formation of polycentric spatial pattern in Wuqing was a result of local entrepreneurial 
government to a large extent. Three major approaches that are land-centred expansion, cross-
boundary cooperation and physical connection to urban network have facilitated the existing 
historical central places and created a new centrality in its planning vision. Although Wuqing 
District has shown greater autonomy, the application of these approaches involves multiple 
and contested interests inside and outside its territory. The emergence of new centres in 
Wuqing also has significant impact on the polycentric development of Tianjin City Region 
and Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Region.  
8.6.1 Land-centred expansion 
The development of Wuqing New Town, Jing-Jin Industrial City and other development 
zones are rooted in a philosophy of urban expansionism in Wuqing. As the core area of 
Wuqing District, Wuqing New Town expanded significantly in recent years. The expansion 
scheme of Wuqing New Town was ambitious. In 2005, urban construction land was 30.7 
km2 and the population was only 260,000 (TJLRCC and TJPB, 2015). In the New Town 
Master Plan (2008-2020), construction land in Wuqing New Town is planned to increase to 
60 km2 and the population target for 2020 is 600,000. The size of Wuqing New Town was 
therefore planned to be doubled in this planning horizon. 
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The expansion of Wuqing New Town was driven by Wuqing Development Zone and 
Wuqing High-speed Railway Station, the only stop on the Jing-Jin express line. Residential 
and commercial areas were concentrated around Wuqing Station and expanded east towards 
the New Town. Wuqing Development Zone was built up in the north of county town along 
the Jing-Jin express way, the development corridor of Tianjin. It expanded continuously and 
comprised several functional zones developed in different phases. The establishment of these 
development zones helped Wuqing to attract investment and industrial projects as well as to 
promote urbanisation. Since it was founded in 1992, Wuqing Development Zone was 
extended in 2000, 2008, and again in 2011. The total area of Wuqing Development Zone is 
now 55 km2, up from 7.4 km2 in 1992 (WQDZ, 2018). The fourth phase of Wuqing 
Development Zone has been planned for the north-west of Wuqing New Town and is still 
under construction (Interview, G21WQ).  
The expansion of the built-up area of Wuqing took place initially within Wuqing New Town. 
Meanwhile, new industrial parks have been planned and emerged around other separated 
towns since 2000s. These new industrial clusters were initially rural industrial parks and 
were upgraded to municipal level development zones for specialised industrial development. 
These development zones have expanded dramatically as well. Taking Jingbin Industrial 
Park as an example:  
‘Jingbin Industrial Park was founded in 2000. Its area reached 3 km2 in 2006 after 
few years’ development. In 2009, it was approved as one of 31 municipal level 
development zones and the planned area was enlarged to 9.65 km2. Since 2016, the 
administrative committee has begun to adjust the plan and scale of Jingbin Industrial 
Park. The planned area may be further expanded to 13 km2.’ (Interview, G18WQ)  
However, recent expansion has become more rampant. Former expansion was contiguous or 
next to county towns and other small towns to complement their economic, population and 
infrastructure base. Recently, in the name of regional development and integration, leapfrog 
expansion began to emerge in the rural area. In 2013, Wuqing Development Zone extends 
to a new area in Gaocun in the form of an exclave. Gaocun Science and Technology 
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Innovation Park as a subordinated development zone of Wuqing Development Zone was 
newly developed (Interview, G19WQ). In addition, the new ‘edge city’, Jing-Jin Industrial 
City, proposed by Wuqing District Government also located in Gaocun. Nonetheless, the 
site for Jing-Jin Industrial city was selected beyond Gaocun Science and Technology 
Innovation Park to facilitate new development at the edge of Wuqing.  
The successive expansion in Wuqing has given rise to a multiply clustered spatial pattern. 
The land-centred expansion increases the fiscal revenue of Wuqing and in turn provides 
Wuqing with more funds to prepare new land. The logic is that, first, the large development 
zones and newly designated industrial parks will contribute to the tax revenues and create 
new employment opportunities. Meanwhile, the improved built environment and increasing 
job opportunities will attract migrants and push up house prices. Rising land price and new 
land leasing will increase the district’s financing ability. This capital circuit will drive 
Wuqing District to further expand its built-up area for the purpose of generating even greater 
fiscal income and driving economic growth.  
8.6.2 Cross-boundary cooperation 
Thanks to the improvement in public transport and the progress of city regionalisation, 
Wuqing District developed rapidly, and it has the second largest GDP among the 16 districts 
of Tianjin. Recently, Tianjin Municipal Government proposed a new development concept 
of ‘four cities’ in its internal discussion, referring to Beijing, Tianjin Central District, TBNA 
and Wuqing (Interview, G22WQ). That means the governmental and developmental status 
of Wuqing have been further promoted in the context of the integrated development of 
Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region.  
In fact, regional integration has become an important theme for Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region 
since the early 2000s. Considering the increasing economic disparity between Beijing, 
Tianjin and Hebei Province, cooperation between Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei was put on the 
agenda in 2004 by the central state. National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) 
encouraged the Development and Reform Commissions of Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei to 
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hold a strategy symposium in Langfang to search for a consensus on regional economic 
development. The NDRC also started to make a regional plan after the symposium. However, 
the plan making took a long time and was not approved by the central state because of 
conflicts between the regional governments. The boundary effects were still strong in 
Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Region. Therefore, in practice, there has been no substantial progress 
on regional integration. One example is the designation of a regional airport. As one planner 
recalled,  
‘Tianjin would like to cooperate with Beijing, but I feel that Beijing deliberately 
ignored Tianjin’s endeavours. For example, the site selection for Beijing’s second 
international airport and the designation of Xiong’an District. Tianjin is a reasonable 
and good choice for those projects and had done some preparation. However, in the 
end Beijing selected the south location rather than Tianjin where Beijing and Tianjin 
could have shared resources.’ (Interview, P03)  
The competition between Beijing and Tianjin is still fierce. The functional relationship 
between these two major cities are weak and they avoid developing as an integrated region. 
For instance, one government official mentioned the major development area of Beijing and 
Tianjin and found that:  
‘Beijing developed towards the north while Tianjin developed towards the south in 
past decades.’ (Interview, G07TJ)  
Nevertheless, spontaneous cooperation initiated by lower tier governments has formed for 
some specific purposes. The development of Jingbin Industrial Park depended on the 
Langfang Economic and Technology Development Area (LETDA) (Interview, G18WQ).  
‘Jingbin Industrial Park and LETDA are adjacent but separated by an administrative 
boundary. LETDA is a national level development zone. In the initial stage, some 
enterprises in LETDA were relocated to Jingbin Industrial Park because LETDA has 
limited available land and stricter regulation on the enterprises’ scale, and their 
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economic and environmental performance. Taking advantage of its location 
advantage close to LETDA, Jingbin Industrial Park has taken on industries that were 
excluded from or did not conform to LETDA’s rules.’ (Interview, G18WQ)  
The initial cooperation between LETDA and Jingbin Industrial Park was mainly driven by 
market forces. This kind of cooperation is spontaneous and there is no need for institutional 
changes to coordinate the two governments. However, in the face of keen competition 
between cities and substantially unbalanced development, social inequalities and 
environmental problems in Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Region, higher level and comprehensive 
cooperation is required. The integrated development of Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei region 
requires the direct intervention of central state for smoother cooperation because this process 
involves multiple tiers governments and non-government actors.  
Since 2014, the coordinated development of Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei has been upgraded 
to a national development policy because of the emphasis of new generation of political 
leaders. The ‘Jing-Jin-Ji Collaborative Development Plan’ was approved by the central 
government in 2015, which indicated an integrated and coordinated plan will become the 
priority in near future and will be implemented in practice. Correspondingly, the institutional 
arrangement and governance modes will be adjusted to reshape the intergovernmental and 
interjurisdictional relations. Therefore the city region in China has become the ‘new state 
space’ to cope with the governance crisis such as intercity competitions and heavily polluted 
environment (Wu, 2016). The city-region and cross-boundary governance have moved 
beyond the traditional inter-city relationships and formed a multi-level polity (Yang, 2006).  
The reassertion of coordinated development of Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Region by central 
government affects local government decision making. Wuqing has become the frontier area 
for collaborative development, especially the edge of Wuqing District. However, region 
building means that development strategies and initiatives are no longer implemented by 
Wuqing District Government exclusively, it is heavily influenced by central state, Beijing 
Tianjin and Hebei government at provincial level, as well as by Langfang and Tongzhou 
Districts.  
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For the central state, the priority task of collaborative development is to solve the challenges 
that Beijing is facing. Beijing is required to disperse non-capital functions (fei shoudu 
gongneng) to Tianjin and Hebei or to the even larger Bohai Rim Region. By doing this, it is 
envisaged that he poorly developed Hebei province will receive more industries to stimulate 
economic development. Meanwhile urban problems in Beijing, such as congestion, 
overcrowding, high house prices and air pollution can be eased to a certain extent. 
Accordingly, central state approved two important plans to fulfil the objective of 
decentralisation. The first is that the Beijing Municipal Government will be relocated to 
Tongzhou District and the second is that the central state proposes to build Xiong’an New 
Area as a regional suburb in Hebei Province, which is also remarked as an example of ‘new 
style urbanisation’ in China. 
The policies and initiatives of the central state play a backstage role in Wuqing’s bottom-up 
entrepreneurialism. Wuqing found a good opportunity to promote development through 
cross-boundary cooperation, in the north-west part of Wuqing District. The Jing-Jin 
Industrial City is designated in the name of regional integration and city-regionalisation. The 
birth of the new centre at the edge is Wuqing District Government’s endeavour (Interview, 
G30WQ). When I worked as a planning consultant for Tongzhou District Government on 
the 13th Five-Year Plan in 2015, Wuqing District Government proposed an ambitious plan 
to construct a new city from scratch, crossing the administrative boundaries of Tongzhou, 
Langfang and Wuqing. In the initial proposal, Tongzhou District, Langfang in Hebei and 
Wuqing District was each envisaged to provide a certain area of land. During the plan 
making process, Wuqing District Government actively sought support from Tongzhou and 
Langfang. In its own 13th five-year plan, Wuqing District Government decided to create new 
centrality and this new city has also been recognised as an important functional cluster in 
Tianjin City Master Plan showing that Tianjin Municipal Government also supported the 
development of the new city.  
It is interesting that this new centre was supposed to be located on the reverse direction 
towards Tianjin Central City (Figure 8.5). The broad place between Beijing Tongzhou 
District and Wuqing District Centre was selected. As one planning officials introduced:  
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‘Previously, the newly planned new towns like Tuanbo New Town and Jing-Jin New 
Town were located between the centre of districts or counties and Central District. 
The spatial linkage with Central District is critical. Unlike previous new towns, some 
new urban clusters created in this round of master plans are at the edge of city, 
detached from the Central District.’ (Interview, G12TJ） 
Jing-Jin Industrial City has also been confirmed as an important industrial platform by the 
central state to facilitate regional cooperation (MIIT, 2016). However, the site for the new 
city is leading to tensions between Beijing and Tianjin. The designation of Xiong’an New 
Area and the location of the Beijing New Airport indicate that the relationship between 
Beijing and Hebei would be a major concern of the central state and Beijing Municipal 
Government. From the standpoint of Beijing Municipal Government, environmental 
improvement is the priority, so that Beijing Municipal Government is planning to build up 
a green belt surrounding Beijing. In the most recent Beijing City Master Plan, the current 
location of Jing-Jin Industrial City is defined as an ecological area, forbidden for new 
development (Interview, G19WQ). Wuqing is looking for an alternative place for this plan. 
As a local government official noted,  
‘Since Beijing is the capital city, we must obey the newly published Beijing master 
plan and adjust Tianjin city master plan and the Jing-Jin Industrial City plan 
accordingly. Jing-Jin Industrial City may be re-located to Sicundian, another town to 
the south of current location.’ (Interview, G19WQ) 
Nevertheless, Tianjin Municipal Government still insisted on finding a cross-boundary 
location as a demonstration of regional collaborative development.  
‘In his field trips to Hebei and Beijing in late 2018 and early 2019, the deputy mayor 
of Tianjin suggested to find a pilot area to overcome the institutional barrier for 
regional cooperation. In this context, we proposed to build the coordinated 
development demonstration zone to the north of Jingbin Industrial Park. Jingbin 
Industrial Park has a good industrial base and development potential. Tongzhou 
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Yongle Development Zone, Jingbin Industrial Park, and Langfang Development Zone 
will provide 6.5 km2 area land to build the pilot area. These areas are not separated, 
in fact, they are contiguous. The new cooperation mechanism in terms of tax sharing, 
talents, and common education and health systems will be explored in this 
demonstration zone.’ (Interview, G18WQ) 
This plan achieved support from three local governments and several thematic cooperation 
protocols have been signed (Interview, G18WQ). Since Tongzhou was planned to become 
the secondary administration centre, the economic structure and functions would be adjusted 
and the regulation for new development would be much stricter than other urban districts in 
Beijing. The thresholds for industrial development have become stricter and some industries 
have been forced to relocate or have been closed down leading to the loss of tax revenue and 
employment. Through the cooperation with neighbouring cities, Tongzhou can achieve 
functional adjustment by sharing the benefits and costs with neighbouring areas. Meanwhile, 
Wuqing and Langfang will create new space for development and attract more projects and 
talents from the capital city. 
This new demonstration area looks just like a miniature of Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region 
(Figure 8.9). The governance mode of this demonstration zone aims to produce a reciprocal 
place for three neighbouring cities and so that facilitate the regional balance. Cooperation is 
based on land interests and redistribution of fiscal revenue and social provision. As argued 
by Huang et al. (2016), newly planned projects at the urban edge will lead to a polycentric 
spatial structure and extend the polycentricity to a larger scope. Either the Jing-Jin Industrial 
City and the demonstration zone in Jingbin Industrial Park will facilitated polycentricity at 
urban and regional scales after they achieve substantial development. 
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Figure 8.9 A pilot zone for cross-boundary cooperation between Tongzhou, Langfang 
and Wuqing 
Source: Adapted by author, based on map collected from Jingbin Industrial Park Administrative Committee. 
Note: LETDA: Langfang Economic and Technological Development Area; YETDA: Yongledian Economic 
and Technological Development Area 
8.6.3 Joining the urban network through the TOD mode  
According to the international experience, new towns or town centres often adopt the 
Transit-Oriented Development (TOD) model to join themselves to the larger urban network. 
For the peripheral area, efficient transport connecting it with a more central area is the key 
element for its development. Public transport hubs are often identified as local centres with 
mixed land use, high density and modern landscapes. The TOD development model is not 
just a design approach for community development or improvement of the accessibility to 
jobs and public transport, it has become the building block for regional development 
(Dittmar & Ohland, 2012). In this content, the TOD principle is an important means for 
Wuqing to join the regional urban network so that it can enjoy the regional and network 
economies, especially benefit from the access to Beijing (Figure 8.10).  
226 
 
 
For Wuqing, the most import public transport is the inter-city High-speed Railway, which 
has been in operation since 2008. Wuqing is currently the only stop between Beijing and 
Tianjin Central District. It only takes around 20 mins to get to Wuqing Station from Beijing 
South Station and 10 mins from Tianjin Station. In the context of policy convergence in 
variegated development zones, the availability of High-speed Rail has become the most 
important advantage for Wuqing New Town and the Wuqing Development Zone (Interview, 
G21WQ; G22WQ). The efficient public transport allows Wuqing to exploit the regional 
market and to access to high-order services and employment opportunities possible.  
In the Wuqing Master Plan (2008-2020) and Wuqing New Town Master Plan (2008-2020), 
the location of Wuqing High-speed Railway Station was also defined as the district and New 
Town centre (TJLRCC and TJPB, 2015). Other public transport such as buses were 
suggested to be well connected to the transit station. Public transit services are also coupled 
with commercial services, administration and public space (Figure 8.10, 8.11). The 
commercial, administration, public facilities and residential land were also distributed close 
to Wuqing Station and a commercial and business zone was designed in front of Wuqing 
Station. A large Italian themed shopping mall called ‘Florentia Village’ was built in front of 
Wuqing Station in 2011 (Figure 8.11), a mega commercial facility that aims to serve the 
regional market. A large proportion of customers are from Beijing and other parts of Tianjin 
rather than residents in Wuqing District. In order to attract more regional customers, the 
outlet reimburses customers’ high-speed railway tickets if they meet a spending benchmark. 
Wuqing District Government is also located not far from the Wuqing Station and many high-
rise residential buildings and public facilities have been constructed around the station 
(Figure 8.10, 8.11). This area has become a high-end community in Wuqing District with 
good access to public transport and high-quality facilities. 
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Figure 8.10 The application of TOD principle in Wuqing New Town (top) and Jing-Jin 
Industrial City (bottom) 
Source: Adapted by author, based on maps from TAUPD (2008) (top) and from website (bottom) available at 
http: //www.sohu.com/a/129227739_634857
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Figure 8.11 Built environment changes in Wuqing 
Source: Photographed by author. Note: From left to right: Wuqing High-speed Railway Station, exterior of 
Florentia Village, interior of Florentia Village, Wuqing District Government building and Cultural Square. 
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The newly established Jing-Jin Industrial City at the edge of Wuqing is intended to be 
connected to the high-speed railway as well (Figure 8.10). The line of Capital Ring Intercity 
High-speed Railway (Langfang to Xianghe part) has been approved by NDRC to connect 
important cities, towns and mega infrastructure in Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Region. Because 
of the new plan of Jing-Jin Industrial city, Wuqing North Station was planned to be 
constructed, which will link this new city with Beijing Daxing International Airport and 
Langfang. This station will be the second high-speed railway station in Wuqing. In the Jing-
Jin Industrial City Master Plan (2016-2030), the high-density and mixed use of land near to 
the planned transportation hub was stressed as well (Figure 8.10). Through the TOD mode, 
Jing-Jin Industrial City will become an important new centre in Wuqing and have chance to 
get better resources and development opportunities from Beijing and Hebei. However, 
because the adjustment of Jing-Jin Industrial City, the scheme for the station setting will be 
affected as well (Interview, G19WQ).  
The TOD mode also means the development of a multimode transportation system. The 
subways and light rail may become another potential advantage for Wuqing (Interview, 
G21WQ; G22WQ). A new subway line is planned to be extended to Wuqing, which will 
connect Central district, Beicheng District and Wuqing New Town. Then it will be extended 
to Langfang in the form of light rail and will be connect to another cross-boundary light rail 
that starts from Tongzhou, crosses three counties (Xianghe, Dachang and Sanhe) in 
Langfang and arrives in Pinggu District in Beijing. That means this line will link Wuqing 
New Town and Jing-Jin Industrial City with Beijing Tongzhou District and Langfang. The 
connection between Wuqing and other cities in the region will be enhanced in future through 
the combination of multiple transport modes.  
In addition, several important expressways connecting Beijing and Tianjin Central District 
and Binhai New Area pass through Wuqing and set exits there. Expressways can facilitate 
transportation of goods and people by trucks and mobile cars. First, the Jingjin Highway is 
a development axis of Wuqing, and Wuqing New Town expanded along the Jingjin 
expressway. Second, other towns and industrial development zones such as Jingbin 
Industrial Park also attempted to have more expressway exits to have better access to other 
cites (Interview, G18WQ).  
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‘Jingbin Industrial Park is close to the four highway exits, and we applied for a new 
exit and got approval from municipal government. The construction will start by the 
end of 2019 and the exit can be put into use in 2021.’ (Interview, G18WQ) 
The good location has attracted many e-commerce businesses to the Jingjin E-Commerce 
Industrial Park and Jingbin Industrial Park (Interview, G12TJ; G18WQ). Due to the large 
regional market, these companies have not only set up their warehouses here, but also their 
computing centres and accounting centres (Interview, G18WQ). Wuqing also provides some 
higher order functions that serve the whole region. It has also borrowed functions from 
Beijing and Langfang. Benefiting from the prosperous job market and housing market in 
Beijing, many migrants buy homes in Wuqing but work in Beijing, so that Wuqing’s housing 
market is much more prosperous than other exurban and suburban districts. Indeed, it is also 
the only exurban district that comes within the scope of Tianjin’s house price restriction 
policy (Interview, G22WQ).  
In short, the TOD mode was applied to Wuqing New Town and Jing-Jin Industrial City to 
enhance their centrality through local urban design and land use control. Moreover, through 
joining the larger urban network, Wuqing District can borrow size and function from other 
key urban agglomerations, especially Beijing. This approach promoted urban function and 
upgraded industrial structure of Wuqing as well as boom local real estate development.  
8.7 Comparison of polycentric development between Dongli and 
Wuqing  
Dongli and Wuqing are no longer peripheral areas, distinguished by their traditional core-
peripheral relations with the central city. Dongli and Wuqing has shown a polycentric spatial 
pattern in their visions and development trends, which constitute more than one municipal 
level centre and several other development clusters. These development nodes are a mix of 
a new urbanity and a rural legacy. Exotic modern buildings, large scale shopping malls, and 
advanced transport facilities can be found but remnants of rural lifestyles and undemolished 
rural dwellings still exist. The emergence of new centres in Dongli and Wuqing are important 
components of polycentric system of Tianjin, but they have shown many differences in terms 
of governance, planning and spatial changes, compared to Central District and the TBNA 
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Core Zone in Tianjin. This section summaries the characteristics of emergence new centres 
and compare the logics, politics and spatial outcomes of two embedded cases systematically. 
8.7.1 The emergence of centres in-between 
The relationship between central and peripheral area in Tianjin has become more complex, 
dynamic and ambiguous. Dongli and Wuqing are much more dynamic and complex than 
traditional city centre. They have shown some features of in-between space that comprises 
the post-suburban economy.  
The in-between space is a new landscape of urbanisation characterised by mixed land use, a 
relatively balance of residence, work and leisure, hybridity of culture and social groups and 
the fuzzy boundaries (Keil and Young, 2009; Wu and Phelps, 2008; Young and Keil, 2010). 
It is a new pattern and process of suburbanisation that straddles the lines of traditional city 
and traditional suburb and contests the binary dichotomies of urban and rural landscapes and 
the core-periphery relationship (Young and Keil, 2010). Phelps (2004) defined the in 
between space like suburbs, edge cities, technopoles as relatively new locations between 
established urban centres. In China, some particular zones in the urban fringe have shown 
some elements of post-suburbanisation (Wu and Phelps, 2008).  
Based on extant literatures, the in-betweenness of post-suburban area could be regarded as 
a place between city and suburb, a functional relationship between the forces of centrality 
and dispersal and a new political relation between traditional bounded territory governance 
and multi-level governance involving non-local government. The centres in Dongli and 
Wuqing can be regarded as in-between space because they embody typical features of in-
betweenness.  
The in-betweenness of centres in Dongli and Wuqing are reflected in three aspects. First, 
from the geographic situation, new centres in these two districts are located between major 
established urban centres, Beijing, Tianjin city proper and the TBNA. They were previously 
hinterlands of key urban centres with little influence on the development of key urban nodes. 
However, they have become key areas in terms of the implementation of polycentric 
development strategy in Tianjin recently. The emergence of new centres and approaches 
they adopted have generated great influences on urban spatial structure and the regional 
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urbanisation. Secondly, with respect to their governance framework, the political, economic 
and social relations with other places have penetrated administrative boundaries and have 
reshuffled the inter-scalar power relations through reterritorialization and rescaling in these 
two cases. The governance boundaries in these two districts do not coincide with their 
jurisdictional boundaries. Thirdly, in the spatial material term, these two places are in a 
transitional state. They are no longer simply traditional suburbs or specialised industrial 
districts but have shown a blending of city and suburban features. The central places in these 
two cases are formed through densification and modernisation process. Former rural 
landscapes were replaced by high-end commercial and residential facilities and modern 
infrastructure. Former rural populations were either actively or passively urbanised in the 
last decades. However, the new centres still show deficiency in vitality and identity, 
compared to traditional city centre. Several newly planned centres or clusters in both Dongli 
and Wuqing are facing uncertainty and challenges in their projected transition to actual urban 
centres.  
In-between space is said to reflect problems and challenges such as the lack of plan and 
regulation, splintered infrastructure and a lack of clear spatial imaginaries (Keil and Young, 
2009; Young and Keil, 2010). However, the new centres in-between considered here have 
become the new growth poles of Tianjin. Their economic and demographic growth are much 
more significant than other areas. In addition, these centres have become new frontiers of 
experiment and innovation in urban policy and planning practice as well. They are often 
endorsed by ambitious master plans of concrete projects and linked with clear spatial 
imaginaries and positioning. Correspondingly, land use, public facilities and key transport 
infrastructure are arranged preferentially to these places.  
8.7.2 Differences between these centres 
From the discussion above, development strategies, governance mode and spatial changes 
vary between Dongli and Wuqing. This section summarizes the main characteristics of their 
spatial development modes and their origins as important nodes and governance mode in 
Dongli and Wuqing.  
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8.7.2.1 Spatial development mode and the role of land 
Wuqing adopted an expansionist approach and Dongli adopted a centralisation mode in term 
of spatial development (Figure 8.12). In Dongli District, major changes in spatial terms were 
the designation and development of model towns. Villages have been demolished and the 
rural population has been resettled to the Model Towns. The resettlement projects have 
relocated people to designated residential districts so that district government can provide 
better services and improve the level of urban management. This development mode also 
creates new urban land for development. The land in model towns has become legal urban 
land and the land use right and property right are all legitimated by the transformation of 
rural construction into urban construction land. The corresponding industrial park and 
commercial real estate projects further promote urbanisation. From the morphological and 
administrative dimension, they have urban identity, although the change in lifestyle imposed 
upon the resettled peasants difficulties for many of them. 
On the contrary, Wuqing District has greater incentives and ambitions to facilitate economic 
development and urban expansion. Wuqing New Town has expanded continuously. Other 
central towns in Wuqing also developed their own development zones nearby. These rural 
development zones were expanded and upgraded to important industrial clusters of Wuqing. 
In addition, new ‘edge cities’ and demonstration zones for regional integration have been 
planned at the boundary of Wuqing. Through the continuous expansion and new designation 
of demonstration zones for regional integration, Wuqing District has been able to acquire 
more land development quota. And the revenue for land leasing can increase the fiscal 
revenue and invest into infrastructure construction and new land consolidation.  
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Figure 8.12 Spatial development mode in Dongli (left) and Wuqing (right) 
Source: Produced by author 
8.7.2.2 Origin of clusters: newly planned or consolidated 
It is difficult to distinguish clearly driving forces that facilitate the formation of new centres 
and clusters in Dongli and Wuqing. Some centres are newly proposed by political interests, 
and some existing urban clusters are often confirmed as important centres by planners 
according to technical rationality. Newly planned centres need the support of market 
rationales such as low land cost, good location, and access to major infrastructure. In addition, 
state entrepreneurialism in China is a governance mechanism characterised by the 
combination of planning and market instruments (Wu, 2018). Existing urban settlements will 
further develop into important centres with the support of municipal and central states. 
Therefore, the formation of new centres is affected by the joint forces of planning and the 
market. 
This research defines the origin of emerging centres in cases according to their initial status. 
From a historical perspective, the formation of new centres can be divided into four types, 
namely top-down planned, top-down consolidated, bottom-up planned and bottom-up 
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consolidated (Table 8.2). The top down mode refers that the new centre is proposed and 
funded by the upper level governments such as central state and municipal government. 
Bottom-up planned mode means that centres are newly proposed by local district or county 
governments from bottom. Bottom-up consolidated mode means the new centres are 
historical settlements and gradually consolidated by planning and market forces.  
Consolidated development is often related to easy accessibility to harbours, airports, railway 
stations and so on. The nodality of these facilities can improve the importance and 
attractiveness of new centres. Places near these facilities have greater potential to become 
important centres. Sometimes, new centres would be selected as the priority places to build 
these facilities to enhance their centrality. For example, Wuqing Sub-city was proposed 
based on the historical county town. It has developed fast through continuous expansion and 
industrialisation. Since a new High-speed Railway Station was built here, its status became 
more important in the polycentric system of Tianjin. Therefore, Wuqing Sub-city is a 
bottom-up consolidated centre. In addition, the newly planned Jing-Jin Industrial city is an 
artificial bottom-up centre, but one high-speed railway station is planned to be built to 
enhance its centrality. Beyond these two municipal level centres, central towns and general 
towns in Wuqing grew spontaneously and new development zones were planned and 
developed by local governments besides these towns for industrial development.  
For Dongli District, two of three municipal level centres were designated or initiated by 
Tianjin Municipal Government. Liulin subcentre in Central District, Airport Economic Zone 
and TEDA West Zone were newly planned because of good location and available land 
resources. They are proposed in the top-down approach. Dongli Lake Functional Cluster is 
one newly planned important centre on behalf of local government’s interest. Dongli District 
also has four model towns facilitated by the municipal and district government through rural 
consolidation and urbanisation. The traditional residential districts were consolidated 
through the concentration process. These micro centres are counted as bottom-up 
consolidated approach except Huaming Model Town, which is funded and initiated by 
Tianjin Municipal Government.  
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Table 8.2 The approaches to the formation of centres 
Centres Approach  Consolidated Newly planned 
In urban 
system of 
Tianjin 
Top-down 
-- Liulin Sub-centre; 
Airport Economic Zone; 
 
Bottom-up 
Wuqing New Town; 
 
Jing-Jin Industrial City; 
Dongli Lake Functional Cluster; 
In urban 
system of 
districts 
Top-down 
Huaming Model 
Town; 
 
-- 
Bottom-up 
Junliangcheng, 
Jinzhong and Xinli 
Model Towns; 
Central Towns in 
Wuqing; 
Jing-Jin Technology Valley; 
Jingjin E-Commerce Industrial 
Park; 
Tianjin Wuqing Automobile 
Industrial Park; 
Jingbin Industrial Park  
Source: Summarized by author 
8.7.2.3 New politics in the formation process of new centres 
Dongli District government is relative weak and fragmented. Its jurisdictional area has been 
divided to three parts governed by Municipal, Binhai New Area District Government and 
Dongli District Government respectively. Liulin subcentre and Airport City are proposed 
and governed by Tianjin Municipal Government or TBNA Government. Dongli has little to 
say about these areas. The major responsibilities of Dongli has been adjusted to improve the 
ability of urban governance and social affairs management. Therefore, Dongli District 
government has become a service government and shown a return to administrative function. 
The spatial change in Dongli District are more likely to be influenced by Tianjin Municipal 
Government or TBNA Government. It has become a location where initiatives and 
experiments of municipal government can be carried out. Dongli District has implemented 
urbanization through consolidation of small village settlements and hence several medium-
scale urban settlements have been formed at the district level. Meanwhile, there is also an 
enhanced control of ecological space functions that act as green belts between these clusters 
and between Central District and TBNA, which will facilitate polycentric spatial pattern. 
The development ambition of district government was further weakened by the new strict 
regulation on the construction of a green belt. It is a top-down regulation and Dongli District 
Government just play a key role in the implementation process.  
237 
 
On the contrary, Wuqing District government has strong power with more autonomy. It 
stimulated economic growth through creation of new economic space in past decades. It also 
takes advantage of its close distance and convenient connection with Beijing to attract 
investment and talents at the regional scope. In the context of the re-emphasis of regional 
integration by the central state, new spaces in the name of regional integration have been 
proposed by local district government and got support from Tianjin Municipal Government. 
The planned ‘edge city’ acts as the pioneering and pilot zones for regional integration. 
However, the new proposal conflicts with the interests of Beijing and are required to be 
revised. A new cross-boundary cooperation project was proposed by Wuqing District 
Government and Tianjin Municipal Government based on Jingbin Industrial Park. This 
project is planned on the boundaries of Beijing Tongzhou District, Langfang LETDA and 
Jingbin Industrial Park. It is operated under the intergovernmental negotiation mechanism 
involve three local governments under the supervision of three different cities. Wuqing 
planned to build a reciprocal place at the edge that can facilitate the cross-boundary 
cooperation and benefit for its local economies at the same time.  
 8.8 Conclusion and discussion 
As Anas et al. (1998) argues, subcentres are sometimes arrayed in corridors. Inner city 
subcentres, suburban centres, newly planned edge cities, and important clusters have been 
recognised and developed along the major development corridors of Tianjin (Interview, P03). 
These key parts of Tianjin’s polycentric spatial structure are located in two districts, Dongli 
and Wuqing. This chapter has selected these two districts as cases and examined the 
rationality, governance and development process of new formation centres in the 
intermediate area of Tianjin. Special attention has been given to the recent new governance 
arrangements, planning practice and spatial changes related to the implementation of 
polycentric policy.  
Dongli and Wuqing were suburban and peripheral area of Tianjin for a long time. Both 
Dongli and Wuqing have experienced dramatic growth and urbanisation since the open door 
policy. Recently, these two districts have evolved into hotspots of new development in 
Tianjin and begun to show a polycentric development pattern since the late 2000s. Several 
centres at municipal level have been developed or planned in Dongli and Wuqing, which 
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reshaped the spatial structure of Tianjin and local districts simultaneously. However, an 
analysis of the origins and conditions of new centres in Dongli and Wuqing reveals that these 
centres have distinct development trajectories because of their different geographical, 
historical and political contexts. Dongli’s polycentric form is a collage of three centres 
governed by Tianjin Municipal Government, the TBNA Government and Dongli District 
Government determined by the fiscal and administrative relationship between them, while 
Wuqing has produced ‘twin cities’ spatial pattern within its territory in its planning vision 
due to local entrepreneurialism government and the central state’s rescaling strategy.  
Consequently, the two cases have adjusted their development strategies and adopted distinct 
approaches to forge new centres or facilitate polycentric development because of their place 
speciality. Dongli stresses its administrative function and proposes to achieve complete 
urbanisation in near future. Dongli attempts to consolidate the rural settlements to model 
towns following the ‘success’ of Huaming Model Town. It also needs to coordinate with 
Tianjin Municipal Government to build the new green belt which separates and controls the 
size of Central District, TBNA and model towns in Dongli. Wuqing District Government 
still stresses local development and growth, but in the name of regional integration to bid for 
higher level governments’ support. It attempts to improve the significance of existing 
Wuqing New Town and create the new centrality at the edge through land-centred expansion, 
cross-boundary cooperation and physical connection to urban network.  
By comparison of the two cases, the centres in Dongli and Wuqing has shown some common 
features as in-between spaces in the polycentric system in terms of the locations, 
development status and governance modalities. The distinction between the peripheral area 
and central area has therefore became blurred. These centres located between major 
established urban centres, are characterised by qualitative transformation in structure, 
function and governance. Urban density has been increased and new functions have been 
added in privileged centres in Dongli and Wuqing. Moreover, development projects with 
special purposes have reshuffled the inter-scalar power relations including multi-tiers and 
cross-boundary authorities. Nevertheless, differences exist in the spatial development mode, 
origins and new politics in the development process of specific centres (Table 8.3). 
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Table 8.3 Comparison of polycentric development in Dongli and Wuqing 
Dimension Wuqing District  Dongli District 
Location Between Beijing and 
Tianjin; 
An exurban district 
Between Central District and 
Binhai New Area; 
A suburban district 
Governance Strong and autonomous  Weak and fragmented 
Major objectives Economic development; 
Regional integration 
(Rural) urbanisation; 
Social affair management 
Spatial 
development 
approach 
Expansionism; 
TOD mode 
Centralisation; 
Green belt 
Centres at 
municipal level 
Wuqing New Town; 
Jing-Jin Industrial City 
 
Liulin Subcentre; 
Airport City; 
Dongli Lake Functional Cluster 
 
Key nodes at the 
district level 
Central towns and 
Development Zones 
Model Towns 
Physical 
connection with 
major centres 
High-speed railways; 
Express ways 
Light railways; 
Subways 
Source: Summarized by author 
In conclusion, the centres ‘in-between’ in Tianjin are more dynamic and restless. In-between 
spaces have become the foci for implementation of new planning practices recently. The 
analysis in detail shows that the planning rationality, governance modes and the spatial 
outcomes in Dongli and Wuqing are heterogenous. This finding verifies and unpacks the 
complicated relationships between political powers, professionals and spatial changes in 
polycentric transition of Tianjin from a more local perspective.  
Meanwhile, the findings of this chapter reassert the argument in chapter six that 
polycentricity is an assembly of fragmented projects and a power product that finds its 
justification through the work of the planning profession. Polycentric development in Dongli, 
Wuqing and even Tianjin is still land-centred and project-based, which will pose three 
challenges for sustainable development. First, new centres are important development 
projects and are often planned and selected to be built in places where land is easier to 
acquire. The new development of land can promote local development and financing. These 
new places are often not well connected and integrated with other urban centres by public 
transport in the initial stage. Second, the consolidation process aims to produce new 
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development quota for new projects sometimes, e.g. Huaming Model Town. This approach 
may generate negative economic and social impacts on vulnerable groups. Third, planning 
is still critical and the state and developers are main actors in the planning and development 
process of new centres. The lack of public participation may lead to the failure of ambitious 
plans because lack of market demands and public identity. 
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Chapter 9 Conclusion: toward a Chinese approach to 
polycentricity  
9.1 Introduction 
Polycentricity has been identified as a prominent feature of modern landscapes as well as a 
buzzword in spatial planning at a range of scales worldwide. Since the Reform and Opening-
up Policy in 1978, major cities in China have experienced significant polycentric transition 
manifested by their new spatial policy framework and reshaped urban spatial structure. The 
polycentric transformation recently has provoked academics’ interests in structural and 
performance analysis in quantitative ways. Nevertheless, there is little research that 
investigates the formation and implementation of polycentric development policies in 
Chinese cities from a processual and critical perspective.  
In response to polycentric transition in China and in order to fill the gap in research, this 
research aims to investigate how polycentric development is applied in spatial planning and 
implemented in practice in China’s transitional context. More specifically, this research 
provides answers to the following two questions, as indicated in the introductory chapter: (a) 
what are the underlying meanings and rationality of polycentric urban development in the 
policy and planning discourse in China? and (b) how concrete centres in polycentric system 
are created, governed and materialized to facilitate the implementation of polycentric 
policies? A detailed examination was conducted in the overall case of Tianjin and three 
embedded cases within its administrative region. 
This chapter draws together the empirical findings in previous chapters with reference to the 
aims and objectives. It starts with a summary of key findings on the formation and 
implementation of polycentric development strategies in China. Then it discusses its main 
contributions to debates on polycentricity particularly and literature on Chinese urban 
development generally. Following that, the implications on policy and plan making are 
analysed. The last section suggests the possible directions of future research.  
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9.2 Summary of major findings  
Polycentricity has been researched in multiple disciplines and from different standpoints. 
This research is carried out from a perspective of spatialised political economy, which 
interprets the polycentric discourses, power relations and urban space critically and regards 
polycentricity as a product of the articulation of their influences. To enable an empirical 
analysis in this way, this research first explores concepts and theories of polycentricity and 
unfolds major polycentric configurations into an assembly of key elements. Then it 
investigates the planning and governance of polycentric development at a variety scales in 
the European context to explain the reasons for the popularity of this concept in spatial 
planning and the factors affecting its implementation. Based on these discussions and 
drawing on theories of production of space and politics of space, a novel theoretical 
framework is developed, which can bridge policy making and implementation, integrate 
vision and reality, and link power, knowledge, and space together. This framework 
comprises three key components that are state power, planning profession and produced 
space, which are framed by four key dimensions of polycentricity that are context, scale, 
process, and approach.  
The theoretical framework was successfully applied to empirical analysis in chapters 6, 7, 
and 8. Key themes that consists of the framework were identified and critically discussed in 
each empirical chapter. The framework provided analytical angles and guidance for the 
analytical procedures in a systematic way. More importantly, this research framework 
successfully helped to address the twofold research questions. The first research question 
was addressed in chapter 6 and the second research question was fully answered in chapter 
7 and 8. Dialectic relationships between the core components, state power, planning 
profession and produced space, were confirmed and supplemented by the major findings in 
empirical research (Figure 9.1). The most significant findings in previous chapters will be 
draw in this section, which revolve these three key components and their relationships. 
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Figure 9.1 Re-examining the theoretical framework and the relationships between state power, planning profession and space 
Source: Produced by author 
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9.2.1 (Re)formation of polycentric discourses and their underlying meanings 
This research first aims to investigate how the polycentric development strategy is applied 
into spatial planning in contemporary China. The findings from chapter 5 and 6 suggest that 
the special backgrounds in China including features of political framework, periodisation of 
power relations, shift in planning ideology and the dynamics of socio-economic environment 
make the Chinese approach to polycentricity unique. The case of Tianjin demonstrates that 
the concept of polycentricity has been deployed in different ways with variegated 
composition of different elements and the underlying meanings changed in its four editions 
of City Master Plan under a variety of circumstances. Furthermore, it is argued that the 
production and legitimation of distinct polycentric discourses is essentially a political and 
multi-scalar process, which is disguised and justified by the planning profession.  
Distinct discourses of polycentricity embedded in Tianjin City Master Plans 
Chapter 6 investigated the discursive changes to polycentricity in nuance and their 
underlying meanings by applying the analytical framework and a policy discourse analysis. 
The case of Tianjin shows that the City Master Plan in China has a long tradition of referring 
to polycentric development. However, it is argued that the planning discourses regarding 
polycentricity have been shaped and reshaped in successive city master plans, which are 
embedded in China’s wider transitional process. Through a discourse analysis of four master 
plans since the Reform and Opening-up policy, significant discursive turns can be identified 
in Tianjin City Master Plans, which can be defined as ‘polycentric urban settlements’, 
‘functional polycentricity’, ‘polycentric growth nodes’ and ‘nested polycentricity’ (Wang et 
al., 2020).  
This research shows that the concept of polycentricity has been applied at different scales 
and urban functional dimensions in Tianjin. The discourse of polycentricity in the 1986 
Master Plan referred to a ‘polycentric urban system’ or more explicitly ‘polycentric 
hierarchical settlements’ within Tianjin’s jurisdictional area. This discourse was shaped 
based on already existing historical urban settlements and was essentially an embedded 
urban system concept. The discourse in the 1999 plan stressed functional specialisation and 
interaction among different activity clusters rather than just settlement morphology. Due to 
the transition to decentralisation, marketisation and globalisation, specialisation and 
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exploitation of the advantages of the CBD and port became the focal point of the polycentric 
spatial pattern in order to improve economic efficiency. The polycentric discourse in the 
2006 plan was characterised by rampant entrepreneurial narratives which promoted a 
polycentric spatial pattern consisting of many growth nodes, such as a new ‘core’ of TBNA 
and 11 new towns. The discourse in the most recent master plan is much more complicated 
compared to former plans. Nested polycentricity means that the concept of polycentricity 
has become a normative agenda for a wide range of geographic units and it applies not only 
to population and economic activity, but also to the delivery of public services, although 
they may overlap in terms of spatial distribution. 
Mechanism of power and institutionalisation process  
The evolution and construction of discourse is a reflection of the malleability of the concept 
or polycentricity that should not be restricted to a technical interpretation because the 
production and legitimation of distinct discourses is primarily a multi-scalar political process. 
As shown in the account of changing discourse of polycentricity in Tianjin’s master plans in 
chapter 6, the discursive practice of polycentricity in Tianjin’s planning involved multiple 
scales and strong state intervention. Polycentricity acts as a ‘policy glue’ for distinct ends 
and serves the interests of governments at different levels. Compared to the contests between 
different government tiers, the conflicts within the planning system and between different 
government departments are not prominent in the formation and legitimation of polycentric 
discourse.  
This research has drawn out the multi-level polity that variously involves the central state, 
regional authorities (informal entity or authorities of neighbouring area), municipal 
governments and district or county governments in different phases of plan making, plays 
important roles in (re)shaping the discourse of polycentricity. First, central state is the 
primary and the top-level government in the authoritarian policy regime. Although the 
control of central state has been weakened since the marketisation reform and the devolution 
of power to local governments, the central state can still exert its institutional capacity to 
reassert its control and governance ability in multiple ways, such as stricter spatial regulation, 
designation of specific projects and imposition of particular forms of city regional 
governance. Secondly, the emerging regional governance and planning have impacts on the 
competitive and cooperative relationships between constitutes cities and districts, which will 
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reshape the components of polycentric discourse. Thirdly, Tianjin Municipal Government 
itself has played a crucial role in the scaled political system. Municipal government initiates 
the development strategies and defines the future spatial pattern by following the incentives 
and coercion from the central state, coordinating inter-city relationships and balancing the 
internal interests from bottom simultaneously. Because of the limited resources, financial 
constraints and the pressure from upper level, it includes local demands selectively and 
hence reformulate the discourse of polycentricity. Finally, district governments are also 
active actors in the process of shaping new discourses and reforming governance 
mechanisms. The changing strategies of upper level governments have adjusted local 
development strategies and governance frameworks. They may create new nodes by 
themselves or strive for mega projects to become important development nodes in Tianjin’s 
polycentric system for the purpose of place marketing and economic competitiveness.  
Multi-level governments adopt different strategies to achieve their aims and interests. 
Through an institutionalisation process, polycentric discourses appear to be well coordinated 
with other plans and policies, and well matched with political power. The legitimation of 
these distinct discourses in the institutionalisation process further reflects by five main sets 
of actions or policies:  
(1) Legislation of formal and informal plans. City Master Plans are statutory in China. The 
planning area, key principles, and approval procedure are all set out in Urban and Rural 
Planning Act. The discursive changes are synchronous with the evolving process of master 
plan. Moreover, Tianjin Municipal Government legitimised non-statutory strategic plan in 
an Ordinance in 2011 and thereby gave the ‘twin cities’ spatial structure a legal basis.  
(2) Administrative rescaling. The importance of new centres in the polycentric system is in 
accordance with the rank in political system. For example, Binhai New Area has been 
adjusted to a sub-provincial level district and Liulin subcentre was rescaled to be governed 
by Tianjin Municipal Government.  
(3) Administrative annexation. Several formerly independent counties were incorporated as 
urban districts of Tianjin to mitigate the conflicts between counties and cities, and important 
projects within their boundaries were selected as key nodes of Tianjin, e.g. Jing-Jin New 
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Town. Similarly, three urban districts were annexed by Binhai New Area and therefore a 
new networked polycentricity pattern could be formed there. 
(4) Establishment of administrative committee and development corporations. Almost all 
centres such as New Towns, new CBDs in the polycentric system have established their own 
administrative committee and development corporation responsible for detailed planning 
and construction.  
(5) Demarcation of ‘three lines and three zones’ (sanqu sanxian). Master plans also integrate 
the content of Major-functional Zone Plans and recent new practices such as the demarcation 
of growth boundary, ecological area, etc. A spatial regulation plan is proposed as one 
important chapter of recent plans, which defines the morphological frame of Tianjin.  
Role of planning professions 
The empirical findings show that planning professions are intertwined with the state power 
and political interests in shaping the discourse of polycentricity. Interviews with planners 
suggest that planners are essentially representatives of government in China. This fact is also 
asserted in the principle of ‘governmental organisation, expert leadership, departmental 
coordination, public participation and scientific decision-making’ in the regulation of 
Measures for Formulating City Planning (MOC, 2005). Meanwhile, governments and 
politicians impose their own ideas on planners as the state maintains the approval power and 
the client status in plan-making process.  
That is not to say that the role of planning professions is passive or unimportant. This 
research argues that planners recognise the politicians’ intentions and attempt to articulate 
them into plans masked with professional knowledge. Polycentric spatial pattern is taught as 
rational and ideal urban form in planning education and training. It is also regarded as a 
universal principle for urban planning in China considering historical and physical 
conditions. However, the fuzziness and fluidity of the concept creates space to accommodate 
consensus or to allow the play of contested interests and policy experiments. It can be seen, 
therefore, the discourses of polycentricity, acting as ‘policy glue’, are an articulation of 
multi-scalar power in China, rather than a process of systematic, technical analysis.  
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Moreover, planners employ theories and classical concepts like ‘agglomeration economies’, 
‘urban network’, ‘new town’ and ‘green belt’ or coin new concepts to support new spatial 
proposals or development agendas, as shown in the discourse analysis of city master plans 
and the evidence in embedded cases. These concepts explicitly or implicitly refer to a 
polycentric spatial patter based on the evidence from literature. The involvement of various 
stakeholders and their interests are thereby disguised and justified by planning profession. 
Also, planners have their own professional ethics and habits when providing consulting 
service to governments. Although planners need to compromise with political power because 
of domination of state power, they also attempt to make the final plan more scientific and 
pragmatic. More specifically, planners provide rational schemes for polycentricity, suggest 
site selection of new projects and allocate land use quota and public infrastructure to enhance 
centrality, as shown throughout the research. Their technical knowledge can reformulate the 
constituent elements of polycentricity as well as generate significant influences on concrete 
implementation of polycentric policy.  
Polycentric system in Tianjin  
Based on analysis of planning documents in four versions of the Tianjin City Master Plan, it 
is clear that the polycentric system in Tianjin is becoming more significant and complex. 
Drawing on these master plans, a polycentric system consisting of multiple centres of various 
size and types and at a variety of scales is identified in Tianjin in chapter 6. Current 
polycentric system form through extension and adjustment of the old ones.  
It is evident that the planning rationality, evolution process and spatial outcome of 
constituent centres in this system is heterogeneous because of the differences in their history, 
positioning, development status as well as the key actors involved in its formation. The 
development status and development potentials vary from interviewees’ perception. At a 
rough scale, traditional city centre, Binhai New Area Core and Wuqing Sub-city are regarded 
as centres in Tianjin’s urban system. Key nodes such as two sub-centres in Central District, 
Airport City and Eco-city are expected to become new centres in future.  
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9.2.2 From vision to implementation: production of new centres  
This research further aims to examine how the polycentric development policy is 
implemented in practice in China’s transitional context. As a result of discussion in chapter 
6, centres are fundamental components in the polycentric policy framework in China and 
they are characterised by different planning rationality, evolution process and spatial 
outcome. Based on this view, chapter 7 and 8 selects specific centres in Binhai New Area 
Core Zone, Wuqing District and Dongli District outside the traditional central area as 
embedded cases to answer this question by investigating the political process, planning 
rationalities, approaches to improve centrality and changes in space in specific centres. The 
empirical findings from local perspective make it clear how centres in Tianjin’s polycentric 
system are created or formed by involving a variegated multi-level polity and what are the 
strategies, initiatives and actions that these actors adopt to build and consolidate new 
centrality to better deliver the polycentric planning vision. Correspondingly, it is shown that 
these centres have experienced distinct development trajectories and shown different spatial 
outcomes from the perspectives of urban form, functional composition, and spatial identity.  
Chapter 7 employed the infamous Yujiapu CBD in Tianjin Binhai New Area as the first 
embedded case. Yujiapu CBD was built from the ground-up and shows particularities in its 
grand scale, political importance, and extraordinary failure. It was designed to become the 
new centre of TBNA Core. Yujiapu CBD project is a state-led flagship project in Tianjin 
with a combination of multi-level governments’ efforts for multiple purposes and its 
development was heavily influenced by the central state. Yujiapu CBD received direct 
support of central state in terms of very generous funding and a whole catalogue of 
preferential policies. Tianjin Municipal Government and TBNA Government also had great 
intentions to promote its development to stimulate economic growth.  
In chapter 8, the attention was transferred beyond ‘twin cities’ of Tianjin to the intermediate 
places, Dongli and Wuqing. These two districts are traditional suburban and peripheral 
locations of Tianjin, but they have become the new focus of development very recently. The 
formation and development of new centres in these two districts are largely led by Tianjin 
Municipal Government and local district governments. The case of Dongli shows the 
complex relationships between Tianjin Municipal Government, TBNA Government and 
Dongli District Government while the Wuqing case reflects the intergovernmental 
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relationships between the governments of Wuqing, Tongzhou and Langfang, which is 
affected by the central state’s new regional integration plan as well as the contested interests 
of Beijing and Tianjin Municipal Government. These two urban districts were analysed and 
contrasted. The results reveal the similarities and differences in development approach of 
centres in-between. 
Instruments for construction of new centres 
From the detailed cases analysed in chapters 7 and 8, the tools or instruments the states at 
different levels often used to consolidate new centrality and facilitate polycentric 
development can be categorised in six ways.  
(1) Planning and urban design are applied to improve the image of places, to guide the 
concrete construction or to implement stricter control. For instance, Yujiapu CBD held an 
international design competition to promote Yujiapu as a globalised and modern CBD. 
Meanwhile, the TOD principle was widely applied in Yujiapu and Wuqing, and a new green 
belt plan was made in Dongli.  
(2) Financial and development corporations are established to be responsible for the 
investment and construction of new centres. They are affiliated to and controlled by 
governments and play important role in the governance and development of concrete 
projects. Development corporations could raise money from financial market to develop new 
land, build public infrastructure, etc.  
(3) The majority of new centres are policy enclaves which have clear boundaries for the 
implementation of exclusive preferential policies. Preferential policy can attract firms and 
migrants to these designated centres.  
(4) Land was used as the collateral to finance new development and the tool to stimulate 
economic growth in two respects: new development urban land and the appropriation of rural 
collective land.  
(5) Public sector functions and social infrastructure controlled by governments are primarily 
allocated to new centres to improve their vitality, liveability, and connectivity.  
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(6) Institutional innovations are carried out for a better delivery of new policies and new 
projects. This is most evident in the newly planned edge city, Jing-Jin Industrial City. 
Traditional governance mode based on development within city boundaries is being 
supplanted by a new multi-level polity to facilitate cross-boundary cooperation. A 
demonstration area is planned to be built on a physically adjacent area to facilitate the 
cooperation between them by reducing administrative barriers.  
Heterogenous urban space in polycentric system 
Tianjin has shown an ambitious polycentric vision in its plans, which comprise different 
types of centres such as historical urban settlements, newly planned functional clusters, 
agglomeration of public services and economic activities. The analysis in chapter 7 and 8 
proves that Tianjin indeed developed towards a polycentric city. However, it can be found 
that gaps and contradictions exist between the spatial visions and actual development. 
Chapter 7 and 8 investigate the spatial changes of newly designed and emerging centres and 
the results shows that their urban landscapes and development status have shown distinct 
feature, which can be summarized from the perspectives of morphology, function, and 
perception. 
Physically, centres such as Yujiapu CBD and Wuqing New Town are significantly 
intensified and their layout is characterised by mixed land use and compact pattern, 
juxtaposing industrial zones, modern civic amenities, high-rise housing and office buildings 
and public mass transit. The former rural and county landscapes have been substituted or 
supplemented by new urbanity in the peripheral area. Some other places, supposed to be new 
centres, are well protected from any development, as shown in the case of Liulin Subcentre 
in chapter 8. New centres such as Jing-Jin Industrial City which are planned very recently 
are still in the conceptual stage, and there is no substantial construction because of huge 
uncertainty in the context of political and planning system reform.  
Functionally, the existing centres and newly planned centres are all well connected with 
major centres in Tianjin and wider region via motorways, high speed railways and subways. 
Better transportation links have been planned or under construction to further improve their 
physical linkages. However, the functional linkage between centres are relatively weak 
except that they are all closely tied with central District of Tianjin. Major development nodes 
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are expected to development into comprehensive functional centres and previous separated 
industrial zones are also encouraged to integrate with nearby urban settlements. Therefore, 
each centre has become much more independent and hence competition between them has 
also increased. In term of functional composition, the secondary sector is still the pillar of 
suburban and exurban centres as shown in Wuqing and Dongli, although high-tech industries, 
new economies and modern services are emerging in these places. Functional positioning of 
centres in Dongli and Wuqing were also adjusted recently to response to new conditions, 
accompanying by power reshuffles.  
Perceptually, Tianjin was recognised as a polycentric city (region) by majority of 
interviewees because of the existence the TBNA and the new development of CBD, sub-
centres and new towns. However, the image and identity of the centres in the polycentric 
system varies due to the differences in urban forms, functional composition, and political 
and policy importance. Only few centres were identified as genuine centres or potential 
centres by the informants. There exists evident gap between the planning and the lived 
experience. This contrast is even more significant in Yujiapu CBD case. Although, an 
agglomeration of modern buildings has been constructed and political supports from 
multiple tiers of government have been given, Yujiapu CBD is still regarded as an infamous 
‘ghost city’ and a failed government project. Moreover, the identity of CBD was not stable 
and easily affected by the political changes. With the CBD policy now withdrawn due to 
political changes, Yujiapu CBD is gradual disappearing from policy documents and public 
awareness. In the area beyond the Central District and the TBNA Core, places such as 
Wuqing sub-city were identified as emerging centres. From the empirical case in Wuqing 
Sub-city, it shows that the factors such as history, economic size, geographical location, 
industrial base, and well-established networks are still more important in shaping the identity 
of being new centres.  
9.3 Contributions  
9.3.1 Contributions to the debate on polycentricity 
This thesis enriches the current debate on polycentricity significantly. In general, this 
dissertation, using Tianjin as an in-depth case study, explores the construction and 
reconstruction of polycentric discourse in plan making and reconfiguration of governance 
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and urban landscapes in specific localities during policy delivery through a processual 
analysis. As the polycentric transition is embedded within a wider urban transformation and 
evolution of planning system in China in past five decades, this research is an important 
contribution to the understanding of the rational for and the overall pattern of Chinese 
urbanisation and urban transformation more generally. Moreover, it offers wider insight into 
how planning acts as a mechanism whereby competing views on urban development can be 
reconciled and political actions can be legitimated with the help of planning professions in 
China. In particular, a Chinese approach to polycentric development emerges based on the 
case study of Tianjin. This qualitative research helps to rebalance the literature and to 
understand the genesis of the policy narratives and practices surrounding this concept in 
China. The contributions are reflected in following aspects. 
First, this research provides a new perspective for understanding spatial restructuring in 
decision making and implementation process in China, which more fits the messy world of 
policy and captures the interaction between political, technical, social and economic factors. 
Previous research on polycentricity in China mainly focused on spatial analysis and 
performance evidence of polycentricity at both urban and regional scale and imported this 
concept simply ignoring the Chinese unique context. Majority of these studies on 
polycentricity are empirical research drawn upon the theory of polycentric model and theory 
of agglomeration economies. Recent research has begun to investigate the role of state policy 
in spatial restructuring from the state-market or state-society paradigm, which shed lights on 
spatial pattern changes at macro level or general trend (regional development, urban rural 
relations, changing urban system, land-based expansion, etc) (Lin, 1999; Wei, 2012). These 
studies offer important insights into the urban reality and the role of state, policy, and 
planning in the shaping process. Few insights have been shed on this specific topic, although 
some work has been conducted in this direction. For example, Cheng and Shaw (2017) 
provides an overview of application of polycentricity in master planning in Chinese eight 
cities. However, their analysis is conducted in a superficial way, which merely presents and 
compares the expression of urban spatial structure in planning documents. They realised the 
differences between the expressions but ignore the power and rationality configuration 
underlying these differences or adjustments. Liu and Wang (2016) recognise the political 
factors and the power of planning when they find the quantitative results are consistent with 
‘polycentric’ master plan. Huang et al. (2017:38) also argue that the urban planning is one 
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of important factors affect the transformation of urban structure in China. Nonetheless, their 
arguments lack the considerations of historical conditions and features of planning such as 
contingent rationality, infusion of conflicts and performance.  
The critical discussion about the nature and process of polycentricity at intra-urban scale 
remains very scarce in the literature. Giffinger and Suitner (2015) argue that the shift from 
the structural to processual understanding polycentric development is important. This 
dissertation, using Tianjin as a case study, brings to light the emerging and changing 
polycentric discourses in its master plans since 1978. This research examines the polycentric 
transition along with the historical process of fast urban growth and the changing 
implications of different actors including different levels of states. Different from empirical 
research on polycentricity, it adopts a social constructionist approach to reconceptualise 
polycentricity. It highlights the role of scalar politics and state interventions in the planning 
making process in China. Through a processual analysis, this research finds that China has 
a long tradition to embrace this concept and use polycentricity as an umbrella concept to 
accommodate new spatial elements and contested interests. There is a debate in Europe that 
if the concept of polycentricity is just a case of old wine in a new bottle (Luděk et al., 2009). 
The results of this research show, on the contrary, that the same concept of polycentric 
development is embedded in China but with distinct components, meanings and political 
intentions in different phases. The discourses of polycentric development in China’s plans 
are an articulation of multi-level governments’ interests and a justification by planning 
professions rather than a systematic, technical, ‘professional’ analysis.  
Secondly, this research builds up an analytical framework which identifies key elements that 
need to be considered when analysing polycentricity, either in policy or in real development 
outcomes. This framework includes three key components, planning professions, state 
power and produced space, which are framed by context, scale, approach, and process. The 
changing macro environment, societal, historical, and geographic factors, and the political 
process inherent in strategy-building will influence the policy discourse and urban spatial 
structure (Wu and Yeh, 1999; Giffinger and Suitner, 2015). This framework includes these 
elements and hence enables contextual and place-based analysis. In this way, it also provides 
space for comparative studies between China and the west. As introduced in literature review, 
polycentricity has been widely discussed in the planning and policy realm in Europe. 
Polycentricity has become a popular planning tool as the conceptual ambiguity of 
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polycentricity has enabled multiple interpretations (Shaw and Sykes, 2004; Rauhut, 2017; 
Granqvist et al., 2019). The reproduction of polycentric policy framework takes place at 
different spatial scales and involve multiple administrative levels (Richardson and Jensen, 
2000; Gloersen et al., 2007). This research is the first explication of the Chinese case. China 
bears a resemblance that has taken place in western Europe. However, the power struggles, 
claims of knowledge and planning tools embedded in the reproduction process are distinct 
from those in the western, as illustrated in empirical chapters.   
In addition, this framework deals with scales in a reflective way. On one hand, this thesis 
analyses the polycentricity at the intra-city level based on multiple geographical scopes, 
which reflects a dynamic development process of both central city and peripheral area and 
considers interactions with a lager region. On the other hand, the political scales that are tied 
to political and economic power is included into analysis, which is often reshuffling and 
interlocking with geographical scales. Therefore, applying this analytical framework can 
help to explain polycentricity explicitly in terms of its components, functions, scales and 
objectives. As Van Meeteren et al. (2016) argue, the loose definition of polycentricity that 
is just like Babel’s Tower hinders the academic debate on polycentricity. A more explicit 
explanation provides opportunities to eliminate barriers for academic communication and 
bridge a common language between policy-making and research. 
Thirdly, the analytical framework developed here can also be extended to cities and regions 
in both China and other countries, which will facilitate further international comparative 
studies at a variety of scales. The findings based on the case of Tianjin can be extended to 
other cities in China with reasonable confidence, because other cities are facing similar 
opportunities and challenges in the transition process. However, it does not deny the 
existence of variegated interpretations because of the differences in history, the size, political 
ranks, and topographic factors. Special political-economic and socio-spatial contextual 
factors in China not only provide conditions for polycentric transformation but also make 
the polycentric development a unique and new approach, which is not consistent with Europe 
or North America. These differences in major concerns, geographical scales, governance and 
driving forces can be discerned from the literature review and empirical analysis in this 
research. Because China has experienced dramatic economic growth and urbanisation in 
contrast to a less urbanised and industrial society in past decades, polycentric development 
policy is mainly achieved through continuous creation of new centres. Cities in China have 
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a much larger spatial scope than cities in Europe, and therefore, polycentric development 
policy is most often applied at intra-city scale and began to emerge at regional scale during 
recent city cluster development in China, whereas in Europe, polycentric development plays 
important roles at transnational and urban region scales.  
Polycentricity is also worth more attention within the policy and planning research in China. 
Different tiers of government and their affiliated institutes are key actors in the process of 
formation and implementation of polycentric development policy. Different from western 
counties, states in China have strong power and credibility and they invent many tools based 
on the unique state-owned land system and authoritarian political system to facilitate 
polycentricity. This research also shows the importance of planning in governing social-
spatial changes in China. Planning centrality is a salient feature of state entrepreneurialism 
in China (Wu, 2018). This research verifies this argument through the evidence of specific 
centres such as Yujiapu CBD but also further highlights that planning still maintains its 
power under the new planning ideology to implement stricter control or to facilitate regional 
cooperation based on Dongli and Wuqing cases. In sum, planning as part of the state 
apparatus is not only a platform for the operation of polycentric discourses but also an 
instrument for promoting new mega projects and hence for better delivery of polycentric 
policy.   
Finally, the heterogeneous space in polycentric Tianjin echoes with the literature on post-
suburbia or in-between spaces (Phelps, 2004; Wu and Phelps, 2008; Young and Keil, 2010). 
The emerging centres in Tianjin’s suburban and exurban area show some feature of post-
suburbia or in-betweenness, such as the increasing density, mixed land use and ambiguous 
governance. This research argues that the territories ‘in between’ and the urban fringe are 
not marginalized in China, while on the contrary these places are more dynamic and restless 
regarding polycentric development. However, the planning rationality, governance modes 
and the development outcomes for these new centres are heterogenous. Therefore, detailed 
analysis of new urban governance and development of these places also shed light on the 
urbanisation and governance in suburban and peripheral area.  
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9.3.2 Methodological reflections 
In terms of methodology, this research employs discourse analysis to investigate formation 
and institutionalisation of polycentric discourses in China’s master planning embedded in 
wider social and political changes. The discourse analysis is conducted based on official 
planning documents and is complemented by semi-structured interview. This qualitative 
analysis provided an in-depth and better understating of genesis of and plurality of policy 
narratives surrounding the topic of polycentricity.  
The discourse analysis approach adopted in this research is mainly inspired by extant 
research on environmental planning and policy, e.g. Hajer (1996), Sharp and Richardson 
(2001), Keil and Debbané (2005), based on the influences of Michel Foucault’s theoretical 
work. The theoretical foundation and differences between text-oriented discourse analysis 
and Foucauldian approach discourse analysis have been discussed in methodology chapter. 
Therefore, this section attempts to emphasise the value and usefulness of this approach based 
on the experience of this research and to argue for potential application to planning research 
in China.  
Foucault inspired discourse analysis is a very distinctive research approach compared to 
other analytical approaches, which extends the analysis to the practice and implications on 
the real world. In this research, the discourse analytical framework drawing inspiration from 
Foucault and like-minded scholars provides a cogent explanation of the formation process 
of discourse of polycentricity. Jensen (1997: 17) argues that using discourse analysis, ‘the 
agent and institutions must be considered, as well the hermeneutic practice of interpreting 
documents and actions’. The discourse analysis approach used in this research was deployed 
around the articulation of these themes including language part, power and rationality 
relation and institutionalised practices. By exploring these elements in fine detail, this 
research reveals the agents involved in the discursive practices and their struggles and 
motivations, the spatial strategies used in this process. Discourse analysis approach allows 
the richness of analysis and directs to different insight into polycentric development in China. 
The approach traces the historical roots and temporally discursive practices of polycentricity 
in the case study, which suggests the plurality of discourses of polycentricity, as shown in 
the summary of major findings discussed above. This approach also places the reproduction 
258 
 
of discourses of polycentricity in wider historical and contextualised conditions. In each 
period, there indeed exist many different wider discourses held by different agents and 
inundated with conflicts and negotiations, such as discourses of pro-growth, development 
control, regional integration, sustainable development, new urbanisation, etc. The wider 
discourses communicate with each other and construct particular discourses of polycentricity 
because of the hegemony of certain discourse or the emergence of new wider discourses. It 
is clear that, each polycentric discourse identified in city master plan in Tianjin has a clear 
storyline to make the planning outcome coherent. Hajer (1995) emphasises the importance 
of storyline, which can allow actors to draw from various discourses to give meaning to 
specific phenomenon. The Foucault inspired discourse analysis helps to identify the 
dominant storylines in different periods and hence to explain the contributing elements in 
the policy discourses. It enables to analyse how the discourses are produced and reproduced 
in the inter-discursive communication through investigating the combination of language 
uses and knowledge claims. 
Another value of this approach is that the discourse analysis also assists in providing in-
depth explanation of power and rationality configurations in the plan making process. As 
introduced in the chapter one, this research focuses on the power relations underlying the 
planning output. This part of analysis suits this starting point of this research and explains 
who are involved, whose claims are included, for what purposes and in what ways. 
Foucauldian approach argues that the articulated discourse is an expression of power and 
rationality configuration (Jensen, 1997). Coherent documents and the texts are saturated with 
power and vested interests. This was also manifested in interviews and policy documents in 
empirical analysis. Hajer (1995) claims that coherence is dependent on the institutional 
structure. The discourse analysis adopted in this research goes beyond the linguistic part and 
includes the scalar politics determined by special institutional arrangements in China. The 
approach reveals the multi-level of power relations and the individual agents contribute 
specific elements to the final dominant discourses of polycentricity. The polycentric 
discourses are regarded as the outcome of discursive and material practices operating at 
various levels of state.  
This approach goes even further to investigate the institutionalisation of new discourses. 
After identification of political and technical rationality, this research explains how the 
institutional powers shapes and are reshaped by the discursive practices. My research admits 
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the reciprocal relationship between institutionalisation practices and discursive practices and 
point out changes in concrete policy or institutional arrangement brought by new discourse. 
The following embedded cases in this thesis embrace this process and extend the discussion 
into the application of tools and spatial strategies in specific centres. 
These characteristics suggest the more applicability of this approach to China’s planning 
research in specific and the potential application to multi-level politics research in general. 
The analysis mainly focusing on linguist part is not easy to be carried out considering the 
concrete content and format of Chinese planning documents. Although few scholars have 
employed this approach to analyse environmental discourses in China, e.g. Xu (2016), there 
still lack the methodological precision. This research exemplified the concrete analysis in 
much more detail. Further work can be carried out using this discursive analytical approach 
surrounding other policy narratives in China.      
The limitation of methodology should also be noted. This approach is a social constructionist 
approach, which recognises the subjectivity of researcher in the research process. In the 
research process, the analysis is subject to the selectivity just like the selectivity in the 
discursive formation process discussed in this research. On one hand, the debates on 
polycentricity in China’s planning document is not as prominent as that in the western 
policies. The related discourses are relatively scattered spread and implicit in the documents. 
On the other hand, a great deal of information about positionings, negotiation and 
contestation of different levels of government need to be well integrated. I found it difficult 
to present so many details and make interpretations, but fortunately, the overall discourses 
and the dominant storylines are relatively clear because of significant political economic 
features of certain period. The selection process was also presented clearly in the analysis so 
that readers can follow my analysis and have their own critical understanding.   
9.4 Policy implications 
The findings of this research provide a critical and reflective thinking about polycentric 
development in China, which can inform the challenges and recommendations for policy 
and planning making.  
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First, the concern of the role of states in polycentric development has challenged 
polycentricity as a concept that can achieve economic, social, and environmental 
sustainability. Polycentricity has been regarded as a universal principle and one of few 
theoretical concepts that is suitable to be applied to spatial plans by Chinese planners. 
However, this research reveals that the discourses of polycentricity are essentially produced 
and reproduced by changing power relations and justified by planning profession. 
Polycentricity is used as an organising concept to articulate diverse interests and coordinate 
the political and technical rationalities. Therefore, it is necessary to challenge if 
polycentricity should be widely used in most China’s cities without considering their specific 
social economic and political contexts. The overall benefit of polycentric development 
strategy for city and regions should be questioned and tested during implementation process. 
Indeed, Tianjin’s case shows that over ambitious polycentric development has weakened its 
competitiveness and generated issues such as unstable development schemes, too dispersed 
new development, opportunity cost for large investment, and lack of urban vitality in new 
centres. During plan-making process, both monocentric and polycentric settlement structure 
should be considered in relation to its position within the wider urban and regional context. 
For less urbanised and developed cities and regions, it may be better to pursue agglomeration 
economies first with a concentration form rather than an unrealistic polycentric pattern. 
Secondly, the empowerment of, and building partnerships with, local district governments 
are of great importance in delivering polycentric development. As shown in the empirical 
research, the polycentric development and the development of specific centres involve 
multiple governments. In China, central and municipal governments have stronger power 
than district and lower tier of governments. Selectivity and functional specialisation are 
features of polycentric development which will inevitably lead to conflicts of interests 
between them. Polycentric development should provide a positive-sum scenario instead of a 
zero-sum scenario for the city and regional development in the long run. Therefore, a 
reasonable benefit sharing system or an effective negotiation system is required. It also 
works for recent emergence of cross-boundary cooperation. The municipal government 
should pay more attention to balancing interests of lower level governments and reducing 
internal rivalry rather than just negotiating or bargaining with central state or other 
governments at the same level. Both vertical and horizontal cooperation should be reached 
to pursue polycentric spatial pattern.  
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Thirdly, there still exist risks in the Chinese approach to polycentric development. As 
illustrated in previous chapters, the risks are contained in two aspects. On one hand, the high 
growth rate seems difficult to be sustained since China has entered a ‘New Normal’ era. 
Tianjin, as well as some other cities have become exposed to problems such as a shrinking 
population and a slower economic growth. From the evolution of planning discourse and 
spatial pattern, many new centres are entirely newly planned, and their development heavily 
depends on an influx of population and capital investment. The creation of polycentricity 
may be becoming unsustainable and the maintenance of current polycentric pattern will 
become the priority in future. On the other hand, power domination in the polycentric 
development tends to lead to policy instability. Individual centres are often created and 
promoted by one generation of municipal leaders and their associated representatives in the 
central government aiming to achieve capital investment and economic growth in the short-
term. A change of leadership at both the central and local government level can quickly shift 
the development focus away from half-finished centres and on to the next generation of 
leaders’ new pet projects. Inaccurate projections for future developments and unrealistic 
aspirations of leading politicians result in lower efficiency of investment. An implementation 
framework involving evaluation, monitoring, and feedback in the long run is necessary to 
maintain the continuity and feasibility of polycentric planning. 
Finally, the identity of polycentricity of Tianjin can only be achieved through a reproduction 
of morphological, functional, and political identities at the same time. According to van 
Houtum and Lagendijk (2001), there are three congruent interpretative dimensions of 
identity -strategic, cultural, and functional- that are interdependent and interactive in shaping 
the polycentric urban regions. For Tianjin, the cultural differences between different places 
are not as influential as between the cities or sub-regions in Europe. Plan making and 
materialisation process in China is politically charged to a large extent. This means that the 
polycentric city in spatial vision and urban reality are shaped more by development plans 
than by popular opinion. Too much attention has been attached to morphological and 
political identities. However, morphological polycentricity formed by expansion and new 
development will not certainly cause network economies. Functional coherent development 
is vital to support polycentricity at the urban and regional scales, but it is difficult to form 
without spontaneous mobility and communication in urban network. Lack of functional 
identity is likely to lead to the failure of polycentric development strategy, which is evidently 
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manifested in Yujiapu CBD, booming new towns and variegated development zones in 
Tianjin. To reproduce the functional identity of polycentricity, functional interaction 
between constituent centres need to be enhanced. The functional positioning of these centres 
should not be identical, and their functional image should be matched with the demands of 
firms and people. It requires that polycentric development should not just serve the Chinese 
states. The decision making and implementation of polycentric strategies need to involve 
non-governmental actors such as private companies and residents. Only in this way, can the 
effectiveness and feasibility of spatial plans on polycentric development be improved. 
9.5 Future research agenda 
This thesis investigated the discourses, governance, and spatial configurations of 
polycentricity in Tianjin. More specifically, it examined the changing discourses of 
polycentricity and their underlying meaning in four versions of master plans from an overall 
perspective. Then, embedded cases were selected to illustrate the implementation process of 
polycentric policy by investigating spatial logics, governance, and spatial changes in 
concrete centres. The data were drawn from documentation collected from field and public 
sources and interviews with relevant actors.  
Progress has been made in better understanding the nature of polycentricity and Chinese 
approach to polycentric development. Through deconstructing the definition of 
polycentricity and building a new epistemology towards polycentricity, this research 
successfully bridges the political influences, professional knowledge, scales, contextuality, 
and urban reality together and the researcher’s confusions originated from personal 
education and working experience have been successfully resolved by this research. It argues 
that the production and legitimation of distinct discourses of polycentricity is an articulation 
of multi-scalar power and therefor the states play crucial roles in this process. The detailed 
cases show that the planning rationality, governance mechanism, and spatial changes in 
specific centres are heterogenous, which reflects the complexity of polycentric development 
in contemporary China.  
Based on the discussions in this research, future research agenda is built which includes new 
research questions raised during research process or further extension of research findings. 
During this research process, the political system and planning system in Tianjin and China 
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have been changing. Previous government departments responsible for different types of 
planning are gradually merged from municipal level to district level. More importantly, a 
territorial spatial plan has been under making and will substitute city master plan. The 
administrative and planning system adjustments have not completely finished when doing 
this research. In future, with the established a new system, more efforts may focus on how 
the concept of polycentricity is applied and implemented in new spatial plans at different 
scales. More research should be carried out to investigate the reshuffled power relations, 
new planning techniques and their influence on the plan making and implementation. Based 
on that the similarities and differences compared to previous planning system can be drawn.  
The empirical analysis could be further extended to other centres in Tianjin, other cities and 
even can be upscaled to regional scale in future. The analytical framework in this research 
is process-based, context-based and scale reflective. It is suitable to be applied to any spatial 
scale, at which the concept of polycentricity has been applied. This research was conducted 
at the intra-city scale. In future, the framework could be applied to more complex territories, 
such as Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region to investigate the discourses, governance, and spatial 
configurations at regional scale. City clusters and regions have become the most important 
spatial units for development and governance in China recently. Further research can shed 
lights on conflicts of interests, the formation of coalition and the negotiation process at 
regional scale through a processual and critical understanding like this research.  
More broadly, this work also offers insights to urban and planning research in China and 
will provoke more research proposals beyond the topic of polycentricity. For example, 
research will be needed on institutional and organisational problems of planning system 
along with recent reform. Based on implications on policy and plan making in this research, 
solutions can be found in the aspects of transparency of decision-making process, public 
participation, and the relative independent role of planning professions. Future research 
could be directed towards how planners can improve their roles as professions and 
consultants; how public participation can be facilitated so that the ‘differential space’ can be 
included in policy agenda; and how the decision making progress and outcomes can be more 
accurately recorded and more easily accessible. Through addressing these questions, the 
research fields and approaches of urban and planning research in China can be greatly 
enriched.  
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Appendix 1 List of Interviewees 
Categories Organisations  Code 
Tianjin 
Municipal 
Government  
Tianjin Municipal Government Policy Research Office G05TJ 
Tianjin Municipal Development and Reform Commission G27TJ 
Tianjin Transportation Commission G09TJ 
Tianjin Transportation Commission G10TJ 
Tianjin Municipal Land Resources and Housing 
Administration Bureau 
G11TJ 
Tianjin Municipal Urban-rural Development Commission G03TJ 
Tianjin Municipal Urban-rural Development Commission G07TJ 
Tianjin Municipal Urban Planning Bureau G08TJ 
Tianjin Municipal Urban Planning Bureau G12TJ 
Tianjin Municipal Urban Planning Bureau G16TJ 
Tianjin Land Consolidation Centre G20TJ 
Tianjin Binhai 
New Area 
TBNA Planning and Land Resources Administration 
Bureau  
G06BH 
Tianjin Economic-Technological Development Area G04BH 
Tianjin Economic-Technological Development Area G13BH 
Yujiapu Central Business District Administrative 
Committee 
G01BH 
Yujiapu Central Business District Administrative 
Committee 
G02BH 
Dongli District 
Dongli Planning Bureau G14DL 
Dongli Planning Bureau G15DL 
Dongli Planning and Natural Resources Bureau G23DL 
Dongli Planning and Natural Resources Bureau G24DL 
Huaming High-Tech Zone G28DL 
Wuqing 
District 
Wuqing Development and Reform Commission G29WQ 
Wuqing Planning and Natural Resources Bureau G22WQ 
Wuqing Development Area G21WQ 
Jingbin Industrial Park G18WQ 
Gaocun town G19WQ 
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Nankai District Nankai Development and Reform Commission  G17NK 
Planners  
Tianjin Academy of Urban planning and Design Binhai 
New Area Branch 
P01 
Tianjin Academy of Urban planning and Design P02 
Tianjin Academy of Urban planning and Design P03 
Tianjin Academy of Urban planning and Design P04 
China Academy of Urban Planning and Design P05 
Academics 
Tianjin University A02 
Tianjin University A03 
Tianjin University A05 
Nankai University A01 
Tianjin Normal University A04 
Firms 
managers 
Real estate companies: Country Garden F01 
Real estate companies: China Fortune Land Development F03 
Development corporations: Tianjin Capital Urbanisation 
Co., Ltd. 
F04 
Development corporations: Tianjin Expressway Group Co., 
Ltd. 
F05 
Planning consulting companies: ENVIROGENE F02 
Note: Planning and Natural Resources Bureau is newly established by the integration of Planning Bureau, 
Land Resources Bureau in the second fieldtrip due to the political and planning system reform in China.  
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Appendix 2 Guiding Questions for Semi-structured 
Interviews  
Staffs from Tianjin Municipal Government:  
1. What is your sense of definition of polycentricity and what are the main elements 
of it? when and where you first came across it? 
2. When did Tianjin propose and put forward the polycentric development model? 
Has the connotation and meaning of ‘polycentricity’ changed? What are the goals 
of spatial development strategies during different periods respectively? 
3. What are the reasons for changes of spatial development strategy? What is the 
main driving force, government or market forces? Is it the planned results by 
government or the spontaneous stage of urbanisation?  
4. At present, which areas are the centres or key nodes in the conceived polycentric 
urban form in Tianjin? What are the criteria of the selection of these centres? 
What are the conceived relationships between these centres (physical linkage, 
functional division of labour, etc.)? 
5. Under what specific historical background and policy background are these areas 
and nodes selected as the centres of Tianjin? What kind of development bases do 
they have when planning and policy recognise their central role? How are they 
mentioned in planning and policy? 
6. In development reality, what features do the current spatial structure of Tianjin 
show? To what extent can Tianjin be regarded as a polycentric city? Whether 
some new (sub)centres have emerged in reality? 
7. What measures have the government generally adopted to consolidate the 
development of these centres to achieve the polycentric spatial structure in the 
whole city-region? What influences did these measures generate? 
8. Whether your department has any incentive to achieve polycentric urbanization, 
and what impacts will it have on your department (or region)? Are there any 
conflicts of interest with other departments? What is the role and duties of your 
department or district in Tianjin’s polycentric spatial transformation？ 
9.  Whose interests are served by polycentric development- developers, enterprises, 
public services, the public? Whether the polycentricity is benefit to or detrimental 
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for the development of the city? What problems and challenges emerged during 
the spatial change in Tianjin?  
10. Will the spatial development strategy of Tianjin continue to emphasize the 
polycentricity? Which areas have more potential and will become the focus of 
future development? 
Staffs from local government 
1. What is your sense of definition of polycentricism and what are the main 
elements of it? when and where you first came across it? 
2. When did Tianjin propose and put forward the polycentric development model? 
Has the connotation and meaning of ‘polycentricity’ changed? What are the goals 
of spatial development strategies during different periods respectively? 
3. Whose interests are served by polycentric development- developers, enterprises, 
public services, the public? Whether the polycentricity is benefit to or detrimental 
for the development of the city? 
4. How has the role and function of your district evolved in the spatial development 
strategy of Tianjin? From the perspective of planning and policy, when were new 
centres formed in this area?  
5. Under what specific historical background and policy background are these areas 
and nodes selected as the centres of Tianjin? Does local government play an 
active role in the process? Why? 
6. What kind of development basis does your district have when planning and 
policy recognise their central role? How are they mentioned in planning and 
policy? What are the meanings of these concepts? 
7. Why these places are planned as or developed into a centre in Tianjin? What are 
the distinct advantages of your locality compared to other areas in Tianjin? 
8. What kinds of governance innovation and administrative apparatus has been set 
for the consolidation of centres? Do these changes facilitate the development? 
Are there any conflicts of interest with other departments at higher level? If so, 
how to coordinate? 
9. What kinds of special arrangements or policies in economic development and 
infrastructure investment has been implemented by the municipal government 
and local government for the consolidation of centres? Do these changes facilitate 
292 
 
the development? Are there any conflicts of interest with other departments at 
higher level? If so, how to coordinate? 
10. How has the demographic composition, economic structure and built 
environment of your area changed significantly? Are these changes beneficial to 
local development? Are these changes beneficial to the improvement of the 
quality of life? 
11. What are the relationships between this place and other area in Tianjin? Is the 
relationship beneficial to the development of Tianjin? 
12. What are the economic development goals and spatial layout strategy from the 
perspective of local government in near future? How does it align with the 
economic transformation and spatial strategy of Tianjin city region? 
Planners and academics:  
1. What is your sense of definition of polycentricism and what are the main 
elements of it? when and where you first came across it? 
2. What is the origin and main reason the Chinese cities have taken on polycentric 
spatial structure in recent years? What is the rationale for the polycentric urban 
structure that is considered as an ideal and sustainable urban structure? 
3. How is the polycentric development principle applied in Chinese urban planning? 
Is it a universal principle in planning? Is it influenced by western theory and 
practical experience? 
4. In terms of urban and regional planning, is there something different and unique 
about polycentric development in planning and practice in China, compared to 
the West?  
5. When did Tianjin propose and put forward the polycentric development model? 
Has the connotation and meaning of ‘polycentricity’ changed? What are the goals 
of spatial development strategies during different periods respectively? 
6. The spatial development strategy of Tianjin’s has experienced the transformation 
from monocentricity to polycentricity. What are the reasons for that? What is the 
main driving force, government or market forces? Is it the planned results by 
government or the spontaneous stage of urbanisation?  
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7. Whose interests are served by polycentric development- developers, enterprises, 
public services, the public? Whether the polycentricity is benefit to or detrimental 
for the development of the city? 
8. At present, which areas are the centres or key nodes in the conceived polycentric 
urban form in Tianjin? What are the criteria of the selection of these centres? 
What are the conceived relationships between these centres (physical linkage, 
functional division of labour, etc.)? 
9. Under what specific historical background and policy background are these areas 
and nodes selected as the centres of Tianjin? What kind of development bases do 
they have when planning and policy recognise their central role? How are they 
mentioned in planning and policy? 
10. In urban reality, what features do the current spatial structure of Tianjin show? 
To what extent can Tianjin be regarded as a polycentric city? Whether some new 
(sub)centres have emerged in reality? 
11. What role does the planning play in the formation of centres and polycentric 
transition? How can we ensure the successful implementation of the spatial 
development strategy in the planning? 
12. Whether the polycentric strategy is successfully implemented and what problems 
and challenges emerged during the implementation of planning? 
13. Does the current planning system need further improvement to achieve 
polycentric urban structure?  
14. Will the spatial development strategy of Tianjin continue to emphasize the 
polycentricity? Which areas have more potential and will become the focus of 
future development? 
Firms:  
1. Can you provide your institution’s basic information (type, establishment time, 
operating conditions, geographical distribution, etc.)? 
2. In recent years or in the next few years, what kind of development strategy will 
your organization have in Tianjin? What are the reasons for new strategy? 
3. What is the relationship between your institution and the state? What role does 
the government play in your decision-making process, such as financial 
incentives, land supply, etc.? 
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4. Have you heard of the idea of polycentricity? What is your sense of definition of 
polycentricism and what are the main elements of it? What does it mean to you?  
5. Does your organization agree that the spatial structure of Tianjin has gradually 
present a polycentric model? Do you agree that there are multiple urban centres 
in Tianjin? Why? 
6. What factors will affect your identity of polycentricity? For example, government 
propaganda, planning policy, landmark building, or economic and social 
development level? 
7. What changes have taken place in your location in recent years (transportation 
infrastructure, urban construction level, land rent price)? Why and How did these 
changes affect you? 
8. Do you think the urban spatial structure of Tianjin will affect your institution’s 
performance? What benefits or drawbacks that brings to your organisation? 
9. What is your organization's contribution to the urban spatial structure change in 
Tianjin and to the local economic and social development? 
10. Would you like Tianjin develop into a polycentric city in future? Whose interests 
are served by polycentric development of Tianjin, developers, enterprises, public 
services, the public? Whether the polycentricity is benefit to or detrimental for 
the development of the city? 
 
